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RUPPs: Inside India's little-known political parties that recieve millions of dollars
Little-known political parties are receiving millions in donations despite limited electoral activity.
Meta denies accusation of anti-Lula political bias in Brazil after electoral court ruling
Tech giant Meta has denied accusations it has acted with political bias during Brazil’s presidential campaign.
Workers Can Govern, but They Need Power First
A new book makes the most rigorous case yet for why so few working-class people hold office. But by treating the lack of workers in office as a law of electoral democracy, its authors underrate how mu...
Kansas' third-party secretary of state candidate eager to inspire electoral evolution
Scott Morgan, a convert to third-party politics in Kansas, embraces his secretary of state nomination by United Kansas Party as an opportunity for change.
Latino voters, souring on Trump, swing toward Democrats, new poll finds
The growing electorate played a critical role in Trump’s 2024 victory. Now, sentiment is dipping, particularly on economic issues, a new NBC/Telemundo poll finds.
Sherrod Brown bets again on working-class voters
Brown spent his whole career building a pro-worker brand. He's betting that same message—delivered to a more anxious electorate—will fuel a comeback after losing his 2024 reelection bid.
Supreme Court again blocks new Missouri congressional map favoring GOP
The ruling is the latest twist in an intense legal drama that has plunged the state into electoral confusion.
American Slaveholders Lost Their Wealth but Kept Their Political Power
In new research, Luna Bellani, Anselm Hager, and Stephan Maurer examine how the abolition of slavery after the American Civil War affected the political influence of former slaveholders. Despite the blow to their economic standing, former slaveholders maintained their electoral success, and once in office, their influence actually grew.
What American Jews want from the midterms
Though a small electorate, Jewish voters are being pushed to the center of political debates this midterm cycle.
Trump, politics and lawfare take center stage in Arizona's attorney general race
Four years ago, Democratic Attorney General Kris Mayes won the office by less than 300 votes. Now, she’s hoping her track record taking on President Trump, fake electors and predatory businesses will earn her a second term in office.
India’s regional politics continue to evade central capture
India's 2026 state elections contradict the story of the BJP building a national political order, with electoral results shaped by distinct regional identities and traditions
Public financing of California's electoral campaigns could curb power of money in politics
California's political system makes it difficult to get elected without personal wealth or wealthy donors, a psychology professor argues.
Maha split shows all is not well with Kennedy’s US health revolution
Republicans worry Make America Healthy Again is an electoral liability while activists claim it has abandoned its values
Twins 4, Guardians 3: Coming Out Party
That the article editor’s thumbnail selector offered two dozen images of a beaming Emmanuel Rodriguez, smiling as he jogged around the basepaths with his fist in the air, should tell you everything you need to know about the top prospect’s first major-league at-bat. A 2-1 fastball was swiftly deposited 420 into left-center field, tying the […]
Hong’s Defeat in Wisconsin Sparks New Disagreements Within Democratic Party
Some Democrats said the outcome showed that the moderate wing of the party carried more electoral weight, while Ms. Hong’s strong showing gave some progressives hope.
The Cost of Cutting American Science: How Federal Cuts Diminish Public Health Capacity
Among the federal government’s many responsibilities is the work it does to protect public health. Federal agencies monitor our food supply to ensure safety, conduct research to better understand emerging health threats, provide funding for public health programs in communities and work to detect and respond to disease outbreaks. Americans rely on these efforts every day—in a 2024 online survey, 74% of respondents said that “if the federal government issued safety guidance about food you eat regularly,” they would follow it. Changes to Federal Public Health Capacity The Trump administration’s efforts to reshape the federal government have resulted in significant impacts on our nation’s public health capacity over the past 20 months, affecting the response to health concerns such as measles, Ebola and cyclosporiasis. Agencies with core public health, food safety and disease prevention responsibilities experienced large workforce decreases during the first year of the administration. At the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for instance, the workforce in February 2026 was 26.7% smaller than in September 2024 before the start of the Trump administration. The Food and Drug Administration saw a similarly steep decline of 21.6%. Agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and Food Safety and Inspection Service also experienced large workforce decreases. (function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})(); Changes can also be seen in crucial public health occupations. The number of federal food inspectors, for example, decreased by more than half between September 2024 and February 2026, going from 1,035 to 473. This is the lowest number of food inspectors employed by the federal government since at least 2005. By February 2026, there were also 33.3% fewer federal public health program specialists, whose work includes advising federal funding recipients on public health activities and analyzing the effectiveness of public health programs. Government’s capacity is diminished as employees with specialized knowledge and experience in protecting the public and responding to health risks depart, leaving agencies less prepared to carry out their public health missions. There also have been vacancies in critical high-level leadership positions at public health agencies, most notably at the CDC, which had a permanent Senate-confirmed director for less than a month between January 2025 and early August 2026. Although the CDC has previously been led by acting directors at the start of an administration, the nearly yearlong gap since the departure of the administration’s first permanent director in August 2025 is without precedent. As of August 2026, the FDA is also currently without a Senate-confirmed commissioner following the previous commissioner’s resignation in May 2026. Additionally, public health agencies are experiencing increased politicization of their leadership ranks. In agencies such as the CDC and Food Safety and Inspection Service, the number of individuals in the Senior Executive Service—the most senior career leaders in government—has declined significantly, while at the same time the number of political appointees has reached record levels. (function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})(); (function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})(); At the CDC, for example, the number of career SES decreased 42.9% between December 2024 and February 2026, while the number of non-Senate confirmed political appointees at the agency was six times larger than the agency’s historical average from 2009 and 2024. Knowledgeable career leaders are integral to the ability of public health agencies to carry out their work with scientific integrity and professional judgment, and rapid leadership turnover and increased politicization threaten agencies’ ability to make evidence-based decisions to protect our health. The upheaval and politicization in public health agencies have also negatively affected employee engagement. Strong employee engagement is crucial to the ability of agencies to carry out their mission and successfully provide essential services to the public. In the 2025 Public Service Viewpoint Survey conducted by the Partnership for Public Service, the Department of Health and Human Services—which encompasses major public health agencies such as the CDC and FDA—had an employee engagement and satisfaction score of 20.4 out of 100, one of the lowest among large agencies. Only 2.8% of HHS employees indicated trust in their political leaders and only 8.7% reported confidence that they could report a suspected violation of law or regulation without retaliation. Employees at HHS also reported that the agency’s ability to provide services to the public had suffered. Nearly half of employees at HHS, 47.5%, said their work unit was worse at delivering quality services compared to its performance in 2024. In addition, 57.8% said their work unit was performing worse at fulfilling stakeholder needs. In addition to the work done within federal agencies, the federal government also distributes significant funding for public health and disease prevention work to state and local governments, nonprofits and small businesses—funding which has been significantly disrupted. At the CDC, for example, there was a 71.9% decrease in the amount of project grant funding issued in fiscal year 2025 compared to fiscal year 2024. The FDA also issued far less funding in fiscal year 2025—a 21.3% decrease from its fiscal year 2024 funding. Changes in federal funding include the ending of grants to community organizations that worked on HIV prevention and the cancellation of funding for research into improvements to patient safety and healthcare quality. These changes go beyond federal agencies to impact the broader public health ecosystem, including the state and local health departments responsible for much of the on-the-ground public health work in their communities. About 80% of the CDC’s domestic funding is directed towards state and local partners—meaning that cuts to CDC funding can ultimately result in cuts to state and local public health capacity. Federal agencies also provide expertise and assistance to state and local health agencies as they deal with particular health challenges, but workforce cuts have resulted in fewer federal employees available to help. The Impact of Changes to Public Health Capacity These changes to federal public health capacity are not abstract concerns. Disrupted programs, reduced funding and lost expertise at public health agencies across all levels of government threaten the public’s physical well-being and safety. In some cases, this has already led to harm. The most immediate impacts of federal cuts were seen in interruptions to ongoing public health programs and crisis responses. In one instance, when CDC grants were canceled during the 2025 Texas measles outbreak—the most severe measles outbreak in 25 years—public health officials in Lubbock, Texas were forced to pause parts of their measles response work supported by the frozen funding. Lubbock’s director of public health further said that a lack of available CDC experts to reach out to for advice “definitely” impacted the department’s response to the measles crisis. Cuts to federal funding also forced Dallas County Health and Human Services to cut staff and cancel 50 community vaccination clinics during the outbreak. Public health work outside of major outbreak responses was also disrupted. For example, in April 2025, the Milwaukee Public Health Department was unexpectedly unable to reach experts on lead poisoning due to firings at the CDC when responding to concerns about lead contamination in Milwaukee public schools. Due to federal workforce cuts, several programs at the CDC, including Alzheimer’s and epilepsy programs, have also become trapped in limbo—existing on paper, but without the staff necessary to operate. More recent crises reveal how federal cuts have weakened the public health infrastructure needed to prevent and respond to dangerous new outbreaks. Internationally, cuts at the U.S. Agency for International Development eliminated funding for disease testing and contact tracing abroad, which delayed detection of and responses to the 2026 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While international outbreaks may seem far removed, the unchecked spread of disease in any country can quickly pose a danger to economic well-being, security and health around the world. Within the United States, public health cuts inhibited responses to the summer 2026 outbreak of the food-borne parasite cyclospora. At the federal level, cuts to funding for lab equipment and for CDC staff with expertise in parasitic infections—including 9 out of 11 staff members at the lab responsible for identifying parasitic outbreaks in 2025— contributed to the largest reporting delay in outbreak cases at the CDC in 15 years. Conflicting communications from the FDA about the source of the outbreak, which followed cuts to the agency’s communications department, additionally led to confusion among the public about how to best avoid infection. At the same time, cuts to HHS funding and support for local and state public health slowed some health departments’ responses to the crisis. The exact costs of these delays, constraints and confusion in public health responses are difficult to estimate. However, their message is clear: federal cuts have already made containing threats to public health even more of a challenge. Conclusion Protecting public health—from food safety to disease prevention—is one of the federal government’s most important missions. Dramatic and haphazard cuts to federal agencies and funding have already disrupted the public health system, impacting the response to challenges such as measles, lead poisoning and cyclosporiasis. The U.S. public health system needed improvement before these disruptions. Since 2022, federal leadership and coordination in response to public health outbreaks has been on the Government Accountability Office’s High-Risk List of areas in need of attention to improve government effectiveness and efficiency. Recent cuts only compound these concerns. The chaotic dismantling of government and resulting disruptions to crucial functions like public health and disease prevention highlight the need for meaningful reform and concrete policy proposals to reimagine how government can better serve the public and be more effective, responsive and accountable. To learn more about the impact of federal cuts to public health and science more broadly, visit The Cost of Cutting American Science. Learn more For more information on the Partnership for Public Service’s government reform initiative, visit Government for a New Era. View here In line with The Cost of Cutting American Science, federal workforce data in this brief is as of February 2026
5 things to know about Bryan Ávila, Byron Donalds' running mate
The South Florida Republican has paired an unblemished electoral record with a prolific legislative résumé.
S.C. Succession: History-Making Debate Could Reshape Palmetto State's Evolving Politics
Three female candidates take the stage in South Carolina amid shifting electoral sands...
Kamala Harris backs major changes to the Supreme Court, Electoral College ahead of possible 2028 campaign
Former Vice President Kamala Harris endorsed Supreme Court expansion and abolishing the Electoral College at the National Urban League Conference while weighing a 2028 run.
In Britain, a comedy candidate plays political spoiler
The U.K. electoral system has long featured parody also-rans. But now, Britain’s foremost far-right leader could find himself upended by a man wearing a bin.
