SCROLL NEWS / DISCOVERY
Search headlines
Find the stories shaping the conversation.
Results for " georgetown " 126 found 🔀 AI-powered Shuffle
ChristianaCare announces new health campus planned for Georgetown
ChristianaCare is planning a new health campus in Georgetown as part of its $865 million in new investments in Delaware over three years.
Lewis' 26 help Villanova down Georgetown 80-73
WASHINGTON (AP) Acaden Lewis' 26 points helped Villanova defeat Georgetown 80-73 on Saturday.
Lewis' 22 lead Georgetown past Creighton 76-68
WASHINGTON (AP) KJ Lewis' 22 points helped Georgetown defeat Creighton 76-68 on Wednesday.
Science Politics communicates science, tech and policy to a broad audience | School of Foreign Service
Science Politics, a new STIA publication, blends academic rigor with journalistic storytelling to reach scholars, policymakers and the general public.
Science Politics communicates science, tech and policy to a broad audience | School of Foreign Service
Science Politics, a new STIA publication, blends academic rigor with journalistic storytelling to reach scholars, policymakers and the general public.
Full-length Replay: Big East Men's: DePaul at Georgetown
From Capital One Arena in Washington, D.C.
Women's College Hoops Spotlight: Georgetown Coach Praises 'Best' UConn Team
FOX Sports' Laken Litman breaks down Georgetown coach Darnell Haney's eyebrow-raising comments after UConn throttled his team.
Investment and Statecraft: The International Politics of Sovereign Wealth Funds - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
In 1953, Kuwait established the world’s first sovereign wealth fund to invest the country’s oil revenues and generate returns that would reduce its reliance on a single resource. Since then, over 100 separate funds have been created to preserve national wealth and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. Today, they manage over $10 trillion in global assets. In this discussion with GJIA, political economist Kathryn Lavelle explains the increasingly novel dynamics that surround fund behavior and what the world can come to expect from their growing presence in international financial markets. GJIA: When it comes to the roles sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) play in global markets and politics, what would you say makes them unique? Kathryn Lavelle: Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) operate on behalf of governments as investors. That in itself is a strange relationship. Within them, a core contest takes place between the state’s interests (or sovereign) part of the dynamic, and the money interests (or wealth) part of it, and these two aspects are frequently in contradiction, serving fundamentally different goals. SWFs are also quite fascinating because when you talk to the people who manage these funds, they have an interest in convincing you that the decisions are made almost exclusively on a financial basis—they really will go to great lengths to differentiate their government owners and those who make the management decisions. At the same time, these people ultimately answer to someone in power. Therefore, for most SWFs, it remains deeply unclear who is actually making the investment decisions and for what purposes. Of course, it is not always clear how other vehicles, such as hedge funds and private equity make the decisions they do, but I think what a lot of people find particularly disconcerting about SWFs is that they seem to act on behalf of people who have a different identity from their own. People who could be trying to manipulate politics and markets in a way that would have a long-term effect on their own populations. Regular investors come and go at will, and they only share an interest in profit as far as most of us understand. However, SWFs have that extra “sovereign” part right behind them that obscures their true interest. GJIA: These funds can be found in countries all across the globe, in both authoritarian states and democracies. Would you say SWFs differ in their goals and structures between regime-type? KL: It is not necessarily regime type that makes the goals and structures of SWFs different. It has to do with their economies. Let’s look at a country like China. There’s going to be a debate about exactly how to characterize the regime, but it is a country with many different kinds of sovereign wealth funds, and a particularly opaque state connection to each. At one time, some of the state-owned Chinese oil companies created specialized investment vehicles listed outside Chinese markets that excluded parts of the firms that were more associated with human rights violations. At the same time, the China Investment Corporation (CIC)—China’s largest SWF—draws a lot of concern, not necessarily because of its investment activities, but because of the dynamics of global politics. So, I wouldn’t really tie differences to regime types themselves in a wholesale way, but rather to how such funds are perceived and how they are structured. Saudi Arabia’s SWF is getting all kinds of attention for its involvement in Hollywood, and this takes me right back to when I was a student in the 1980s, when people were concerned about Japanese investment entities buying assets in Hollywood. They aren’t quite the same in financial terms, but it’s the same kind of concern about foreign investment that drives people to be suspicious, and the whole idea that “foreigners are influencing Hollywood.” This holds true across industries, and it reflects where politics are in places like the United States right now. One metric we can try to look at is transparency, where all the funds will tell you, “we are transparent.” The problem you’ll keep running into with this approach is how you value things. When trying to do comparative studies of equity markets, you’ll find that every country doesn’t