Brazil: Lessons from a Disaster
By Antonio Martins (Outras Palavras) Defeats become deeper and more prolonged when we misunderstand what caused them, avoid correcting course, and embrace “solutions” that only compound our mistakes. Lula’s government and the Brazilian left suffered a disaster in Sunday’s election. Contrary to every poll, the president finished the first round 2.2 million votes behind Flávio Bolsonaro—and, more significantly, 3.4 million votes below his total four years ago, when the machinery of the state was working against him and in favor of his opponent. His vote share declined in 98 percent of Brazil’s municipalities. The PL, the main party of the far right, elected 121 deputies and 28 senators, becoming the largest caucus in both houses of Congress. The parties aligned with the Centrão—Brazil’s bloc of transactional center-right parties—were somewhat diminished, but will still hold roughly 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 in the Senate. That will make it easier to assemble the majorities needed to amend the Constitution or impeach Supreme Federal Court justices. If elected, Flávio Bolsonaro could appoint four members of the Court, substantially altering its internal balance of power. What produced these results? How can the far right be prevented from consolidating them into a prolonged political hegemony? And what is the essential change of direction the left now needs? Explaining the Disaster Across the commercial media and the exuberant chaos of digital platforms, interpretations are multiplying. Some focus on specific episodes: Lula’s absence from the Globo debate, his very close relationship with Alexandre de Moraes, or his emphasis on issues supposedly remote from most people’s everyday concerns, such as rare earth minerals. Among the more systemic interpretations, three seem especially questionable. One argues that the principal defeat was not the left’s, since its congressional representation declined only slightly. The decisive movement captured at the ballot box, according to this view, was a shift within the right itself—from the more moderate and transactional forces of the Centrão toward the more ideological and radicalized forces of the PL and Novo. A second interpretation holds that the nature of electoral and political processes has changed. The material interests and aspirations of society, it argues, no longer play the central role they once did; they have given way to forms of subjective self-identification that the left has yet to understand. And a third concludes that, because of these two developments, we should expect a political winter: a prolonged period in which the far right and the broader right dominate Brazilian political life. There are important elements in all three interpretations. The problem lies in what they deny or leave out: Lula’s third government was a small-bore government. It offered the majorities that elected it neither a clearly better life nor reasons to believe again in politics and its power to transform society. These failures flowed from two fatal accommodations, which I will examine below. As a result, the government suffered a slow but steady erosion of support. And, as has happened in so many Western countries, it gave the far right the opportunity to present itself as anti-system and to benefit from popular frustration and distress. The interpretation that emphasizes the migration of votes from the center-right and traditional right toward the far right has been advanced, among others, by the courageous journalist Leonardo Sakamoto. In his UOL column on Monday, October 5, he highlights the miserable behavior of the traditional conservative parties. Over the past four years, they repeatedly joined forces with the “neo”-fascists, helping to “normalize” them—a criticism that could equally be directed at almost the entire corporate media. Believing they could use the far right as a stepping stone, they instead ended up partly devoured by it. This was especially true in the Senate, where the PL’s gain of 13 senators and Novo’s gain of two came at the expense of the PSD, which lost nine; the MDB, which lost two; the PSDB, which lost two; and the PP, which lost one. Sakamoto’s observation is accurate and necessary, but it leaves uncomfortable questions unanswered. Why did the erosion of the Centrão benefit the far right rather than, for example, producing growth for the left—as has happened so many times before, both in Brazil and elsewhere? The answer is not difficult. Throughout its four years in office, Lula’s third government was almost invariably associated with the Centrão. Here lies its first accommodation: accepting the limits imposed by conservative institutions; avoiding, as much as possible, any attempt to strain those limits through popular pressure; and believing only in the modest changes that could be squeezed through openings in Congress. The failure of the campaign to end the six-day workweek is emblematic. Lula could have electrified the presidential race by pairing it with a popular campaign for passage of the measure. Instead, he chose to place his hopes in the hands of Senate president Rodrigo Alcolumbre. He generated no mass mobilization, did not force his opponents onto an uncomfortable defensive, and won no victory. In September 2025, the government squandered the greatest of its many opportunities to shake up conservative power in Congress. Popular opposition to the so-called Shielding Amendment—which, if approved, would have restricted criminal proceedings against members of Congress—brought crowds into the streets, mobilized primarily by artists and social movements. This opened the possibility for a broader political education: a campaign that could begin exposing the limits and dysfunctions of Brazil’s political system while putting Bolsonaro’s movement on the defensive for its predictable support of political privilege. The amendment was defeated. But the executive branch then backed away from the fight. It remained associated with an institutional world widely seen as corrupt, elitist, and indifferent to ordinary people’s struggles. In doing so, it forfeited its credibility as a vehicle for the protest vote. On Sunday, it reaped the bitter fruits. Are We Doomed? Taking a different approach from Sakamoto, the philosopher Moysés Pinto Neto and other writers have drawn attention, in their first analyses of October 4, to the fragmentation of the public sphere produced by Big Tech platforms. Through their algorithms, these platforms present each person with a different view of social reality. As a consequence, it becomes much harder to identify common material problems and demands—for example, the fight for labor rights or for a properly funded public health system. Voters no longer embrace such demands, these authors argue, because they no longer see themselves as part of a collective. Instead, they tend to value the identities assigned to them by neoliberal subjectivity—the role of the entrepreneur, for example. On this interpretation, the left’s possible error lies in clinging to outdated illusions. Moysés’s warning is highly relevant and resonates with arguments such as Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor’s “Apocalyptic Fascism and the Billionaires’ Bet.” Unlike a century ago, the far right no longer promises a radiant future. It concentrates instead on resentment—especially that of young men. “They belong to a generation that fears it may never own a home, but compensates with the pleasure it gets from constantly provoking progressives online. Convinced their future has been stolen, they share memes romanticizing historical authoritarian regimes,” the authors write. But Moysés seems to confuse this danger with inevitability. He fails to see that the left’s answer cannot be adaptation. On the contrary, it must strengthen the possibility of politics as collective action. Nor does he recognize that precisely such a reversal is already becoming possible in some of the most promising mobilizations of the twenty-first century: the election, at the end of 2025, of the young Muslim Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York, on a platform centered on the intensely material fight for an affordable city; the Left Party’s victory in Berlin two weeks ago, built around the demand to expropriate private real-estate corporations; and the very recent wave of demonstrations in Spain—including an occupation of Madrid’s Puerta del Sol—in which tens of thousands of young people mobilized by the Tenants’ Union have demanded limits on rents. By putting itself in the straitjacket of the “fiscal framework” in the first months of 2022, Lula’s third government adopted the second fatal accommodation of its term. Faced with conservative institutions and a country devastated by four years of Bolsonaro, increased public investment was the government’s remaining weapon for offering a more dignified life to the majority and forging an anti-conservative pact with them. The same state that disburses 1 trillion reais a year to enrich a small class of rentiers could instead spend money to extend the Family Health Strategy to every Brazilian, at a cost of 30 billion reais; provide full-day public schooling and childcare to all adolescents and children—and, especially, relief to their mothers; achieve universal sanitation while cleaning up polluted urban rivers; multiply metro systems; begin transforming the urban peripheries; and undertake many other urgently needed projects. In April 2023, an article in Outras Palavras warned that the fiscal framework could “shrink the Lula government and preserve the forces that condemn the country to inequality and regression.” A year later, another article showed that restraints on public spending were strangling policies vital to ordinary people and undermining the president’s popularity. In November 2024 came a reality check, in the form of the government’s humiliating defeat in the municipal elections. Even then, the fiscal lock was neither removed nor loosened. On the contrary: throughout the government’s four years, fiscal restraint remained central to its political narrative. The administration proudly proclaimed that it had “put the state’s accounts in order,” without grasping either how misleading that phrase was—given the payment of 1 trillion reais in interest—or how badly the message was hurting it politically. Lula finally woke up in September 2026. The increase in Bolsa Família benefits, after four years of being frozen; the announcement that anti-obesity drugs would be offered through Brazil’s public health system; and the ban on online betting showed that the state has the power to act decisively on behalf of the majority when those in government are willing to confront obstacles. The huge marches that closed the campaign in Fortaleza, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo on the eve of October 4 showed how such initiatives can mobilize activists and the broader public. But it was too late—and too little to change the outcome of the first round. History has not ended The possibility of a turnaround in the three weeks leading up to November 25 cannot be ruled out. It will not be simple or easy. Lula must not only make up a deficit of 2.2 million votes; he must also offset the movement of voters who backed other right-wing candidates in the first round, most of whom are likely to move toward Flávio Bolsonaro. Pulling that off will require a broad, grassroots effort to win over voters, potentially reinforced by new initiatives from Lula. The coming hours and days will be decisive. If Bolsonaro’s movement also wins the presidency, the result will create a high-risk situation for Brazilian sovereignty and democracy. The enormous challenges posed by such an outcome would require the left to reexamine, in depth and with a genuine willingness to engage in self-criticism, its political projects—or its lack of them—and its practices. But would that mean we are condemned to the long winter of far-right hegemony that some analyses are beginning to forecast? It is far too early to say, suggests a recent text by Álvaro García Linera, the thinker who served as vice president of Bolivia under Evo Morales. His central hypothesis is that this political current will prove short-lived. At a moment when the entire world is once again talking about sovereignty and protecting national economies, the far right offers a stale, recolonizing neoliberalism. Its submission to the United States is as blatant and pathetic as Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro’s overtures to Donald Trump. Its project amounts to something like every man for himself: greater inequality, capitalism without limits, devastation, and supremacism. Will it work? In the United States, just two years into his second term, Trump himself is reaching record levels of unpopularity and may be on the verge of losing Republican control of both the House and Senate in November. Every new beginning is difficult. Whatever the outcome of the second round, the defeats of October 4 show how profoundly the Brazilian left will have to rethink and rebuild. But just as it would be foolish to underestimate the seriousness of its mistakes, it would be equally foolish to conclude that rebuilding a political project is no longer possible. History has not ended. The times are moving faster than ever. Originally published in Portuguese by Outras Palavras. English translation by Eric Blanc; I’ve added the subtitles. More We can’t stop the far right at home or abroad without a revitalized labor movement, which is yet another reason why you should become a sustaining supporter of the Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) — one of US labor’s pivotal bright spots. Relatedly, Jacobin published a short piece of mine reflecting on a decade of Bernie Sanders inspiring a whole new generation of young worker organizers.
India's youth protests over electoral rolls, but can 'cockroaches' threaten Modi's political grip?
Thousands detained, leaders arrested on arrival, and a capital under lockdown: the youth-led protests against the election chief have the attention of the Indian government. But experts say toppling it is another matter.
Indonesian electoral reform remains stalled by political deadlock
Constitutional Court rulings have created an opportunity to reform Indonesia's electoral laws, but conflicting political incentives are stalling changes needed to safeguard fair electoral competition.
AI as the next political divide
We have a guest post today from our friends at Focaldata, with whom we have done polling before. They have been doing a lot of work on attitudes towards AI and how this is affecting politics on both sides of the Atlantic. In this post, they explore exclusive new polling – with a whole set of fascinating charts on how voters’ views are developing and why. In particular, the authors explore why the debate is currently so much more polarised by party in the US than in the UK, to the benefit of the Democrats. Subscribe Focaldata HQ is located in Shoreditch, east London. To access the office from the Shoreditch High Street Overground station, you have to walk under the bridge at Braithwaite Street. We mention this not as a navigational aid, but because the posters above caught our eye over the summer. Since June, the area has been the centre of a fiercely contested debate around the construction of a data centre on the Truman Brewery estate on Brick Lane, less than 200 metres from our office. It was one of the first ‘US-style’ protest movements around AI data centres the country has seen, and may not be the last. These protests served as the catalyst for our forthcoming report, examining whether AI could become the next political divide on both sides of the Atlantic. We wanted to understand what was driving the emerging politics of AI and whether the dynamics at play in the US offer clues as to how the British debate will evolve. Over the last month, we polled 3,851 people across the UK and US about their views on AI. Our research found striking similarities between the two countries: for instance, both electorates are evenly split on their views towards AI development, with just over a third in favour (37% in each country), a similar number opposed, and the remainder somewhere in the middle or unsure. Statistically speaking, there is no difference in overall sentiment towards AI between the UK and US. Under the hood, demographic patterns also look largely the same in the two countries, with millennials, degree holders, full-time workers and those who describe themselves as financially comfortable more pro-AI than the rest of the country. Despite this convergence in overall attitudes, there is a striking divergence in how much of a politicised issue AI has become. In the US, attitudes are increasingly split by political affiliation and the issue has become the latest front in the seemingly interminable culture war, playing a role in the upcoming midterms. This stark political polarisation of AI has not happened in the UK – at least not yet. In what follows, we test several hypotheses for why the two countries are so far apart on a political basis. Understanding which hypothesis is correct will give us an indication of where the British dynamics go next.
For Texan Voters, College Football Is as Partisan as Everything Else
In a new poll from the Texas Public Policy Foundation, we learn that members of the electorate butt heads even when it comes to which team’s fans they most despise.
SpaceX, Meta, Hyundai. Can these multibillion-dollar deals change Louisiana's fortunes?
“Site selectors and business executives read the news and when they see a state has momentum, there is a certain degree of herd mentality,” said Chris Lloyd, a site selector with McGuireWoods Consulting, a Richmond, Virginia firm whose clients include Google, Honda and Amazon Web Services. “Once Meta came in that made it safe for Amazon to come in and that put Louisiana on the map.”
Establishment Democrats’ Response to DSA’s Electoral Wins Should Be of Concern to Anyone Invested in the Future of Black Politics
Whatever happened to “big tent” politics?
‘Send help’: LA GOP leader issues desperate appeal after Dem mayor’s campaign vid shocks viewers
LA County GOP Chair Roxanne Hoge says Karen Bass's viral 6-to-1 matching funds video reveals how Democrats codified electoral 'shenanigans' into law.
Australian lawmaker critically injured by car is 'no accident,' prime minister says
Helen Haines, 65, was struck by a Toyota Land Cruiser SUV outside her electoral district office mid afternoon in the city of Wangaratta in Victoria state, a police said.
US Football Hall of Fame revamps selection process
The American Pro Football Hall of Fame announced revisions to its selection process on Friday, including trimming the selection committee from 50 to 28, to combat "unintended biases."Porter said previous selection process bylaws left room for "unintended biases", including in the way individuals presented nominees, how selectors were assigned to each of the NFL's 32 clubs and issues related to players reaching the last year of eligibility in the Modern-Era Players category.
Aipac’s brand has become toxic. Can its ‘pro-Israel, pro-peace’ rival J Street move in?
J Street’s liberal Zionist politics are landing with the Democratic establishment but the electorate may have moved on
Remembering 1970 Britain — a cautionary tale
Well, if you listen to the polls and the political talking heads these days, in less than a month we will see a blue something sweep across the electoral map. Some say a blue wave and bolder predictors claim a blue tsunami is coming. Heck, I’ve even seen a prediction that Kansas might elect a […]
The Cost of Cutting American Science: How Federal Cuts Diminish Public Health Capacity
Among the federal government’s many responsibilities is the work it does to protect public health. Federal agencies monitor our food supply to ensure safety, conduct research to better understand emerging health threats, provide funding for public health programs in communities and work to detect and respond to disease outbreaks. Americans rely on these efforts every day—in a 2024 online survey, 74% of respondents said that “if the federal government issued safety guidance about food you eat regularly,” they would follow it. Changes to Federal Public Health Capacity The Trump administration’s efforts to reshape the federal government have resulted in significant impacts on our nation’s public health capacity over the past 20 months, affecting the response to health concerns such as measles, Ebola and cyclosporiasis. Agencies with core public health, food safety and disease prevention responsibilities experienced large workforce decreases during the first year of the administration. At the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for instance, the workforce in February 2026 was 26.7% smaller than in September 2024 before the start of the Trump administration. The Food and Drug Administration saw a similarly steep decline of 21.6%. Agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and Food Safety and Inspection Service also experienced large workforce decreases. (function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})(); Changes can also be seen in crucial public health occupations. The number of federal food inspectors, for example, decreased by more than half between September 2024 and February 2026, going from 1,035 to 473. This is the lowest number of food inspectors employed by the federal government since at least 2005. By February 2026, there were also 33.3% fewer federal public health program specialists, whose work includes advising federal funding recipients on public health activities and analyzing the effectiveness of public health programs. Government’s capacity is diminished as employees with specialized knowledge and experience in protecting the public and responding to health risks depart, leaving agencies less prepared to carry out their public health missions. There also have been vacancies in critical high-level leadership positions at public health agencies, most notably at the CDC, which had a permanent Senate-confirmed director for less than a month between January 2025 and early August 2026. Although the CDC has previously been led by acting directors at the start of an administration, the nearly yearlong gap since the departure of the administration’s first permanent director in August 2025 is without precedent. As of August 2026, the FDA is also currently without a Senate-confirmed commissioner following the previous commissioner’s resignation in May 2026. Additionally, public health agencies are experiencing increased politicization of their leadership ranks. In agencies such as the CDC and Food Safety and Inspection Service, the number of individuals in the Senior Executive Service—the most senior career leaders in government—has declined significantly, while at the same time the number of political appointees has reached record levels. (function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})(); (function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})(); At the CDC, for example, the number of career SES decreased 42.9% between December 2024 and February 2026, while the number of non-Senate confirmed political appointees at the agency was six times larger than the agency’s historical average from 2009 and 2024. Knowledgeable career leaders are integral to the ability of public health agencies to carry out their work with scientific integrity and professional judgment, and rapid leadership turnover and increased politicization threaten agencies’ ability to make evidence-based decisions to protect our health. The upheaval and politicization in public health agencies have also negatively affected employee engagement. Strong employee engagement is crucial to the ability of agencies to carry out their mission and successfully provide essential services to the public. In the 2025 Public Service Viewpoint Survey conducted by the Partnership for Public Service, the Department of Health and Human Services—which encompasses major public health agencies such as the CDC and FDA—had an employee engagement and satisfaction score of 20.4 out of 100, one of the lowest among large agencies. Only 2.8% of HHS employees indicated trust in their political leaders and only 8.7% reported confidence that they could report a suspected violation of law or regulation without retaliation. Employees at HHS also reported that the agency’s ability to provide services to the public had suffered. Nearly half of employees at HHS, 47.5%, said their work unit was worse at delivering quality services compared to its performance in 2024. In addition, 57.8% said their work unit was performing worse at fulfilling stakeholder needs. In addition to the work done within federal agencies, the federal government also distributes significant funding for public health and disease prevention work to state and local governments, nonprofits and small businesses—funding which has been significantly disrupted. At the CDC, for example, there was a 71.9% decrease in the amount of project grant funding issued in fiscal year 2025 compared to fiscal year 2024. The FDA also issued far less funding in fiscal year 2025—a 21.3% decrease from its fiscal year 2024 funding. Changes in federal funding include the ending of grants to community organizations that worked on HIV prevention and the cancellation of funding for research into improvements to patient safety and healthcare quality. These changes go beyond federal agencies to impact the broader public health ecosystem, including the state and local health departments responsible for much of the on-the-ground public health work in their communities. About 80% of the CDC’s domestic funding is directed towards state and local partners—meaning that cuts to CDC funding can ultimately result in cuts to state and local public health capacity. Federal agencies also provide expertise and assistance to state and local health agencies as they deal with particular health challenges, but workforce cuts have resulted in fewer federal employees available to help. The Impact of Changes to Public Health Capacity These changes to federal public health capacity are not abstract concerns. Disrupted programs, reduced funding and lost expertise at public health agencies across all levels of government threaten the public’s physical well-being and safety. In some cases, this has already led to harm. The most immediate impacts of federal cuts were seen in interruptions to ongoing public health programs and crisis responses. In one instance, when CDC grants were canceled during the 2025 Texas measles outbreak—the most severe measles outbreak in 25 years—public health officials in Lubbock, Texas were forced to pause parts of their measles response work supported by the frozen funding. Lubbock’s director of public health further said that a lack of available CDC experts to reach out to for advice “definitely” impacted the department’s response to the measles crisis. Cuts to federal funding also forced Dallas County Health and Human Services to cut staff and cancel 50 community vaccination clinics during the outbreak. Public health work outside of major outbreak responses was also disrupted. For example, in April 2025, the Milwaukee Public Health Department was unexpectedly unable to reach experts on lead poisoning due to firings at the CDC when responding to concerns about lead contamination in Milwaukee public schools. Due to federal workforce cuts, several programs at the CDC, including Alzheimer’s and epilepsy programs, have also become trapped in limbo—existing on paper, but without the staff necessary to operate. More recent crises reveal how federal cuts have weakened the public health infrastructure needed to prevent and respond to dangerous new outbreaks. Internationally, cuts at the U.S. Agency for International Development eliminated funding for disease testing and contact tracing abroad, which delayed detection of and responses to the 2026 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While international outbreaks may seem far removed, the unchecked spread of disease in any country can quickly pose a danger to economic well-being, security and health around the world. Within the United States, public health cuts inhibited responses to the summer 2026 outbreak of the food-borne parasite cyclospora. At the federal level, cuts to funding for lab equipment and for CDC staff with expertise in parasitic infections—including 9 out of 11 staff members at the lab responsible for identifying parasitic outbreaks in 2025— contributed to the largest reporting delay in outbreak cases at the CDC in 15 years. Conflicting communications from the FDA about the source of the outbreak, which followed cuts to the agency’s communications department, additionally led to confusion among the public about how to best avoid infection. At the same time, cuts to HHS funding and support for local and state public health slowed some health departments’ responses to the crisis. The exact costs of these delays, constraints and confusion in public health responses are difficult to estimate. However, their message is clear: federal cuts have already made containing threats to public health even more of a challenge. Conclusion Protecting public health—from food safety to disease prevention—is one of the federal government’s most important missions. Dramatic and haphazard cuts to federal agencies and funding have already disrupted the public health system, impacting the response to challenges such as measles, lead poisoning and cyclosporiasis. The U.S. public health system needed improvement before these disruptions. Since 2022, federal leadership and coordination in response to public health outbreaks has been on the Government Accountability Office’s High-Risk List of areas in need of attention to improve government effectiveness and efficiency. Recent cuts only compound these concerns. The chaotic dismantling of government and resulting disruptions to crucial functions like public health and disease prevention highlight the need for meaningful reform and concrete policy proposals to reimagine how government can better serve the public and be more effective, responsive and accountable. To learn more about the impact of federal cuts to public health and science more broadly, visit The Cost of Cutting American Science. Learn more For more information on the Partnership for Public Service’s government reform initiative, visit Government for a New Era. View here In line with The Cost of Cutting American Science, federal workforce data in this brief is as of February 2026
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Truth and Politics in the Age of Post-Truth
Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work. Subscribe This is an excerpt from Global Politics in a Post-Truth Era. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations. The term post-truth is by now so ubiquitous in describing the state of politics in the Western world and even beyond that the most pressing issue of the day appears to be about making democracy work in the era of post-truth rather than questioning the normalisation of the term itself in the first place. The critical turning point appeared to have occurred in 2016 when the term was chosen by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘The Word of the Year.’ On its website, the Dictionary notes the transformation of post-truth from ‘being a peripheral term to being a mainstay in political commentary and connects ‘the spike in frequency’ directly with the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald J. Trump in the United States – both occurring in 2016. Paired with the noun ‘politics,’ post-truth is defined as an adjective ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.’ The Oxford English Dictionary traces the first use of the term to a 1992 essay in The Nation by the playwright Steve Tesich as he reflected on the 1980s Iran-Contra scandal and the 1990–91 Gulf War: We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a people that totalitarian monsters could only drool about in their dreams. All the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppressing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no longer necessary, that we have acquired a spiritual mechanism that can denude truth of any significance. In a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world (Tesich 1992, 13; emphasis added). He then continued, The Gulf War is over but the war at home goes on. The gulf between rich and destitute widens – between those of us who live in a modern post-industrial nation and those of us who live in the Third World countries of our inner cities. The present administration’s response to this internal crisis has shifted from benign to malignant neglect. The current levels of misery and decomposition of our cities and the economic gulags of our ghettos are acceptable. Since there is only so much hope to go around, there is a freeze on hope. The have-nots have now been reclassified as never-will-haves (Tesich 1992, 13). In the context of Tesich’s essay, truth includes both facts, as in what happens, and ‘moral absolutes,’ as in the ‘self-evident truths mentioned in our Constitution’ (Tesich 1992, 14). Together, these two notions of truth entail the obligation to both act and react. The two passages cited above show that even in the early post-Cold War years, Tesich was already deeply concerned that the American people are neither prepared to act on truth nor react to truth that is disconcerting, or what he calls ‘bad news’ (Tesich 1992, 12). Accordingly, Tesich’s insight as captured by the term post-truth is not that truth is irrelevant to what we know, but rather it is irrelevant to how we act. In contrast, ‘post-truth politics,’ as defined by Oxford as a term that pitches ‘objective facts’ against ‘emotion and personal belief’ such that the latter appears to have overtaken the former in shaping ‘public opinion’ and thereby, democratic politics. When Tesich’s post-truth politics and its current usage are juxtaposed, the two are in fact not identical in terms of what truth is and how it relates to politics. Against such consideration, this chapter provides a critical survey of selected historical events and theoretical considerations for the purpose of gaining a more nuanced understanding of the relation between truth and politics. Truth and Language One notable impact of post-truth politics is that language is being overtly deployed as a political weapon not only by politicians and those in power, but among the general population. It seems that once facts are irrelevant to the validity of what is being said, language becomes the platform for an all-out political contest in which what is said is no more than an act of will expressed as an assertion of power and/or an exercise in defiance. As early as in the writings of Thucydides (460–400 BCE), the vulnerability of logos – which is the human capacity for rational discourse in tumultuous times – was already noted. Thucydides belonged to a school of Greek thought which maintained that language is conventional and that the association between name and things is a result of ‘human use and habit’ rather than ‘nature or divine dispensation’ (Connor 1984, 99). The conventional nature of language means that it is incapable of providing its users with any independent criteria for judgement. In Thucydides’ study of the Peloponnesian War (431–405 BCE), the subversion of logos as seen in the manipulation of language was introduced through his account of the civil war in Corcyra (Thucydides 1972, 236-245). The war first broke out in 427 BCE between the pro-Athenian democratic faction and the pro-Spartan oligarchic faction before it spread to the rest of the Greek world. There was a general breakdown of law and order, resulting in extreme violence and death. Language underwent changes that were reflective of the events of the time. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) translated Thucydides’ description of the situation as follows: The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true-hearted manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice: to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything... he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of society, and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it, was commended (Hobbes 1839–1845, 8: 348; Thucydides 1972, 242-243). What concerned Thucydides most was that the meanings of words are no more than linguistic conventions that require logos to support them. The Corcyrean civil war was a reminder that such capacity cannot be assumed. This is why history understood as an authentic account of what happens matters. Guided by logos, the historian’s task is ‘the search after truth’, which is established through ‘the absence of the fabulous,’ including ‘the rejection of myth and unverifiable stories’ (de Jonge 2017, 2). Thus, history plays an important role in facilitating the stability of language – without which distinctions and judgements cannot be rendered communicable. Just like Thucydides, Hobbes was a nominalist who subscribed to the view that there is no inherent meaning to words. Hobbes’ state of nature, where there is no common authority, is precisely one in which distinctions cannot be made. As Hobbes put it, there is ‘no Mine and Thine distinct’ nor is there distinction between ‘the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice’ (1968, 188; emphasis in original). This is clearly an unsustainable condition for everyone. Behind Hobbes’ famous words that life in the state of nature is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ is his uncompromising argument for the ‘Leviathan’, which is described by the late American political theorist, Sheldon Wolin (1922–2015), as the ‘sovereign definer’ (Hobbes 1968, 186; Wolin 2004, 238–243). Accordingly, the social contract is importantly a ‘linguistic contract’ that binds all parties to ‘general names agreed upon’ (Peters 1979, 125; Hobbes 1968, 111). Through Thucydides and Hobbes, we can identify a line of thinking that sees politics as a contestation over the use of language, which is based on shared conventions and norms. Thus understood, politics is not a collective quest for the true nature of our being or an epistemological exercise in pursuit of true knowledge. Rather, politics is about humans living with one another by finding a shared language to communicate with one another on matters that affect them all. Truth is in that sense contingent on what is being said as opposed to setting the standard for it. In other words, truth is the embodiment of shareability among us. While truth as such ensures the viability of a political entity, truth by no means represents a normative standard to adjudicate among contesting actors in what they say, let alone in what they do. During Thucydides’ times, ancient China was also experiencing a tumultuous time as the ruling Zhou dynasty deteriorated into the period of the Warring States (481–221 BCE). This was when the rulers of Zhou no longer presided over the territories brought under its control through conquest. Instead of professing allegiance to the Zhou royalty, the lords of these territories became kings themselves to rule over their own land. The period was one marked by endless military campaigns as each of the seven major states aimed to conquer the rest (Lewis 1999). Yet, the period was also known for its intellectual vibrancy as different thinkers challenged the restoring of order among these warring states – including offering ideas and advice to rulers on good governance. Among these thinkers was Confucius (551–479 BCE). His thought, which came to be known as Confucianism, went on to become the state ideology of China from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–222 CE) until the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 when China became a republic. The founding text of Confucianism was the Analects, which is a collection of dialogues between Confucius and his students as recorded by them. One key concept Confucius advanced is the ‘rectification of names’. Though the term only appears in one exchange in the Analects, it is considered a major aspect of Confucius’ thought. Generations of Confucian scholars from past and present, including Western academics, have debated over its interpretation (Makeham 2003). The passage in question reads as follows: Zi Lu said: ‘The monarch of the state of Wei wants you to govern the country, what is the first thing you plan on doing?’ Confucius said: ‘First it is necessary to rectify the names.’Zi Lu said: ‘Is that really what has to be done? You are being too pedantic, aren’t you now? How will you rectify these names?’Confucius said: ‘Zhong You, you are too unrefined. A gentleman, faced with a matter that he does not understand, takes a skeptical attitude. If names are not correct, one cannot speak smoothly and reasonably, and if one cannot speak smoothly and reasonably, affairs cannot be managed successfully. If affairs cannot be managed successfully, rites and music will not be conducted. If rites and music are not conducted, punishments will not be suitable. And if punishments are not suitable, the common people will not know what to do. So, when the gentleman uses names, it is necessary to be able to speak so that people understand. If one can say it, one can definitely do it. A gentleman should not be careless with words’ (Analects 13:3 in Cao 2016, 148). This translation is offered by the contemporary philosopher Cao Feng. As Cao notes, the passage is what started the whole debate over ‘exactly what kind of names did Confucius... wish to rectify’ (Cao 2016, 148). Of the three major groups of interpretation examined by Cao, beginning with classical Confucian scholarship, one is arguably the most influential and certainly most pertinent to the issue of language and politics. This is the interpretation that was first associated with the Neo-Confucian master, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who argued that the ‘rectification of names is simply the rectification of politics’ (Cao 2016, 149). Within this interpretive framework, rectification has the dual functions of correction and prescription by ensuring that predetermined hierarchical roles are strictly adhered to through following ‘the system of rites and propriety’ (Cao 2016, 151). In addition, the rectification of names entails ‘using names to rectify actuality’ (Cao 2016, 151). Yet Cao rejects this whole body of interpretive works by arguing that these were ideas developed later. Instead, Cao suggests the following: The original meaning of Confucius’ rectification of names may, then, be quite simple. Confucius did not mean to establish a concrete, normative system of “names”; rather, Confucius was simply the first person in history to realize or remark upon the importance of language in politics. As a politician, he noticed and foresaw the impact that the indeterminacy, ambiguity, and arbitrariness of names would have on politics. Confucius recognized the political consequences of language’s not accurately expressing meaning or not being accurately received by people. He realized the great role that names, as a means of distinguishing right and wrong and establishing norms, could play in society and politics (Cao 2016, 168). Scholarly debates aside, Cao’s view has the advantage of identifying an interpretation of this controversial exchange in the Analects that enables its readers to extrapolate from it the observation that the meaning of words depends as much on their users as on their interpreters; neither of which can be predetermined. Accordingly, a good ruler is someone who can speak without ambiguity to his subjects and make good his words through actions. Stated differently, Cao’s view on what concerned Confucius then, who was living through times of protracted political upheaval, is that language is an indispensable political tool for those in power and can be deployed by both good and bad rulers alike. To sum up, this historical survey shows that politics as a war of words is by no means a distinctive marker of contemporary politics nor the Western world. Be it ancient or current, east or west, language is subject to manipulation to serve political purposes and when there is an outright war of words that defies existing norms, it is indicative of a political situation in which people no longer share a language and truth becomes irrelevant. Accordingly, political order entails stability in language use. Truth and Politics As previously noted, current use of the term post-truth as an adjective to the term ‘politics’ suggests that once there was a time when politics aligned with truth. Indeed, if we start with Plato’s Republic as the key founding text of Western political thought, we see that the ideal polis (city-state of ancient Greece) is where truth and politics converge, and justice is achieved. Written around 380 BCE when Athens was still coping with its defeat by the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, the Republic is a defence of the rule of the ‘philosopher king’, defined as someone who is ‘guided by the truth’ and is ‘always and in every way’ in pursuit of the truth (Plato 1974, 490a). For Plato, truth converges with virtues and hence, letting the philosopher take charge of politics is to let the wisest and the most virtuous lead the less wise and the less virtuous even if it requires compulsion (Plato 1974, 499b). In Plato’s words, ‘…until the philosophers attain power in a city there will be no respite from evil for either city or citizens…’ (Plato 1974, 501e). The uncompromising rule of philosopher-kings is made palatable by the claim that we are all ‘earth- born brothers’ with random mixtures of gold, silver, bronze and iron, but only the gold can rule (Plato 1974, 414–415). Understandably, academic debates over the interpretation of Plato’s Republic revolve around the question of whether truth as attained in philosophy can be realised in politics as action and whether such a connection is even desirable. Without getting into the details of these scholarly exchanges, I suggest that they all share the concern that truth acquired through the rigorous process of philosophical reasoning is not without problem when applied to the real world of living humans. This is because not all humans are philosophers – and indeed, in Plato’s view, not everyone is capable of becoming a philosopher given the protracted and arduous training that one needs to endure to become one. Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), a highly influential political philosopher of the twentieth century, notes that ‘Plato was the first to introduce the division between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not know’ and that such a separation has remained ‘at the root of all theories of domination’ (Arendt 1958, 223, 225). What Arendt points out in this remark is not the gap between theory and practice, but rather that Plato provides the normative ground for those who know the truth to tell those who do not know what to do. Arendt herself took on the challenge of understanding the relationship between truth and politics through her analysis of Nazism and Stalinism. Arendt’s insight, which was controversial when The Origins of Totalitarianism was published in 1951, was to identify Nazism and Stalinism as representative of a new form of political rule – totalitarianism – making it distinct from ‘other forms of political oppression... such as despotism, tyranny and dictatorship’ (Arendt 1973, 460). Arendt defines totalitarianism as a self- contained system of ideas driven by their ‘logic’ and marked by a mode of reasoning called ‘ideological thinking.’ Ideological thinking as such is a distinctive form of political reasoning defined by three characteristics. First, ideological thinking claims to provide a ‘total explanation’ of all historical happenings, encompassing the past, the present, and the future. Second, while ideological thinking is an attempt to account for ‘factual reality’ in its totality, this mode of thinking is paradoxically divorced from reality and experience. This is because experience, being rooted in specificity, is clearly limited in its claim to totality. It follows that as its third characteristic, ideological thinking aims to emancipate thought from the limitation imposed by experience through a ‘specific method of demonstration.’ The method involves arranging facts into an ‘absolutely logical procedure’ that starts from an ‘axiomatically accepted premise’. It is, in short, a ‘process of deduction from a premise’ – which is the only possible movement in the realm of logic that leads to one definitive conclusion. This is how the ‘logicality of ideological thinking’ provides the basis for total explanation and the ‘principle of action’ for totalitarian movement (Arendt 1973, 468–474). Stated differently, totalitarianism is a form of uncompromising idealism that exists in one’s head irrespective of shared reality as experienced. It is the perverse form of what Arendt later refers to as ‘rational truth’, which is the product of the ‘speculative mind’ that belongs to philosophy, mathematics and the sciences. The ‘speculative mind’ is the mind working on its way to generate axioms and theories by relying on the cognitive capacity of the human brain (Arendt 1977, 231). The presence of others has no bearing whatsoever on rational truth. In contrast, ‘factual truth’ is what happens when humans are ‘living and acting together’ (Arendt 1977, 231). Factual truth is therefore particular and temporal by definition. But more importantly, factual truth is ‘political by nature’ because it can only be validated in the context of the human community (Arendt 1977, 238). In other words, factual truth is about humans in their plurality rather than in their singularity. For factual truth to be sustainable, we need what Arendt calls ‘common sense’ – understood as ‘community sense’ (Arendt 1982, 72). There is also another distinction about truth that Arendt makes which is pertinent to understanding how totalitarianism works. The issue is whether the so-called totalitarian ideology is simply an unnecessarily cumbersome way of saying that it is an all-round and polished lie. Here, Arendt calls totalitarian ideology the ‘modern lie’ – in contrast to the ‘traditional lie’. The latter is restricted by two conditions: that it is a lie about the ‘particulars’ and that it deceives only the ‘enemy’ – which means that the liar is not engaged in self- deception. The modern lie, however, involves a ‘complete rearrangement of the whole factual texture’. It also intends to deceive everyone alike, to the extent that those who initiate the lie eventually ‘fall victims to their own falsehood’ (Arendt 1977, 249–254). This distinction between the traditional and modern lie is important. It indicates that not only is totalitarianism a lie, but the lie is in fact too big to fit into the standard meaning of the word. To tell a lie from truth, we need a common standard. In the case of a traditional lie, the common standard is precisely ‘the fabric of factuality’. As such, a lie always appears as a ‘tear’ to that fabric. Yet, modern lies require making a surrogate reality with a completely different context for facts to fit ‘without seam, crack, or fissure, exactly as the facts fitted into their original context’. Arendt notes that as long as those who concoct the surrogate reality are prepared to engage in self- deception to ‘create a semblance of truthfulness’, there is nothing to prevent ‘these new stories, images, and non-facts from becoming an adequate substitute for reality and factuality’ (Arendt 1977, 253–254). Totalitarianism therefore requires a person to stand outside of the system itself in order to make sense of it. Arendt points out that it is futile for us to argue with (for example) a Nazi or a Stalinist on race or class. To confront totalitarianism requires more than just a confrontation with specific facts. It is a more fundamental confrontation between reality as experienced and its total rejection. This means that Nazism and Stalinism are more than radical ways of conducting racial conflict or class struggle. Rather: Totalitarian politics – far from being simply antisemitic or racist or imperialist or communist – use and abuse their own ideological and political elements until the basis of factual reality, from which the ideologies originally derived their propaganda value– the value of struggle, for instance, or the interest conflicts between Jews and their neighbours – have all but disappeared (Arendt 1973, xv). Accordingly: The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (that is, the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (that is, the standards of thought) no longer exist (Arendt 1973, 474). Who then is the ‘ideal subject’ of totalitarianism? Although there is a revival of interest in Arendt’s observation on truth and politics since the onset of post- truth politics, not enough has been said about her reply to the question (Hyvönen 2018; Klinkler 2018; Lee 2019; Zerilli 2020). Yet if we take a look at Arendt’s portrait of this ideal subject, her view is even more pertinent to our current challenge. As a self-contained system of ideas that is detached from experience, totalitarian thinking offers consistency in ways that reality cannot. Arendt notes that this kind of consistency is especially appealing to those who have lost a sense of bearing in the world (Arendt 1973, 353). They constitute what she calls the ‘masses’. The ‘mass man’ is thus a highly isolated and atomised individual, who is ‘obsessed by a desire to escape from reality’ (Arendt 1973, 318, 352). In his ‘essential homelessness’ the mass man can ‘no longer bear its accidental, incomprehensible aspects’ (Arendt 1973, 352). This longing for escape from reality is a ‘verdict against the world’ in which one is ‘forced to live’ but ‘cannot exist’ (Arendt 1973, 352). Such a situation is ripe for the ‘revolt of the masses’ against ‘common sense,’ which is ‘the result of their atomisation, of their loss of social status’ and with it, the ‘whole sector of communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense’ (Arendt 1973, 352). In short, the masses are people who are considered to be ‘superfluous or can be spared … [who] cannot be integrated into any organisation based on common interest’ (Arendt 1973, 311). Whether one agrees with Arendt’s analysis of the social conditions in the interwar years that led to the formation of the ‘masses’, her portrait of the ‘mass man’ is a powerful account of what can happen to an individual who has become disposable to the society that they used to belong to. Hand in hand with this phenomenon is indeed the collapse of ‘common sense’ that leaves the dislodged individual scrambling for reconnection. By offering the masses a substitute reality validated by the ‘logic of an idea’ rather than by experience, totalitarianism makes it possible for them to live in a world where there is no condition of plurality. Between ‘facing the anarchic growth and total arbitrariness of decay’ and ‘bowing down before the most rigid, fantastically fictitious consistency of an ideology’, the masses will likely ‘choose the latter’ (Arendt 1973, 352). A world created by ideology, then, is more attractive to the masses not because ‘they are stupid and wicked, but because in the general disaster this escape grants them a minimum of self- respect’ by conjuring up ‘a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself’ (Arendt 1973, 353). Moreover, it is precisely this ability to guarantee consistency that makes it possible for the leaders of totalitarian movements to demand ‘total, unrestricted, unconditional and unalterable loyalty of the individual member’ (Arendt 1973, 323). While this chapter is not a study of the social factors that led to specific contemporary developments such as the result of the Brexit referendum or the election of Donald Trump in 2016, Arendt’s ‘mass man’ seem to have found their counterparts among the supporters of Brexit and Trumpism. Studies of voters’ profiles in both events point to a disproportionate share of supporters from white male lower income backgrounds without university educations. These are individuals who have either already lost their jobs to globalisation or who are at high risk of losing their job with very little capacity to be retrained for the twenty-first century market economy of advanced industrialised states (BBC 2016; Pew Research Center 2018). In short, these displaced workers are part of the tapestry forming the modern equivalent of Arendt’s ‘mass man’ – ready to be the recruits of totalitarianism. Conclusion If we step back to take a more comprehensive approach to the relationship between truth and politics, both historically and theoretically, it is not so obvious that 2016 is a defining moment. From ancient China and ancient Greece to our so-called post-truth age, the indeterminacy of language appears to be a persistent political challenge. Language is always open to manipulation by its users to serve power. Nonetheless, the tendency these days is to single out the ubiquity of social media and the proliferation of Internet platforms as the incubator for the countless cyberwars of words that in turn fuel the real world of politics. In this context, language is no longer the conveyor of objective facts and accurate information, but rather the medium for expressing subjective opinions and feelings, as captured by the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of the term ‘post-truth politics’. In contrast, the historical approach used in this chapter shows that it is in fact too easy to point the figure at the Internet and digital communication for the political challenge that we face today. What is being suggested here is that with or without the Internet, language, be it used to convey facts or emotions, is simply a tool for communication that humans have invented. While language per se cannot adjudicate what is true or not true, what is right or wrong, it embodies such capacity when language is a shared norm. That shared norm cannot be sustained without some semblance of cohesion in any given community. Any war of words, irrespective of its platform, is indicative of the breakdown of such cohesiveness. Returning to the original context in which the term post-truth politics was first used by Steve Tesich helps to identify the important distinction between truth as the standard for knowledge and truth as the standard for action. The two do not necessarily coincide. Placed in the context of the history of political thought, this distinction is in fact at the heart of Plato’s Republic. Yet when the philosopher as the quintessential bearer of truth becomes king, the polis that he rules over is far from the ideal of a just state that it purports to be. Instead, it is one that is held together by lies and coercion. What Arendt reveals through her study of Nazism and Stalinism is that it is dangerous for the kind of truth that philosophy generates – ‘rational truth’ – to become the guide to politics. Politics guided by rational truth can only be uncompromising and follows a logic of its own that cannot afford the ambiguity and indeterminacy of reality as lived experiences of humans. A world of post-truth politics can be an opportunity for a new kind of politics if it is indeed about dismantling the idea that truth is the ideal that politics should strive for. But as it stands, the post-truth politics of today is more about invoking a past that never exists to judge the presence as a crisis in naming when the real crisis is about rebuilding a shared space that has room for all – be they of the left, right or centre; cosmopolitan or parochial; civic-minded or self-centred; liberal-minded or bigoted. Politics is and always will be about striving for that space, without which no human can thrive. References Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Arendt, Hannah. 1977. “Truth and Politics.” In Between Past and Future, 227–264. New York: Penguin Books. Arendt, Hannah. 1982. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, edited by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2016. “Brexit vote: The breakdown.” BBC News, December 7, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38227674 Cao, Feng. 2016. “A New Examination of Confucius’ Rectification of Names.” Journal of Chinese Humanities 2: 147–171. https://doi-org.subzero.lib. uoguelph.ca/ doi/ 10.1163/23521341-12340032. Connor, W. Robert. 1984. Thucydides. Princeton: Princeton University Press. de Jonge, Casper C. 2017. “Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Thucydides.” in The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, edited by Sara Forsdyke, Edith Foster, and Ryan Balot. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199340385.013.17 https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.subzero. lib.uoguelph.ca/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199340385.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199340385 Hyvönen, Ari-Elmeri. 2018. “Careless Speech: Conceptualizing Post-Truth Politics.” New Perspectives 26 (3): 31–55. https://www.proquest.com/ scholarly-journals/careless-speech-conceptualizing-post-truth/ docview/2204515132/se-2?accountid=11233. Hobbes, Thomas. 1839–1845. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Sir William Molesworth. London: John Bohn. Vol. 8. Klinkner, Melanie. 2018. “Reasonable Truth.” International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 14 (3): 393–99. doi:10.1386/macp.14.3.393_7. Lee, Haiyan. 2019. “When Nothing Is True, Everything Is Possible: On Truth and Power by Way of Socialist Realism.” PMLA/Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 134 (5). Cambridge University Press: 1157–64. https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2019.134.5.1157 Lewis, Mark E. 1999. “Warring States Political History.” In The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 BC, edited by Michael Loewe and Edward Shaughnessy, 587–650. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Makeham, John. 2003. “Zheng ming (Rectification of names).” In RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism, edited by Xinzhong Yao. Vol. 2: 813-814. New York: Routledge. Oxford Languages, n. d. “Word of the Year 2016.” Accessed 19 August 2017. https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/ Peters, Richard. 1979. Hobbes. Westport: Greenwood Press. Pew Research Center. 2018. “An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters.” Report, August 9, 2018. https://www.pewresearch.org/ politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on- validated-voters/ Plato. 1974. Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett. Tesich, Steve. 1992. “Watergate Syndrome: A Government of Lies.” The Nation: 12-14. January 6/13, 1992. Thucydides. 1972. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books. Wolin, Sheldon. 2004. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Westen Political Thought. Expanded Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Zerilli, Linda M. G. 2020. ‘Fact-Checking and Truth-Telling in an Age of Alternative Facts.’ Le foucaldien 6, no. 1: 2, 1–22. Theresa Man Ling Lee is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Guelph (Canada). Lee is a political theorist who specializes in contemporary political thought. Her research and teaching areas include continental philosophy, Marxism and critical theory, feminism, postmodernism, philosophy of social science, psychoanalysis, multiculturalism, human rights, disability studies, modern Chinese political thought and comparative political theory. Lee has published on a wide range of subjects in these areas, including intercultural pedagogy and the challenges of teaching as a person with multiple minority designations in a Canadian university classroom.