use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles like we do in the United States. A fund may appear opaque politically and not want people to show what they’re invested in or what their intent with that investment is, but they could also just not be able to report it because of the way it was purchased, or the kinds of shares they purchased. There are some assets out there that really are difficult to put a monetary value on. GJIA: To what extent do domestic politics shape SWF behavior in both the investing “home” country and the recipient “host” country? KL: This depends on the type of fund present and also on the extent to which voters’ political views are able to influence the fund. For example, in a democratic home state like Norway, the SWF doesn’t invest in nuclear weapons or tobacco because of social concerns, but there is a continuing debate over whether it should invest in oil, even though that’s where most of the money comes from. The degree to which Norway will continue to make those investments, and whether they contradict the government’s overall climate goals, is an open question in Norwegian politics. Because of the way the fund’s governance is structured, it may not be easy to resolve. On the other hand, some people consider pension funds, like the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS) in Ohio, to be quasi-SWF. They have a very strict separation between the people who make up the management division and the fund owners. No teacher or professor would want to invest in things that may harm the future of their students. At the same time, a fund manager might see an opportunity in a diversified multinational corporation that offers a good return, despite it deriving part of its revenue from e-cigarettes. These contests are very apparent. Domestic politics can work in host countries too. A good example is Singapore’s SWF, Temasek, investing in Thailand’s telecommunications sector. If you study political economy, you already know that countries everywhere are uncomfortable with foreign ownership of their telecom sectors because a foreign entity could monitor or manipulate our communications with each other. In the case of Temasek, there was significant pushback from Thai citizens surrounding the deal, which went on to influence national political sentiment toward Singapore as a whole, underscoring the risks some SWFs may face with their investment choices. In this case, fund behavior led to the dissolution of the entire Thai government in 2006 and a subsequent coup d’état. GJIA: To address some of this unease, the Santiago Principles were established in 2009 to ostensibly promote trust and transparency. From your perspective, have these mechanisms actually changed fund behavior? KL: In international relations theory, we always like to have a clear set of norms and best practices—the orientation we want the proverbial ship to be going in. In that regard, the Santiago Principles at least got the discussion going about which direction SWFs should take at a time when people were very skittish about the growing size of these funds. Nobody wanted them to be out there and potentially destabilizing economies, so talks about disclosure, conditions for withdrawal, and the independence of managers were helpful when initiated. The biggest stumbling block was that there wasn’t exactly a good way to measure compliance with the Principles, let alone how to hold funds to them. If you read the Principles, they’re overall quite vague. In general, a fund doesn’t want to reveal how and why they make certain investment decisions because that information is proprietary—a fund makes money off of how and why it makes decisions—so how do you reconcile that with loosely-defined ideas of openness? Some decisions might have a political purpose. The bottom line is that trying to figure out and assign a score to compliance is not easy, and it is therefore the reason why the Santiago Principles never really got off the ground to the point where they could truly direct fund behavior. GJIA: Many emerging markets are looking to build their own SWFs from mineral and oil revenues. Historically, have funds shaped development trajectories in these countries? KL: I think the big story in international emerging markets investment is that the investment is increasingly no longer unidirectional. In the past multinational corporations of primarily Western background were the main form of foreign direct investment in a country. That has changed dramatically, to the point where you have companies from so-called “developing countries” taking over companies in the United States. Therefore, the landscape of international investment has changed, and I think SWFs are certainly a possibility to be the next step in the game. Historically, you didn’t need an entire financial vehicle to reinvest commodity revenues in your country, but as emerging markets get more financially sophisticated, their capacity to operate such funds has increased. SWFs would allow treasuries to move from relying on holding foreign exchange assets like cash or government bonds to having broader financial markets and targeted growth areas, while easing pressure on welfare expenditures. GJIA: With their increasing financial weight, do you see the presence of SWFs being a factor in the political choices leaders will have to make with regard to domestic and foreign policy? KL: It will depend on just how big the funds get. One of the reasons people are already apprehensive is because of their scale, and if certain SWFs in certain countries achieve a large-enough size, the presence will absolutely be cause for concern. The other factor political leaders will have to consider are their objectives. It’s not always clear how to define a SWF, or even where its activity is concentrated, but it is certainly a worry from the perspective of national security