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Shaky political "science": breakdown of the peer review process
[This article is the latest in our “Shaky Political Science” series. In our 38 page report, “Shaky political ‘science’ misses mark on ranked choice voting,” released in December 2025, we examined over 40 studies focused on ranked choice voting (RCV). Many of these studies suffered from puzzling research methodologies, poorly constructed surveys, unrealistic simulated elections, cherry picked data and faulty analyses that often were contradicted by results from real-world elections (a link to our full paper is here). Here are links to the first four articles in our series: the first one summarizing the overall results of our report; the second one analyzed a study co-authored by University of Minnesota academic Larry Jacobs, which was one of the most error-prone of all the research we reviewed in our report; a third article showing an admirable example of two political scientists holding two other political scientists accountable for their flawed, sloppy research; and a fourth article that analyzed seven studies sponsored by New America’s political reform program that deployed flawed methodology based on “simulated” elections instead of real-world elections, which when combined with some basic misunderstandings of RCV, produced odd and misleading results]. In this fifth article in our “Shaky Political Science” series, we examine two flawed studies on the impact of RCV on voter turnout authored by San Francisco State University professor Jason McDaniel. McDaniel’s research in these two papers stands out for its puzzling methodology, inadequate and cherry-picked data, and faulty analyses that not only misunderstands ranked choice voting but reflects a basic misunderstanding of politics in general. The first of the McDaniel studies actually passed through a peer review process and then was subsequently published by the Journal of Urban Affairs, despite its obvious errors. It is perplexing that a jury of peer political scientists did not catch the errors and send it back to McDaniel for a rewrite or outright rejection. This calls into question the credibility of the peer review process itself. The peer review process is supposed to represent the intellectual pinnacle of the profession – a way for academics to certify the quality of each other’s work, and to act as a check against sloppy research. In the case of the McDaniel study, the peer review process failed. Yet his flawed study has been cited dozens of times by other political scientists in their own flawed works — an unvirtuous circle of academic research. Here is the first Jason McDaniel study that we analyzed: “Writing the Rules to Rank the Candidates: Examining the Impact of Instant-Runoff Voting on Racial Group Turnout in San Francisco Mayoral Elections,” by Jason McDaniel, 2016, Journal of Urban Affairs. This study covered San Francisco’s use of ranked choice voting (RCV) in mayoral elections, purporting to show that RCV reduces voter turnout overall, increases voter errors, and has a negative impact on “marginal populations,” i.e. racial minorities, mainly as the result of the alleged complexity of RCV asking voters to rank candidates and having to be familiar with multiple candidates and related dynamics. McDaniel reached these conclusions by examining five San Francisco mayoral elections taking place in odd years (i.e. where there are no federal or state races on the ballot) from 1995 to 2011, comparing three earlier non-RCV races (in 1995, 1999 and 2003) with the later two RCV races (in 2007 and 2011). Only two RCV races were studied, and as McDaniel acknowledged, only the contest in 2011 was “competitive” (that contest in 2007 was the first mayoral election using RCV, and incumbent mayor Gavin Newsom won easily in the first round of counting, earning 74% of first choices and far ahead of the second place candidate who had just 6.3% of first choices). Yet even the allegedly competitive contest in 2011was won by an incumbent with a landslide margin of nearly 20 points. No other elections were studied by McDaniel, even though San Francisco elects 17 other offices besides mayor with RCV, including the 11 seats on the Board of Supervisors (the name for the city council) in even years, and six other citywide offices in odd years. Previous academic research has found that competitive elections can stimulate greater voter involvement and higher turnout. For unexplained reasons, this study ignored at least 34 other RCV races between the years 2004 to 2011, many of which were very competitive and had high voter turnout. Instead, McDaniel’s analysis based its conclusions on data from only a single, marginally-competitive mayor’s race using RCV. These 2007 and 2011 mayoral elections were the only two RCV elections that McDaniel used as the sole basis for his small data set to determine the impact of RCV on voter turnout. Despite having no meaningful data to inform his study, McDaniel nonetheless concluded that RCV lowered turnout when compared to the previous three mayoral non-RCV elections using two-round runoffs. Then, using the same inadequate database of San Francisco elections, McDaniel also found that “Instant-runoff voting is associated with a significant decline in Black voter turnout and White voter turnout…On average, Black voter turnout decreases by 18 points and White voter turnout decreases by 16 points …” But how could he credibly arrive at that conclusion when his study was based on voter turnout in two RCV contests that were not even remotely competitive? Beyond that, McDaniel tacitly admits that the key determining factor driving Black voter turnout was not RCV vs non-RCV elections, but the presence of a viable Black candidate. McDaniel wrote, “Black voter turnout was about 17 percentage points higher for the two elections that featured an African American candidate compared to the three elections that did not” — but one of those three elections did not use RCV. The same dynamic was present for White voter turnout, in which higher turnout was not correlated with RCV vs non-RCV elections, but the presence of a viable White candidate. Beyond that, McDaniel’s voter turnout results, whether correlated with the race of the candidates or RCV vs non-RCV elections, showed no clear patterns. In his Figure 1, he shows low Asian voter turnout in the non-RCV elections in 1999 and 2003 when there was no viable Asian candidate running, but in the 2007 mayoral election using RCV, there is still no viable Asian candidate, yet Asian turnout increases dramatically. For Latinos, voter turnout is virtually the same in 1999 (no viable Latino candidate, non-RCV elections), 2003 (leading Latino candidate, non-RCV elections), 2007 (no viable Latino candidate, RCV elections) and 2011 (leading Latino candidate, RCV elections). Meanwhile White voter turnout increased dramatically from a low in the 2007 mayoral election, in which the leading candidate was a white incumbent, to the 2011 election in which there were no leading white candidates that finished any higher than sixth place with 5.6% of the vote. Clearly other factors were determining voter turnout than either the race of the candidates or RCV vs non-RCV elections. Despite these inconsistent findings, McDaniel boldly marches forth to render conclusions about the impact of RCV on different groups of racial voters, even though his conclusions are not remotely supported by his data. This looks like the worst kind of “data cherry picking” to cover up a puzzling conclusion based on a poor data set involving only two RCV elections, neither of which were remotely competitive. McDaniel’s cherry picking didn’t stop there. In calculating voter turnout for the three non-RCV mayoral elections in 1995, 1999 and 2003, he failed to mention that in each of these years there was a two-round runoff election, with a first round election in November in which no candidate garnered a winning majority of the vote, followed by the decisive runoff in December. So there were two non-RCV elections in each election year. But McDaniel only decided to include one of the two elections in his data set, apparently the December runoff in each year (which had higher turnout in two out of the three mayor’s races, and lower turnout in the third). So he ignored the November 1995 election, the November 1999 election when turnout was only 45 percent, and the November 2003 election when turnout was only 45.7 percent. This is flawed methodology based on blatant cherry picking, since McDaniel simply omitted three elections worth of data that did not fit within his frame. His study should never have made it through a peer review process, and it is an embarrassment to political science that not only was it approved for publication, but it has been uncritically cited by dozens of other political scientists. Share A “study” without wider context or credible data Lacking a data set that included even a single competitive RCV mayoral race, McDaniel declared that RCV lowered voter turnout in 2011, when turnout was 42.5 percent. But he also ignored -- or did not realize -- that voter turnout in mayoral elections during 2011 had sharply declined in all big cities, including far more steeply in nearby Los Angeles and other cities. In fact, San Francisco’s election in 2011 had the second highest turnout of any mayoral election in the nation’s 22 largest cities from 2008-2011. Was 2011 just a particularly low turnout year all across the country, perhaps because the country was still reeling from the aftermath of the housing market collapse in 2008-2010? McDaniel ignored this factor and did not search for alternative explanations beyond his flawed thesis. Furthermore, while McDaniel suggested that RCV leads to more “overvotes” – which is an invalidated ballot in which a voter, in either a non-RCV or RCV race, makes a mistake and selects two candidates for a single choice – he failed to address that in the June 2012 US Senate primary contest, which used the typical “one-choice” plurality method and did not use RCV, there was more than five times as many overvotes in San Francisco and Oakland than in the RCV mayoral elections in those cities. Additionally, turnout had been significantly higher and more representative in RCV elections for the San Francisco Board of Supervisors races -- that McDaniel didn’t even bother to study -- as compared to previous “delayed two-round runoffs” for those offices, often higher by as much as 40% in the RCV races. Perhaps the most surprising irony was that an earlier study co-authored by McDaniel (Overvoting and the Equality of Voice under Instant-Runoff Voting in San Francisco by Francis Neely and Jason McDaniel, 2015, California Journal of Politics and Policy) found that overvotes are often more common in lower-income precincts, but that the pattern of overvoting is similar in both RCV and non-RCV contests. Wrote Neely and McDaniel: “[Overvote] errors appear to be a function of complexity in general and not IRV per se…. the pattern of overvoting is similar in both IRV and non-IRV contests…Even among votes cast in a top-of-the-ticket race like U.S. Senate, overvoting occurs in an uneven fashion” (IRV, or ‘instant runoff voting,’ is another name for ranked choice voting in single-winner contests). So McDaniel not only contradicted his own conclusion in his earlier study with Neely, but the earlier study had been an important corrective for one of the most frequently made mistakes made by anti-RCV political scientists – a continual failure to provide crucial context by pairing a comparative analysis of real world RCV elections with an analysis of real world plurality or other electoral methods. Unfortunately McDaniel’s earlier study does not get cited much by other researchers, and McDaniel did not even cite it in his own flawed study analyzed above. Incredibly, McDaniel cherrypicked McDaniel, even as his flawed study has been cited dozens of times. Despite being a textbook example of poor political “science,” featuring both inadequate as well as cherrypicked data, the shelf life of McDaniel’s study has been extended endlessly by other political scientists and media outlets who have cited it uncritically. Equally troubling, the Journal of Urban Affairs put this paper through its peer review process and published it despite its numerous flaws. McDaniel gets it wrong, Part II Not content with producing one shoddy, confused paper, McDaniel produced another one a few years later, here is the link: Electoral Rules and Voter Turnout in Mayoral Elections: An Analysis of Ranked-Choice Voting by Jason McDaniel. San Francisco State Univ. (McDaniel, 2019). In this paper, McDaniel extended his previous flawed research focused on San Francisco, about voter turnout and voter impact, to multiple RCV cities through the 2018 elections. In his data set he included San Francisco, Minneapolis, St Paul, Oakland, Berkeley, San Leandro and Santa Fe. He then compared their turnout in mayoral elections to non-RCV cities, and to mayoral elections in those cities held before first RCV usage, and concluded “a significant decrease in voter turnout of approximately 3–5 percentage points in RCV cities after the implementation of RCV.” But he replicated many of the same mistakes as his first study presented above. While in this study McDaniel attempted to distinguish between various factors, such as odd year vs. even year elections, competitive races vs. noncompetitive, contests with open seats and other factors, the analysis is superficial and inadequate. He attempts to incorporate so many often-conflicting variables that his conclusions are once again unsupported by the actual data, and ultimately unconvincing (this second study never underwent a peer review process). For example, McDaniel declared that for RCV cities “in elections that are more competitive than average (margin of victory less than 20%), there is no significant RCV effect on voter turnout.” Yet McDaniel is a professor in a city, San Francisco, in which the 2018 special election using RCV to fill a mayoral vacancy was exceedingly close, decided by a margin of only one percentage point, and resulted in the second highest turnout in San Francisco history for a mayoral election. Illustrating the complexity involved in assessing the critical factors in turnout, that special election was held on the same election day as federal and state offices, which tends to boost turnout. Yet more voters participated in that RCV mayoral election than voted on the same day in the non-RCV primary for governor in which former San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom was running. Even more puzzling, in this study McDaniel inaccurately cited his own previous study from 2015 with Neely. McDaniel wrote, “Neely and McDaniel (2015) examine individual ballot image files within a natural experiment, and find higher rates of ballot errors in RCV elections compared to non-RCV elections” (emphasis added). However, we quoted from that 2015 study several paragraphs above, and in actual fact Neely and McDaniel actually concluded the opposite -- that the pattern of overvoting – which is the most common form of ballot error – is similar in both RCV and non-RCV contests. McDaniel also ignored the fact that in Bay Area RCV elections held in even years – at the same time as federal and state elections, when turnout is highest -- the “undervote” (that is, the dropoff in ballots cast for governor or mayor) has declined, which contradicts his thesis that the act of ranking ballots in RCV elections is too complex and presents a barrier for certain demographics of voters. To his credit, McDaniel actually acknowledged another contradiction in his own paper, which found a negative RCV turnout effect in some odd-year elections but not others, admitting that “may present a challenge to the theory that increased complexity [from RCV] will have a marginal negative effect on voter turnout.” But he tried to wallpaper over that contradiction by blaming it on an unlikely source -- bad election administration. McDaniels wrote, “This would suggest that the negative impact of RCV on voter participation may be alleviated by high quality election administration,” without presenting any data or even anecdotes to support such an unfounded theory. While competent election administration of any election, whether RCV or non-RCV, is crucially important, there is no credible research that supports the far-fetched notion that the quality of election administration has much of an impact on voter turnout in US elections, whether using RCV or otherwise. Upgrade to a $5 subscription The unvirtuous circle of academic research It is puzzling how McDaniel’s first study could have survived the peer review process for the Journal of Urban Affairs. The mistakes in McDaniel’s first study above should have been obvious to anyone with a basic understanding of ranked choice voting as well as elections in general, and elections in San Francisco specifically. It undermines faith in the credibility of the peer review process to think that a jury of peer political scientists did not catch the egregious errors and reject McDaniel’s sloppy research and paper. And it remains a black mark on political science that this thoroughly discredited study has been cited dozens of times by other researchers. Indeed, in our research paper it became apparent that many political scientists cite each other’s flawed research to pad their list of citations and to legitimize their own flawed research, creating an unvirtuous circle of political science. More broadly, McDaniel’s voter turnout studies, like other studies evaluating RCV’s impact on turnout, lacked a recognition that no credible opinion or research can claim that RCV increases voter turnout merely because so many voters are excited to vote for their favorite candidates instead of “lesser evil” candidates without worrying about spoilers. Instead, with respect to turnout, the advantage of RCV has always been that, in most places where it has been used, it has eliminated a pre-November primary or post-November runoff, which usually saw about half the turnout of the November general election. This is especially true during even years when there are state and federal elections on the ballot which substantially drive turnout more than local contests. Any study that does not adequately account for this non-November primary/runoff vs November general election dynamic, or odd year vs even year election factors, is simply not credible. Both of McDaniel’s studies largely failed on those grounds. Steven Hill and Paul Haughey Share Upgrade to a $5 subscription Thanks for reading DemocracySOS…your digital portal for the pro-democracy movement. Subscribe for only $5 per month to receive full benefits and to support our work. Subscribe
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WHO RUNS MARYLAND POLITICS NOW?
ByThe Maryland Wire The Machine Didn’t Die — It Broke Apart Mike Miller is gone. Steny Hoyer is retiring. The two men who helped define Maryland political power for generations are disappearing from the map. Nobody has inherited all of what they controlled. Instead, Maryland power has fractured among Wes Moore, legislative leaders, county organizations, federal figures and a new generation fighting to connect the pieces. By The Maryland Wire For decades, there were two names in Maryland politics that required almost no explanation. Mike Miller. Steny Hoyer. You didn’t necessarily have to agree with them. You didn’t even have to like them. But everyone understood something: Not social-media power. Not cable-news power. Not the temporary power that comes from one big election. They possessed political infrastructure. Relationships. Institutional memory. Donors. Staff. Allies. County leaders. Lobbyists. Legislators. Operatives. And the ability to connect people who needed something with people capable of delivering it. Today one is gone. The other is preparing to leave Congress after more than four decades. And Maryland faces a question it hasn’t had to answer in generations: The answer may be: Nobody. At least not the way Miller once did. Maryland’s old machine wasn’t inherited by one person. It fragmented. And now several ambitious political networks are competing to assemble the pieces. Miller presided over the Maryland Senate for 33 years, becoming one of the longest-serving legislative leaders in American history. He stepped down as Senate president in 2019 and died in January 2021. (Behavioral and Social Sciences) But Miller’s real power wasn’t the title printed on his door. It was the accumulation of relationships behind it. Miller came from Maryland’s old Democratic organization and developed into an extraordinarily adaptable political operator, retaining authority even as the Senate around him became younger and more liberal. (The Washington Post) He understood something fundamental: politics is information. Who wants what? Who owes whom? Which senator needs help? Which county executive wants something in the budget? Which committee chairman can move a bill? Which lobbyist represents which client? Which candidate should receive support today because that candidate could be a senator ten years from now? Miller knew the answers because he’d spent decades collecting them. Miller’s influence wasn’t confined to elected officials. Former Miller aides became prominent Annapolis lobbyists. Maryland Matters noted figures such as Joseph Bryce and Timothy Perry among the high-profile lobbyists who had once served as top Miller aides. (Maryland Matters) That was one of Miller’s greatest political achievements. He didn’t merely accumulate power around himself. He produced alumni. Staffers became lobbyists. Legislators became committee chairs. Allies became power brokers. And decades of relationships reinforced one another. By the end, Mike Miller wasn’t simply a person. He was an ecosystem. Hoyer’s network was different. Miller’s power was rooted in Annapolis. Hoyer connected Maryland to Washington. He served in the Maryland Senate before winning election to Congress in 1981 and ultimately became one of the longest-serving members of the U.S. House and a longtime No. 2 in House Democratic leadership. In January 2026, Hoyer announced that he would retire rather than seek another term. (The Washington Post) His influence stretched through: Prince George’s County, Southern Maryland, Congress, federal agencies, donors, campaign organizations, and generations of Democratic candidates. And Hoyer had something machine builders value enormously: a succession network. That became obvious almost immediately. When Hoyer announced his retirement, Maryland’s 5th Congressional District exploded with candidates. Twenty-four Democrats entered the race. But when the votes were counted, the winner was Adrian Boafo, Hoyer’s former campaign manager. Boafo wasn’t running without establishment help. He was endorsed by Hoyer. He was endorsed by Governor Wes Moore. And he ultimately won the Democratic nomination. (AP News) In his victory speech, Boafo described the result as voters deciding it was time to “pass the torch to a new generation of leaders.” (AP News) That phrase captures the transition perfectly. Hoyer’s seat isn’t simply being vacated. Parts of his network are being transferred. But they aren’t being transferred to another Steny Hoyer. They’re being absorbed into a newer political constellation. And standing prominently inside that constellation is Wes Moore. If someone forces you to name the single person sitting nearest the center of Maryland Democratic politics today, the answer is Governor Wes Moore. The 2026 Democratic gubernatorial primary underscored the scale of his position. Moore won renomination overwhelmingly, receiving roughly 88% of the Democratic primary vote. (WBAL-TV) But raw votes tell only part of the story. Look at the party infrastructure. The Maryland Democratic Party says Steuart Pittman ran for state party chairman in 2025 “at the suggestion of Governor Wes Moore.” Pittman took office that July. (The Maryland Democratic Party) That’s important. Governors traditionally influence their state parties. But party leadership plus fundraising, endorsements, executive appointments and national relationships creates the beginning of something bigger: a political network that could survive the governor’s term. Moore also played a role in the Hoyer succession by backing Boafo. That’s how political organizations reproduce themselves. You support tomorrow’s politician today. And that’s the distinction that matters. Moore has enormous statewide visibility. Miller had decades of accumulated legislative control. Moore can endorse candidates. Miller could influence the environment in which legislators lived every day. Committee assignments. Leadership positions. Legislative priorities. Relationships that had been accumulating since before many current lawmakers entered politics. Moore may have a larger national profile than Miller ever possessed. But he doesn’t possess Miller’s half-century of Annapolis memory. Nobody does. Which is why the modern Maryland political structure looks less like a pyramid and more like several power centers connected by overlapping relationships. One of those centers belongs to Senate President Bill Ferguson. Ferguson controls an institution no governor can simply command. The Senate. Maryland’s official 2026 legislative records identify Ferguson as Senate President. (Maryland General Assembly) That means influence over: committee structure, Senate leadership, legislative priorities, confirmations, and negotiations with the House and governor. But Ferguson is not Mike Miller 2.0. Miller’s extraordinary longevity allowed him to become almost inseparable from the institution. Ferguson possesses the office. Miller possessed the office plus decades of political mythology and accumulated relationships. Those aren’t the same thing. The House now has its own new center of gravity. Official 2026 legislative records identify Joseline Peña-Melnyk as Speaker of the House of Delegates, alongside Ferguson as Senate President. (Maryland General Assembly) That makes the current Maryland governing triangle: Executive power. Senate power. House power. None fully controls the others. And that fact alone demonstrates how different modern Maryland is from the Miller era. The governor proposes. The legislature disposes. Committee leaders negotiate. County interests intervene. And political coalitions shift issue by issue. That’s not one machine. That’s a networked power structure. Then there’s U.S. Senator Angela Alsobrooks. Her significance isn’t that she is the new Hoyer. She isn’t. Hoyer spent decades constructing his network. Alsobrooks brings something different: Prince George’s County roots, a statewide electoral organization, a United States Senate platform, and relationships with national Democratic leaders. That makes her a critical bridge between Maryland and Washington at precisely the moment Hoyer leaves. Hoyer’s retirement therefore doesn’t necessarily weaken Prince George’s influence. It changes who carries it. Prince George’s itself is undergoing a dramatic generational transition. Official 2026 results show Aisha Braveboy winning the Democratic County Executive primary with 87,944 votes and 73.31% of the vote. (Maryland State Board of Elections) That’s political infrastructure. Prince George’s is one of Maryland’s central Democratic vote engines. A county executive with that level of primary support gains: appointments, budget influence, organizational relationships, donor access, and a platform for cultivating the next generation of political leadership. Braveboy therefore isn’t merely another person on the Maryland power map. She controls a place from which a political organization can be built. Boafo is particularly interesting because he sits almost perfectly at the intersection between the old and new worlds. He worked for Hoyer. Hoyer endorsed him. Moore endorsed him. Then Boafo beat an enormous Democratic field for Hoyer’s seat. (AP News) That doesn’t make him powerful on Hoyer’s scale. He’s just beginning. But it illustrates how power actually transfers: not through a ceremonial handoff, but through endorsements, donors, staff, relationships, and voter confidence. Boafo may become Hoyer’s congressional successor. He will not automatically inherit Hoyer’s 40-plus years of political capital. That part has to be rebuilt. This is the part that often gets overlooked. When a machine breaks apart, power doesn’t only move upward. Some people’s relationships become less valuable. Former Miller aides still know Annapolis. Former Miller allies still possess institutional memory. Veteran lobbyists don’t forget how legislation works. But something fundamental disappeared when Miller did: the common center. The person capable of connecting all of them instantly was gone. That changes the value of a political network. Imagine knowing everybody in Annapolis. Useful. Now imagine the person who introduced many of those people, appointed committee chairs, influenced Senate priorities and understood decades of relationships is simultaneously Senate President. Much more useful. Remove that person and the individual relationships remain. But the system becomes decentralized. First: Bill Ferguson. The Senate’s institutional relationships now run through his leadership rather than Miller’s. Second: the House leadership. With the Miller-Busch generation gone, today’s House leaders are building their own committee chairs, alliances and relationships. Third: Wes Moore. Moore became governor after Miller was gone. That distinction matters. Earlier governors had to operate with Miller sitting across State Circle. Moore entered office during a generational reset. Instead of negotiating with the old machine, he has the opportunity to help build the next network. Fourth: Angela Alsobrooks and the emerging Prince George’s generation. Hoyer is leaving. Miller is gone. The county’s political leadership now belongs to another generation. Fifth: politicians who were outside the old Miller organization. When someone dominates an institution for 33 years, inevitably some politicians develop within that organization and others outside it. Miller’s departure created room for people who may never have risen as quickly under the old structure. That’s the biggest point. If Mike Miller’s power had simply transferred to Bill Ferguson, Maryland would still have a machine. If Hoyer’s influence simply transferred to Boafo, Maryland would still have a machine. If every county leader simply took orders from Moore, Maryland would have a machine. None of those things happened. Instead: Moore controls the statewide executive platform. Ferguson controls the Senate. Peña-Melnyk controls the House. Alsobrooks has statewide and federal reach. Braveboy has Prince George’s executive power. Pittman leads the state Democratic Party after Moore encouraged him to seek the role. (The Maryland Democratic Party) Boafo represents the beginning of the post-Hoyer congressional generation. And Baltimore, Montgomery County, organized labor, donors and other county organizations maintain their own centers of influence. That’s not one machine. If you want to understand where Maryland power is moving, don’t simply watch office titles. Watch endorsements. Who does Moore support? Who does Alsobrooks support? Who gets Ferguson’s allies? Who gets House leadership? Who gets Hoyer’s blessing? Who gets labor? Who gets major donors? And most importantly: That is where the new Maryland network becomes visible. The Boafo race was a textbook example. Hoyer’s successor didn’t emerge randomly from 24 candidates. He had ties to the outgoing incumbent and support from the governor. The old network and the emerging one overlapped. And voters chose him. (AP News) Moore may ultimately become the most important person in determining whether Maryland develops another durable statewide political organization. But the test isn’t whether Moore himself remains popular. The test is what happens to the people he supports. Which delegates become senators? Which senators become committee chairs? Which county officials become executives? Which staffers become candidates? Which appointees become statewide leaders? Who gets his donor network? Who gets his political advisers? Who eventually gets his endorsement when Maryland faces a post-Moore gubernatorial succession fight? That’s how we’ll know whether Moore was merely a successful governor— or the founder of another generation of Maryland power. There’s another category worth watching: politicians who came from Miller’s Maryland but remain active in the new one. Dereck Davis is one. Anthony Brown is another. Veteran legislators and former officials throughout the state still possess old relationships that newer politicians don’t. These people can function as bridges. That’s important because political systems rarely reset completely. The new machine usually grows partly from pieces of the old one. Donors don’t disappear. Lobbyists don’t disappear. Operatives don’t disappear. Institutional memory doesn’t disappear. They find new centers of gravity. If you want one name: His overwhelming 2026 Democratic renomination, executive authority, national profile and influence within the Maryland Democratic Party make that difficult to dispute. (WBAL-TV) But saying Moore “runs Maryland” the way Miller once ran the Senate would oversimplify the reality. Maryland power today looks more like this: WES MOORE Statewide organization.Appointments.Fundraising.Executive government.National Democratic relationships. BILL FERGUSON The Senate.Committees.Confirmations.Legislative leverage. JOSELINE PEÑA-MELNYK The House.Committee leadership.Budget and legislative leverage. ANGELA ALSOBROOKS Statewide electoral organization.Federal platform.Prince George’s relationships.National Democratic connections. AISHA BRAVEBOY Prince George’s executive organization.County government.A major Democratic vote base. THE POST-HOYER GENERATION Boafo and the emerging political class that will have to rebuild Hoyer’s Washington-Maryland network rather than simply inherit it. It did something more interesting. Mike Miller’s influence was too personal, too old and too deeply rooted in his own relationships to be inherited whole. Hoyer’s network is too extensive and too intertwined with decades of congressional politics to fit neatly inside one successor. So the pieces are moving. Toward Moore. Toward Ferguson. Toward Peña-Melnyk. Toward Alsobrooks. Toward Braveboy. Toward younger candidates and new county organizations. And toward veteran political survivors who understand both eras. That’s the next chapter of Maryland politics. The person who eventually connects: Annapolis, Prince George’s, Montgomery County, Baltimore, labor, business, donors, the Maryland Democratic Party, and the congressional delegation will possess something Maryland hasn’t truly seen since Miller’s heyday. Not merely another elected official. And maybe that’s why searching for “the next Mike Miller” is the wrong exercise. There may never be another one. The more important question is: Miller spent half a century becoming that person. Hoyer spent decades becoming another version of it. Maryland’s current political leaders are still competing for the privilege. And until somebody actually connects all those pieces, the most accurate answer to the question “Who runs Maryland?” may be the most fascinating one of all: No one does. Not anymore. But there are plenty of people trying. Sources University of Maryland and Maryland Matters — Miller’s 33-year Senate presidency and political legacy. (Behavioral and Social Sciences) Washington Post historical reporting — Miller’s rise from Maryland machine politics and ability to retain power as the Senate evolved. (The Washington Post) Maryland Matters — former top Miller aides who moved into Annapolis lobbying and the changing Senate power structure. (Maryland Matters) Washington Post and Reuters — Hoyer’s January 2026 retirement announcement after more than four decades in Congress and his long Democratic leadership career. (The Washington Post) Associated Press — Adrian Boafo’s 2026 victory in the Democratic primary to succeed Hoyer, including Hoyer and Moore’s support and Boafo’s “pass the torch” remarks. (AP News) Maryland Democratic Party — Steuart Pittman’s official biography stating that he sought the state chairmanship at Moore’s suggestion. (The Maryland Democratic Party) Maryland General Assembly — official 2026 records identifying Bill Ferguson as Senate President and Joseline Peña-Melnyk as Speaker. (Maryland General Assembly) Maryland State Board of Elections — official 2026 Prince George’s County results showing Aisha Braveboy’s dominant County Executive primary victory. (Maryland State Board of Elections) 2026 election reporting — Moore’s overwhelming Democratic gubernatorial primary victory. (WBAL-TV)
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If Not AOC, Then Who?