of opaque external investment. More than that, I think one of the most interesting questions going forward is whether the United States, the home to the world’s largest financial markets, will develop its own fund, for which the Trump administration announced a plan. There have also been several proposals in Congress. Were it to come into being, it would have tremendous weight. At the same time, one of the hallmarks of U.S. capitalism is a lack of government ownership of shares, so it would not be clear how such a fund would be received in domestic politics, or which direction it would take. Given how politically fragmented the country is, a Democratic administration would likely be concerned about different sectors of the economy, such as healthcare, and want investment there, rather than a Republican administration, which might prefer defense industries. No investment vehicle could thrive under conditions of such instability. Moreover, it remains unclear where the money to fund a theoretical U.S. SWF would come from. It would be a fundamentally different entity depending on whether it is financed with debt, economic surplus, commodities, or the sale of state companies, as in the case of Singapore. If it is debt, or government borrowing of some form, then the fund would have to outperform whatever the cost of that debt is, which is not an easy thing to do. I think our political leaders have enough on their plate. Our system has worked well keeping political and investment functions generally separate. We have seen different forms of business rise and fall, and even the perception of different countries, all of which funds are tied to. Unless a major SWF either starts—like in the case of the United States—or collapses—an issue that concerns the Saudis, I don’t see any political tsunamis on the horizon. . . . Kathryn Lavelle is the Ellen and Dixon Long Professor of World Affairs at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. Her research explores the exchange between domestic and international and political institutions with a particular emphasis on political economy and multilateralism. Dr. Lavelle’s first book, The Politics of Equity Finance in Emerging Markets, explored the political circumstances that surround large issues of stock in the developing world. After being granted tenure at Case Western, she was awarded an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship and named the William A. Steiger fellow, a designation given to the most promising political scientist in her class of fellows. While in Washington during 2006-2007, she worked on the staff of the House Committee on Financial Services on issues related to domestic and international monetary policy. Dr. Lavelle holds a PhD in political science from Northwestern University; an M.A. in government and foreign affairs from the University of Virginia; and a bachelor’s degree in international economics from Georgetown University. She is a permanent member of the New York Council on Foreign Relations. This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and length. Interview conducted by Sid Mehrotra. Image Credit: Jason Leung, Unsplash Content Licenses, via Unsplash
DePaul's mission: Replicating home success at Georgetown
DePaul is off to its best start in Big East play since 2015, but there's still opportunity for improvement.
How Junk Science Is Driving Reproductive Health Policy: A Live Conversation With Guttmacher Institute, Georgetown University's O'Neill Institute and Ms.
How Junk Science Is Driving Reproductive Health Policy: A Live Conversation With Guttmacher Institute, Georgetown University’s O’Neill Institute and Ms.
Georgetown County announces business closures ahead of winter weather
Georgetown County has announced closures ahead of upcoming winter weather on Sunday into Monday.
Georgetown secures 81-78 win against Providence
PROVIDENCE, R.I. (AP) KJ Lewis scored 21 of his 26 points after halftime in Georgetown's 81-78 victory over Providence on Saturday to end the Hoyas' six-game losing streak.
Trotter's Trends: Midseason riers and fallers; building the All-Bench All-Stars
An inside look at the problems the Blue Devils have solved, why Georgetown has regressed and 10 off-the-bench gamechangers
CFP takeaways: Even as a favored Goliath, Indiana's win stands alone in sports history
Put it next to the Miracle on Ice and NC State-Georgetown. In a wild title game, here's how Indiana beat Miami.
New class of strong magnets uses earth-abundant elements, avoids rare-earth metals
Georgetown University researchers have discovered a new class of strong magnets that do not rely on rare-earth or precious metals—a breakthrough that could significantly advance clean energy technologies ...
St. John's defeats Georgetown 95-83
WASHINGTON (AP) Zuby Ejiofor had 25 points, 10 rebounds and seven assists, and led five St. John’s players scoring in double figures to help the Red Storm beat Georgetown 95-83 on Wednesday night.
How This Alumna Built the Nonprofit Good Sports
Christy Keswick reflects on her journey from Georgetown to leading the national nonprofit Good Sports to expand access to youth sports.
Carroll's 22 lead Xavier past Georgetown 80-77
WASHINGTON (AP) Tre Carroll scored 22 points as Xavier beat Georgetown 80-77 on Saturday.
Protective teams Georgetown and Xavier meet in Big East clash
Two of the better teams in the nation at avoiding self-inflicted mistakes will square off Saturday night when Georgetown meets Xavier in a Big East Conference game at Washington, D.C.
Full-length Replay: Big East Men's: Georgetown at Marquette
The Hoyas (7-3) host the Golden Eagles (5-6) in the Big East opener for both schools.
Marquette eager to find range vs. Georgetown
Marquette will be looking to rediscover its shooting touch when it hosts Georgetown on Wednesday night in Milwaukee in the Big East opener for each team.
O’Neill Institute’s Center for Health and Human Rights and Ríos host High Court Justices for Second Annual Judicial Dialogues on Health and the Law in Latin America and the Caribbean
The O’Neill Institute’s Center for Health and Human Rights at Georgetown Law and Ríos Strategic Lawyering for Social Justice held the second annual Judicial Dialogues on Health and the Law in Latin America and the Caribbean event.
The New WHO Pandemic Treaty and Global Health Governance: Incorporating Common but Differentiated Responsibilities into PABS - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
On May 20, 2025, the World Health Assembly unanimously adopted the World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Agreement, an international treaty designed to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The product of three years of arduous negotiations, the treaty marks a new era of global cooperation in public health. However, core aspects of the agreement remain unresolved—notably the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) System, which is intended to ensure equitable access to pandemic-related materials and benefits. To support the successful implementation of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” should be formally incorporated into the negotiating agenda of the PABS annex. Introduction For the first time, an international treaty has enshrined the principle of “One Health,” the compelling idea that the health of animals, humans, and the environment all contribute to pandemic risks. SARS (2003), H1N1 (2009–10), Ebola (2014–16), and COVID-19 all emerged through zoonotic spillover from animal hosts—respectively, civets, hogs, and bats. Together, they underscore the need for a coordinated, cross-sectoral approach. The Pandemic Agreement responds to this call, requiring state parties to acknowledge the ecological interplay and commit to a comprehensive “One Health” strategy. Specifically, Article 5 charges governments to address “the drivers of pandemics and the emergence and re-emergence of infectious disease at the human-animal-environment interface,” including wild animal markets, deforestation, and antibiotic overuse. Yet the effectiveness of this “One Health” vision depends equally on the free flow of scientific information and data among countries and institutions. Just as environmental and animal health factors have been neglected in past global frameworks, so too has data sharing been marginalized, despite its centrality to timely detection and response. The Pandemic Agreement takes an important step by requiring governments to enhance data collection and cooperate with the World Health Organization (WHO). However, these provisions will remain aspirational without a robust Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) annex. The PABS system will determine whether countries and researchers can rapidly exchange pathogen samples and genetic data while ensuring equitable access to resulting research and development, including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. Without such mechanisms, the treaty’s promise to operationalize “One Health” and strengthen global preparedness will risk becoming largely symbolic, echoing earlier failures to translate shared principles into coordinated action. Equity Concerns When the 2025 Health Assembly adopted the Pandemic Agreement, it left the difficult question of access to pathogens and the sharing of resulting benefits to be addressed in a separate agreement. Negotiations on this separate agreement, PABS, are now underway in Geneva. Yet governments remain divided over fundamental questions of equity between the countries that primarily contribute to the system and those that primarily draw from it—and consequently benefit. For example, wildlife in countries bordering the equator is likely to produce PABS materials, but companies in Europe are likely to use them to develop lucrative products. The most likely contributor countries are likely to be those biodiverse countries around the equator, such as Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Indonesia, where the number of human-mammalian viral host interactions is large. Conversely, countries most likely to benefit from this material are those with the technology, investors, and infrastructure to capitalize on genomic data, such as the United States, EU member states, and Japan. This imbalance reflects a broader pattern seen in prior international frameworks. Now, as in the past, the wealthiest countries in the world (a useful heuristic is membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)) disproportionately benefit from systems in which pathogens and genomic sequencing data are contributed to a common source. Under the International Agreement on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the “Plant Treaty” or “Seed Treaty”) and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, companies from Europe and North America disproportionately withdraw biological samples and data for development into lucrative medical products. Their governments and companies have both statutory and contractual claims to the products that those companies correspondingly produce. PABS appears poised to follow the same pattern. The text calls for strong language on access to pathogens and associated data, but the corresponding benefits that should flow to poorer countries are couched in equivocal or non-binding language. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities To address these inequities, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” should be formally incorporated into the negotiating agenda of the PABS annex. Common but differentiated responsibilities are often a feature of climate change negotiations. The basic principle is that, even though all countries should reduce carbon emissions, governments that became rich and powerful through massive carbon emissions (e.g., France, the United Kingdom, the United States) should have a greater obligation to address the resulting crises. Applied to PABS, it would require that governments hosting and supporting companies developing lucrative products carry greater obligations toward the cost of running the PABS system; share benefits or final medical products; and transfer technology to help countries worldwide develop their own capacities to innovate and manufacture vaccines during an emergency. For example, an annex could mandate that any company based in an OECD country that withdraws PABS material would be obligated to donate the resulting diagnostics, therapeutics, or vaccines to the WHO during a public health emergency or pandemic. Questions remain about how robust those donations would be, but the principle is that they should deliver highly significant lifesaving benefits to be equitably shared. Theoretically, this approach mirrors the PIP Framework, in which companies withdrawing influenza samples are required to pay half of the operating costs. In practice, however, the framework has fallen short. The PIP Framework Secretariat has struggled to secure payments from companies, with companies often disagreeing over how much is owed. Additionally, without another pandemic influenza to test the strength of the agreement during a public health emergency, corporate compliance with sharing mechanisms remains unknown. Even if these limitations did not characterize the PIP Framework, partially paying for operating expenses does not address the inequity in access to genetic data and pathogen samples that left less developed countries last in line for COVID-19 vaccines (and, before them, H1N1). Common but differentiated responsibilities would go further, addressing governments’ legitimate grievances regarding information sharing. It would make withdrawals of PABS material and resulting products more transparent, building trust across the board. Enforcement and Enduring Success A key implication of this approach is that the governing mechanism of the PABS must have real enforcement authority. The WHO Pandemic Agreement delegates its core governance responsibilities to a Conference of the Parties (COP)—a governing body composed of one representative from each participating government, similar to those established under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The proposed WHO Pandemic Agreement COP is charged with oversight functions but ultimately possesses no real authority to compel a government to take any action it does not wish to take. The text does not give the COP the ability to, for example, sanction a party that does not comply with either textual obligations or PABS provisions. In other words, there are no effective mechanisms in place to ensure compliance. Perhaps just as significant, establishing a meaningful enforcement mechanism within the PABS system would strengthen the WHO’s credibility and its ability to ensure compliance across global health governance. By setting a precedent for accountability, such a mechanism could enhance the organization’s authority not only within the Pandemic Agreement but also in enforcing the revised International Health Regulations and other frameworks for public health emergencies. Conclusion The PABS annex can—and should—be different. It should establish clear responsibilities for funding as well as for sharing the diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines that result from contributions to the system. The system, in turn, must include a dedicated body empowered to hold governments and the corporations they sponsor accountable for their responsibilities before, during, and after pandemics. Doing so would restore trust in the broader agreement, which was eroded as commitments were repeatedly diluted while parties scrambled to meet their own self-imposed deadlines during the Pandemic Agreement negotiations. A robust PABS Annex would cement a grand social bargain. Wealthier countries and their corporations would gain unimpeded access to scientific information essential for developing and manufacturing lifesaving medical products. As such, they would stand to gain considerable economic benefit. Yet that privilege must be matched with responsibility. The grand bargain must include not only the right to innovate, but also the duty to ensure that innovation serves all. As medical products are developed and produced through collective contributions, every person must have equal access. All human beings deserve an equitable chance to survive—to save their own life, the lives of their families, and the well-being of their communities. … Sam Halabi, JD, MPhil, is the Bette Jacobs Endowed Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Health and the Director of the Center for Transformational Health Law at Georgetown Law. He serves as the co-lead for the WHO’s Working Group on Regulatory Consideration on AI and Health’s training workstream. He earned his JD from Harvard, his MPhil from Oxford, and undergraduate degrees from Kansas State University. Lawrence Gostin, LLD (Hon.), JD, BA, is University Distinguished Professor and Founding Director and Timothy and Linda O’Neill Professor of the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law. He is the author of Global Health Security: A Blueprint for the Future (Harvard University Press, 2021); Global Health Law (Harvard University Press, 2014); Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (University of California Press, 3rd ed., 2016); Public Health Law and Ethics: A Reader (University of California Press, 3rd ed., 2018); Law and the Health System (Foundation Press, 2014); Principles of Mental Health Law & Practice (Oxford University Press, 2010). He also directs the WHO Collaborating Center at Georgetown University. Image Credit: United States Mission Geneva, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons
STEM Students Blend Science and Policy in New Capitol Campus Fellowship
Ella Camp (C'26) has always loved science but wanted to pivot from a career focused solely on research. In a new Earth Commons fellowship, she found an opportunity to dig into environmental public policy.
To escape Washington politics, follow this nature path out of town
The C&O towpath takes you from Georgetown to Great Falls Park, where the Potomac River runs wild and commuters, hikers and kayakers roam
A progressive and a moderate scored upsets over incumbent Republican mayors. Their strategies were the same.
A progressive’s win in Lyman and a moderate’s win in Georgetown offered S.C. Democrats a glimmer of hope amid fears the party lost its competitive edge.