What do we do if Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez decides not to run for president in 2028? It makes sense that many leftists are currently focused on calling on her to take the plunge. But the absence of a Plan B, or even much discussion about one, is worrisome. The US Left can’t afford to sit out the 2028 Democratic primary. Doing so in 2024 was a disaster: our abstention self-marginalized anti-billionaire politics from the national conversation and thereby gave space for Harris to pivot to the “center” (i.e. the policy preferences of corporate donors, establishment hacks, and AIPAC). Abstaining again in 2028 would be especially counterproductive since democratic socialists now have so much wind in our sails after our big electoral wins in NYC and across the country. It’s time to deepen our momentum, organization, and profile — not to retreat to the margins during America’s single most important political battle. Even more urgently, keeping Trump’s heir out of the White House may depend on whether leftists and the party’s unprecedentedly disenchanted base can force the Democrats in 2028 to take meaningful steps towards a very angry electorate and away from the corporate-consultant blob that has helped get us into this mess. If AOC (or Abdul El-Sayed) decides to run, we should enthusiastically go all in — DSA, fighting unions, progressive organizations, anybody who wants to see a better country and world. But, as far as I can tell from the outside, there’s a real chance that she doesn’t run. And we can’t just wait and see where she lands before discussing alternatives, since AOC’s decision might not come for quite a while, giving us little time to scramble at the last minute for an alternative. So we should start working now on getting a Plan B into motion, and recruiting a good candidate for the role. Here’s one idea. A Worker Candidate — Healthcare Not Warfare 2028 Run a union worker Leftists don’t need to always run experienced, well-known socialist politicians for high-profile contests. Lula, the current president of Brazil, began his political career as a metalworker militant who ran for governor of São Paulo in 1982. Especially in an era of institutional distrust, it’s possible to lean hard into making a virtue out of a working-class comrade’s distance from traditional politics. Experience abroad shows this clearly. Rachel Kéké — an immigrant hotel housekeeper — ran as the candidate of the leftist La France Insoumise for the National Assembly in 2022, defeating a former minister in the Macron government. The Belgian Workers’ Party in 2024 won its first Flemish seat in the European Parliament by running Rudi Kennes, a three-decade veteran of the Opel Antwerp auto factory. And the South Korean left in 2024 elected auto factory militant Yoon Jong-oh to the National Assembly. If a tiny French Trotskyist organization could make such a big splash in 2002 and 2007 by running a well-spoken postal worker cadre for office — the LCR’s Olivier Besancenot received about 1.5 million first-round votes — it’s not far-fetched to expect that a much larger organization like DSA, together with a broader coalition of the willing, could run this playbook to much greater effect. This is especially the case now that almost everything DSA does immediately becomes a national news story. We don’t need someone famous. We just need a charismatic, well-vetted comrade who works in a relatable working-class occupation — e.g. a nurse, or a worker in auto or construction, or at Amazon. Ideally, they have a compelling personal story or have been part of a significant strike or organizing campaign, but even those criteria don’t necessarily have to be deal-breakers. The main lesson of the Graham Platner fiasco isn’t that we should never run outsiders for office (the momentum he generated proves the exact opposite), but that they need proper vetting and roots in democratic membership organizations like DSA or a union. In any case, there are plenty of ways to signal working-class authenticity without resorting to Platner’s or Fetterman’s performative macho white dude affect. Better to have someone of any gender or race who is actually working class, with firm socialist politics, who can speak from experience about the day-to-day realities of trying to make it in America. There are surely at least a dozen such worker leaders in our movement nationwide; we just need to sit down and convince one that their personal sacrifice for the greater good (i.e. running for president) will be worth it. If we don’t have a frontrunner with a clear path to victory like AOC (or El-Sayed, were he to win Michigan), it’s better to embrace someone whose decision to run in itself tells an important story about US politics: workers have been iced out of our political system and are now fighting hard to break back in. The novelty factor, in itself, would generate press. And it would help democratic socialists signal to the American public that our movement’s defining characteristic is that we represent workers vs. bosses, not that we’re “the furthest left” force in American politics — a framework that suggests we’re extremists and that helps our opponents isolate us from non-college-educated voters by highlighting extremely minoritarian (and misguided) stances included in DSA’s platform like prison abolition. We don’t get many opportunities to speak to tens of millions of Americans; we need to use these opportunities to broaden our appeal beyond those already in our orbit. Run to polarize the 2028 primary and general election around “Medicare for All” and “End All Aid to Israel” Why should democratic socialists use our scarce time and volunteer energy to run in a race we’re unlikely to win? Running in the 2028 primary will not only recruit us scores of members (imagine having a DSA member intervening in eleven nationally televised primary debates!), but — more importantly — it has the potential to be a decisive leap forward towards an America that finally starts meeting the needs of working people instead of HMO and AIPAC billionaire donors. Polarizing litmus tests are good, actually — as long as they’re fought for around popular demands in a thoughtful and strategic way. Democratic socialists have an opportunity and responsibility to make the 2028 primary about two of the most widely and deeply felt issues of our moment: domestically, America’s unaffordable, family-breaking private healthcare system; internationally, America’s bankrolling of the genocidal Israeli government. A candidacy relentlessly demanding Medicare for All and No Aid to Israel would pose a sharp question to the American public, the Democratic Party, and other 2028 contenders: Why can’t working-class Americans afford their healthcare bills at the same time that our government is spending at least $3.8 billion yearly to fund an Israeli regime eager to keep dragging us and the world into more forever wars? Our candidate can agitate around a clear message: I’m running to give voice to all those working-class Americans who are struggling to get by. No matter what state you live in, who you voted for in 2024, or your background, it’s just plain common sense that we should make healthcare more affordable instead of spending billions to enable the Israeli government’s crimes against humanity. Every American who agrees with me when I say ‘Medicare for All — Not a Dime for Israel’ should make their voice heard through our campaign. Racking up a high number of votes for this agenda is a crucial way to show the Democratic Party and the country as a whole that we can’t keep supporting a life-destroying status quo in our healthcare system and in the Middle East. If we want to defeat Trump’s handpicked crony this coming November, we need to speak to ordinary people’s frustrations with the status quo — we can’t keep running the same tired establishment playbook and expecting a different result. For those highly engaged voters (or skeptical media pundits) who raise concerns about wasting votes, the candidate can take the time to explain why this isn’t the case: It's true I'm a long shot. But Zohran showed anything can happen — and voting for me is a pragmatic decision, not a wasted vote. In a heavily divided primary with a large number of candidates and a very discredited establishment, my campaign and the democratic socialist movement I’m part of are positioned to be the balance of power if we can get a large enough number of voters to loudly demand Healthcare Not Warfare. Since there’s a high chance no candidate will get to 50% in the 2028 primaries, the Democrats could very well be heading towards a brokered convention, where a disciplined, principled current committed to breaking from corporate donors can play an outsized role in making sure whoever ends up with the nomination raises the banner of single-payer healthcare and cutting aid to Israel. How exactly could running this sort of primary campaign be translated into actual leverage? The candidate replies: I’m aiming to win the nomination, but if I don’t achieve that goal, my delegates and I will pledge our support in the primary only for a candidate who agrees in the general election to call for ending US aid to Israel and establishing Medicare for All at home. These are both winning planks for November against the Republicans, and the only reason I can see that other candidates haven’t yet raised these is that they’re still more scared of the donor class than they are of the people. That needs to change. If Democratic leaders want young people, workers, and those sick of the status quo to show up in big numbers this November, they need to meet us halfway. In this way, whether or not we win the nomination, democratic socialists could still play a decisive role in 2028. The approach outlined here is similar to what radical left parties periodically do in parliamentary democracies like Denmark or Sweden when they find themselves as a junior partner electorally: they dictate to center-left allies what their terms would be for enabling, from the outside, the formation of a new government. Running a Healthcare Not Warfare candidate will make it significantly more likely that the 2028 Democratic candidate stands with ordinary people instead of donors on these two pivotal planks — a shift that will, in turn, make it easier to achieve the existentially important task of defeating MAGA’s heir in November. Look at how much popular traction the Uncommitted movement got with a similar strategy in 2024 with so little on-the-ground organization — surely we can go much further with a working-class candidate, a much bigger DSA, and a Democratic Party base that has turned against Israel, billionaires, and the hacks in the party who prop them up. Objections and Responses There are quite a few objections to this proposal, many of which are very reasonable. Let me briefly address each here. Socialists shouldn’t waste their scarce time and resources on a candidate unlikely to win. This is a good rule in general, but there are important exceptions, and presidential elections are the main one. There’s no other political contest that gets anything like this level of attention and engagement in the US, so if you want to be a serious force in nationwide politics, you basically can’t afford not to have a candidate. Far from being an overall drain on our resources, running a dynamic 2028 campaign would likely result in a major net increase in members and capacity. In that spirit, the very pragmatic Milwaukee sewer socialists — who mostly ran to win at home in Wisconsin — supported Eugene Debs’s propagandistic presidential campaigns, which they correctly saw as a crucial means of recruiting to the Socialist Party. And now that the (post-1972) Democratic Party gives more weight to voters than party operatives in determining its presidential nomination, it’s become feasible to run as a socialist in primaries without risking a split in the vote against the Republicans in November. We should just support Ro Khanna, who also supports M4A and ending aid to Israel. I like Ro Khanna and would enthusiastically vote and canvass for him for president were he to get the nomination. But there’s a real chance that Khanna’s bid for office doesn’t catch on; he lacks the grassroots organizational apparatus of DSA, and, because he’s not really of the Left or labor (despite his current very good positions), he’s unlikely to generate the type of buy-in and enthusiasm that a DSA candidate would. Moreover, Khanna would be running as an individual, not as someone emerging from and building an organized movement — his campaign would not likely focus on building sustained power from below, nor would it likely polarize the 2028 primary around M4A and Israel aid. Also, and not inconsequentially, the poor electoral results for Tom Steyer and Saikat Chakrabarti this spring suggest that there’s perhaps not much of a popular appetite in the Democrats’ base to support multi-millionaire class traitors. Much better, then, to run a democratic socialist worker. If by Super Tuesday it’s clear that our campaign has captured the main left lane in the primary, Khanna should drop out and endorse us; conversely, if he’s managed to capture this lane, DSA could at that point transform its Healthcare Not Warfare campaign into an independent campaign to elect Ro Khanna focused on winning (and holding him accountable to) those two critical planks. An openness to consolidating an anti-corporate candidate by Super Tuesday is a necessary component of the strategy I’m proposing, because otherwise we risk splitting the primary votes (per DNC rules, you need at least 15% to get any delegates to convention). We should convince Shawn Fain or Sara Nelson to run for president instead. I agree it’d be great if either ran for president, but my impression is that there’s basically no chance that will happen in 2028, because both are firmly focused on their union leadership duties (and, in the case of Fain, beating back a federal witch-hunt). This plan could have DSA end up endorsing a non-socialist, non-DSAer for president. That’s against our principles. It’s a myth, and bad politics, that socialists can’t ever support candidates who aren’t members of their organization and/or who don’t call themselves socialists. Bernie, after all, was not a DSAer. And socialists abroad regularly make tactical decisions about if and when supporting a non-socialist candidate makes sense from the standpoint of promoting working-class interests, defending democracy, and building a socialist current in the process. If your “principles” prevent you and DSA from helping achieve the momentous stride forward of having a Democratic candidate in 2028 run on Medicare for All and ending aid to Israel, those “principles” are not very good. In fact, they actively undermine the causes they’re aiming to support. We shouldn’t confuse principles (working-class independence) with tactics (the best way to advance this in a given context). In my recent article in Catalyst on Milwaukee sewer socialism (I’ve uploaded the full text here), I have a section showing how similarly rigid rules about endorsements had to be eventually discarded in the old Socialist Party nationwide after WWI because they tended to lead socialists towards a sectarian abstention from broader anti-corporate electoral insurgencies beyond their party’s control. For what it’s worth, Lenin’s current under Tsarism frequently backed bourgeois candidates in the second round of elections and Lenin himself advocated that British Communists support Labour Party candidates; for his part, Kautsky in 1912 defended the German Social Democracy’s electoral pact with the Progressives in the runoffs. If our predecessors could be that tactically flexible in an era before the limits of their underlying strategic assumptions about intransigent class politics in capitalist democracies were made clear, then there’s no need to insist on being more tactically rigid today, after a century’s worth of accumulated experience. As long as you maintain your own political profile and organization while engaging in broader coalitional efforts, there’s zero inherent contradiction with the principle of political independence. More specifically: DSA and allied organizations should enthusiastically back Michigan’s Abdul El-Sayed if AOC declines to run and he throws his hat in the presidential ring. (I have no idea whether he’s even considering this path, but there’ll surely be chatter about it if he wins his Senate race this November.) Though he doesn’t call himself a socialist, El-Sayed is a principled Berniecrat, a consistent fighter for Palestine, and would have a clear path to victory. Using the “s” word is far less important than whether a campaign fights for the interests of working people at home and abroad — and whether actively participating in it can grow the organized working class and the Left. And the same holds true if a less anti-corporate candidate were, under pressure, to adopt our two Healthcare Not Warfare planks. Why focus only on M4A and ending US aid to Israel? There are so many other important issues to fight for! Obviously there are many pivotal issues beyond healthcare and Israel, and our candidate — and especially our organizations involved in the campaign — should be prepared to speak on all of these. But one of the crucial lessons of the Zohran campaign is that you have to relentlessly stay on message if you want to cut through the noise. CNN and Fox News will want to talk about DSA’s views on Venezuela and abolishing the police; we need to polarize the debate on the widely and deeply felt issues that are most favorable for growing the Left, isolating our opponents, and winning urgently needed changes. One recent poll found 63% of Americans support M4A, even after respondents were told it would raise taxes and eliminate most private insurance. Another found that 74% of Democrats opposed “providing additional economic and military support to Israel.” And focusing on two demands sets the campaign up to be able to leverage its mandate to make clear demands upon other candidates (which we can’t do if we run with a laundry list of demands). Talking about a Plan B is a distraction from the more urgent work of building a groundswell of calls on AOC to run. It’s good for DSAers, fightback unionists, and progressive organizations to try to convince AOC to run. This proposal is meant as an addendum to pushes to get AOC to run and to line DSA up for that eventuality, not as a substitute for those efforts. But I’m worried that, like in 2024, we might eventually find ourselves with no time to find a viable alternative unless we start now. DSA, with its abundant deliberative processes, moves slowly. The approach you’re suggesting seems risky. If a DSA candidate runs but doesn’t receive a lot of votes, it’ll undercut our current national momentum. This is a reasonable worry. All big initiatives always carry risks, and the path I’m advocating is certainly not free of these. That said, if a Healthcare Not Warfare campaign doesn’t catch on like we envisioned, it’s a pretty simple pivot in March 2028 to explain that in the future we really need our standard-bearers like AOC, or our growing bench of national electeds, to step up in presidential primaries. Moreover, it’s worth noting that the risk of my Plan B proposal is on the whole significantly less than the risk entailed by an AOC run. We should all back her if she runs, since she’d fire up the base, provide huge openings for organizing, have a real shot at defeating a Republican (especially given MAGA’s unpopularity), be a great standard-bearer for our issues, particularly M4A and ending aid to Israel, and be less willing than mainstream candidates to capitulate to any anti-democratic machinations from Trump and co. But it’s also true that AOC could lose, which would be a devastating setback to the country and the Left. Or she could win and find herself unable to pass much, if any, of her (and our) program, a demoralizing prospect. So if we’re willing to take these risks with AOC (and we should), it follows that we should be able to take lower-level risks if she doesn’t throw her hat in the ring. What’s Your Plan B? The US Left is facing its biggest opening for growth and influence since the 1930s. Initiatives that would have been impossible a few months ago are now potentially feasible. A President AOC is now easier to imagine, but if she ultimately assesses that the risks aren’t worth the potential reward in 2028, we can’t be left flat-footed. So even if you’re not convinced by the specifics of my Plan B, I hope you can at least agree that it’d be a disaster for us not to have one — and not to start getting a Plan B into motion. Hopefully other organizers and political currents will put forward their responses and alternative ideas ASAP. The stakes are too high to just wait and see. More As always, please share this article widely. This newsletter depends on all you lovely people to get the word out. Thank you! I uploaded the full text of my Catalyst article on Milwaukee sewer socialism here (it’s updated and 3x as long as the version published earlier on this substack). If you haven’t yet, please make sure to subscribe to Catalyst here; I read every issue front to back, highly recommend. 🌹🎵 Ivan Lins (arranged by Arthur Verocai) — “General da Banda” 🌹🎵
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A state election in eastern Germany has become a revealing test of the changing political landscapes of Germany and Europe, writes Jiang Feng, Professor and Chairman of the Council of the Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies (SAGGAS) at Shanghai International Studies University. His analysis follows the decisive victory of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) (which has been classified as right-wing extremist by German authorities)in the state of Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September, in which it finished far ahead of its mainstream rivals. Jiang previously served as Minister-Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in Berlin. The following article was published on 8 September 2026 on huanqiu.com, the online platform of the Global Times. On 6 September, the results of the state election in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, were announced. The Alternative for Germany (AfD), classified as far-right by German authorities, made history by becoming the largest party in the state parliament, winning 43.8 per cent of the vote — twice its share in the previous election. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had governed the state continuously for 24 years, won just 17.2 per cent, its worst result ever in Saxony-Anhalt. On the night the results were announced, the atmosphere at the CDU gathering was unusually calm. There was neither shock nor argument, as if the defeat had long been expected. Several veteran party members who had spent years working in the state government said: “Defeat is not a bad thing. It is time to make changes.” This state election has not only upended Saxony-Anhalt’s political landscape, but also laid bare the deep tensions between Germany’s traditional party structure and model of governance, on the one hand, and an increasingly polarised society on the other. Its repercussions are already being felt at the federal level, making Saxony-Anhalt a useful case study of the broader trend towards political polarisation and realignment in Europe. Governing Difficulties after Electoral Victory The most immediate consequence of the election is a historic setback for the mainstream party order that took shape in post-war Germany. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD has leapt from a peripheral party to the largest political force in the state. Its electoral base has expanded beyond the traditional category of “marginal protest voters” to take on the characteristics of a cross-class coalition. The party has not only consolidated its support in rural areas, but also attracted many middle-class voters and even members of the social elite with stable jobs, their own homes, and substantial incomes. It has thus evolved from a “protest party” into one with the potential to govern. Despite its commanding lead in the vote, however, the AfD faces an institutional obstacle to governing the state: the mainstream parties’ long-standing “firewall” against it. Neither of the two potential routes to forming a government appears likely to break the current political deadlock. The first would be a coalition of establishment parties, led by the CDU and bringing together the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, the Left Party (Die Linke) and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in a cross-camp government. In terms of parliamentary arithmetic, such a coalition could prevent the AfD from forming a government and preserve the outward stability of the traditional political order. Yet these parties are fundamentally divided over key issues including immigration, the energy transition, economic management, and cultural and education policy. Coalition negotiations would therefore be extremely difficult, and even if a government could be formed, it would most likely prove short-lived. More importantly, an alliance of establishment parties aimed at keeping the largest party out of government would play directly into the AfD’s narrative that “political elites are suppressing public opinion”. It could deepen perceptions of political unfairness, further strengthening the AfD’s political capital, and creating a dynamic in which “the more it is suppressed, the more people vote for it”. Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD’s candidate for state premier, has said that if efforts to form a government fail because other parties refuse to cooperate, the AfD will push for a fresh election, which he believes could deliver the party an absolute majority of seats. This points to more intense political battles ahead. The second option would be a coalition between the AfD and the BSW. Together, the two parties would command a simple majority in parliament, making this, on paper, the quickest route to forming a government. The BSW is the only elected party that has not ruled out cooperation with the AfD, and the two parties share some common ground, including on policy towards Russia. There is therefore a degree of political basis for cooperation. Were such a coalition to materialise, Germany would see its first state government jointly formed by a party defined as far-right and one with a far-left background, creating what might be called a “bipolar anti-establishment alliance”. Such an outcome would fundamentally break with the ideological boundaries of post-war German party politics. It is worth noting that even if the AfD ultimately fails to enter the state government, its roughly 47 per cent share of parliamentary seats would give it a powerful blocking minority. Without its consent, major decisions requiring a two-thirds majority — including constitutional amendments, significant budgetary adjustments, and state-level institutional reforms — would be extremely difficult to pass. Therefore, whoever ultimately forms the government, the AfD will be an unavoidable force in Saxony-Anhalt politics, with a direct influence on the state’s legislative process. Systemic Failures in Germany’s Governance Model The Saxony-Anhalt election result reflects a systemic failure of Germany’s post-war mainstream-party model of governance to adapt to rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions. It stems from multiple, mutually reinforcing structural tensions and highlights the existing political system’s difficulty in adapting to “an increasingly polarised society First, collective anxiety has replaced individual material hardship as a central driver of political mobilisation. The rise of the AfD can no longer be explained simply by poverty or social marginalisation. Its increasingly cross-class electoral base suggests that what is driving voters towards the party is, above all, concern about the broader direction of society. This anxiety about the future of the political community goes beyond individual gains and losses. In political discourse, economic anxiety has become closely intertwined with immigration, while immigration and refugee issues are, in essence, questions of social fairness. This perception turns conflicts over the distribution of social resources into negative assessments of governing parties, providing a broad social basis for far-right political narratives. Second, regional disparities and East German identity have undermined the strategy of addressing eastern Germany’s structural challenges at the regional level. More than three decades after German reunification, eastern states such as Saxony-Anhalt have experienced periods of economic growth, but their underlying economic structures remain weak, and household incomes and wealth remain significantly below those in western Germany. At the same time, they continue to face population outflow, an ageing population, labour shortages, and other structural challenges. At a deeper level, historical experiences — including the collapse of the former East German economic system, mass unemployment during the transition, and the westward shift of decision-making power over major issues — have left some residents with a sense of being “second-class citizens” and of being excluded. For years, the German government treated the “syndrome” of reunification as a regional problem to be gradually addressed at the local level. That approach is becoming increasingly unsustainable, as regional development disparities emerge as a core structural factor shaping national politics. Third, the erosion of institutional trust is perhaps the most decisive factor. AfD supporters tend to distrust establishment institutions, including parliament, government, and the mainstream media. Their concerns about economic security, pensions, and social fairness are significantly greater than the social average. Increasingly, their support for the AfD reflects not an expectation that the existing system can be improved, but a search for an alternative to the current political order. Such a systemic deficit of trust will be extremely difficult for the traditional parties to repair in the short term. Fourth, a generational shift in political mobilisation has amplified political polarisation. Unlike traditional parties, which rely heavily on offline rallies and mainstream media coverage, the AfD has developed a social-media mobilisation strategy built around “raising an issue — identifying who is responsible — offering a simplified solution — building a shared identity”. It turns complex social tensions into concise political narratives, rapidly channelling public sentiment into political support. The contrast on the eve of the election was particularly telling. The establishment parties, together with trade unions and churches, organised an offline march attended by more than 10,000 people, but its reach was largely confined to those present and to traditional media coverage. The AfD held a much smaller indoor event, yet livestreaming on TikTok, YouTube, and other platforms, combined with the involvement of online influencers, gave it a reach and mobilising capacity far beyond that of the march. The contrast illustrates how the traditional parties’ methods of political mobilisation are increasingly struggling to keep pace with a political environment transformed by changes in media technology. A Microcosm of Structural Political Change in Europe The shockwaves from the Saxony-Anhalt election quickly travelled beyond the state to the federal level. Calls for political accountability followed immediately after the results were announced. The governing CDU and SPD are now under enormous pressure, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil face an unprecedented test. Political polarisation in Germany is no longer simply a regional phenomenon. The post-war model of multiparty government by establishment parties is breaking down and being reshaped. Viewed in a broader European context, the Saxony-Anhalt election is part of a continent-wide wave of party polarisation, mainstream-party decline, and rising right-wing forces. Far from an isolated phenomenon, it is a microcosm of the structural political changes unfolding across Europe. Weak economic growth, cultural tensions over immigration, and declining trust in institutions are fuelling the rise of right-wing forces in several countries, challenging the liberal internationalist order established in post-war Europe. As a core member state of the European Union, Germany’s ability to adapt its political system and the direction of its politics will have profound implications for both European integration and the evolution of the international order. Subscribe [ Pekingnology China’s Germany watchers take stock of Berlin’s uneasy turn On 7 December 2025, nearly 50 Chinese scholars and policy researchers gathered in Beijing for the 2025年德国形势年终研讨会 “2025 Year-End Seminar on the Situation in Germany… Read more 9 months ago · 31 likes · 1 comment · YIRUI LI and Yuxuan JIA ](https://www.pekingnology.com/p/chinas-germany-watchers-take-stock?utm_source=substack&utm_campaign=post_embed&utm_medium=web&embedding_publication_id=1151841) [ Jiang Feng on Germany's 2025 and beyond: no easy exit ](https://www.eastisread.com/p/jiang-feng-on-germanys-2025-and-beyond) Yirui LI and Yuxuan JIA · Jan 24 The following is an op-ed by Jiang Feng, published on 29 December 2025 at Shanghai Observer 上观新闻, the digital platform of Jiefang Daily, the official newspaper of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). [ Read full story ](https://www.eastisread.com/p/jiang-feng-on-germanys-2025-and-beyond)
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Germany’s Political Tailspin: Your Weekly SPIEGEL Recap
It might be tempting to dismiss the results of last Sunday’s state election in Saxony-Anhalt, in which the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party raked in 43.8 percent of the vote, as a rather unimportant extremist blip in a state that hardly anyone can find on the map. And you wouldn’t necessarily be wrong to do so. The state’s population – around 2.1 million – is a mere 2.5 percent of the German total. And while the state capital of Magdeburg was once the political heart of the Holy Roman Empire back when Otto the Great used to hang out there (more than a millenium … no … milennium … nope … millennium ago), it is today something of a backwater, albeit one with a ginormous cathedral in its center. We wanted to briefly interrupt this week’s newsletter to extend a heartfelt thank you to all of our subscribers, both new and old. And to remind you all that a free subscription gets you access to this newsletter every Saturday. A paid subscription, by contrast, gets you one DER SPIEGEL article every weekday, delivered to your inbox. We strive to select pieces that both demonstrate what Europe’s leading newsmagazine has to offer and provide an international audience – namely, you – with an insight into how Germany and Europe view the world. If you haven’t already signed up for a paid subscription, please consider doing so if you can. Our Substack channel relies entirely on reader support and we are excited to continue offering you the best of DER SPIEGEL. Subscribe But even beyond the fact that a huge percentage of the voters in the state decided to place an X next to a party with an ideological lineage that runs rather directly back to the right-wing extremist soup out of which the Nazi Party was born, the results are a perfect example of a phenomenon that has been plaguing German elections in recent years: the lack of an obvious path to a majority. Call it the Balkanization of German politics. There are a number of developments driving the phenomenon, but for the purposes of this newsletter, here are two of the most salient: Persistent voter frustration with the country’s two (former) big-tent parties – the Christian Democrats (CDU) on the center-right (17.2 percent in Saxony-Anhalt last Sunday) and the Social Democrats (SPD) on the center-left (9.3 percent). The presence of parties on the far left (Left Party), the populist left (the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – BSW) and the far right (AfD) with which mainstream parties are reluctant to form coalitions. So what happens now? Stories of the Week A Lack of Leadership The answer for many people in the country, and particularly within the CDU, is clear: pin (some of) the blame on Chancellor Friedrich Merz. According to a survey taken directly after the election in Saxony-Anhalt, 88 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that if the federal government in Berlin were doing a better job, the AfD wouldn’t be as strong. And it is true that the predominant impression of the federal government ever since Merz was sworn in on May 6, 2025, is one of ineffectiveness and bickering. His rather unique combination of bumbling-plus-bravado has also not exactly endeared him to the German public. Indeed, his standing in the country is so shaky that his popularity – according to recent polls – has now dropped even below the historic lows associated with his predecessor Olaf Scholz. The situation is such that the CDU even opted to keep him largely out of the campaign ahead of the Saxony-Anhalt vote. And since then, dissatisfied rumblings within the CDU have grown louder. DER SPIEGEL’s Swantje Karich notes that the problems with the CDU go much deeper than Merz. “The center-right has a trust problem. At a press appearance following the devastating election result in Saxony-Anhalt, Friedrich Merz said that the party wanted to ‘reach people more effectively’ through ‘emotional engagement.’ It sounded as though he were announcing a political program. On the basis of that statement, it is difficult to take his empathy seriously.” “The Chancellor’s chastened appearance did, at least, reveal where he stands: with his back to the wall. Elections will be held in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania next week, and the CDU could fare even worse there. The party is polling at between 8 and 10 percent in the state.” “What is at stake is the political tradition that has lent stability to the Federal Republic since 1945: a democratic conservatism that understands what must be preserved, but also how to embrace progress and openness to the world. If the Union continues along its current path, it risks becoming politically irrelevant after the 2029 federal election – and Germany could soon find itself with a government of the far right.” The Trumpification of Political Debate? It is often said in Germany that to understand the political and social trends that will soon be dominant in Europe, one need only look across the Atlantic to the United States. When it comes to political debate, that has certainly proven true. Donald Trump understood early on that triggering mouth-foaming outrage among Democrats is an ideal way to both generate headlines and to secure loyalty among supporters. And he realized that far more quickly than the left side of the political spectrum understood that simply ignoring the old man might be the best recipe. To be sure, there have been signs recently that the US president may be over-relying on the strategy. Earlier this week, in an apparent grandpa-discovers-AI moment, Trump sent out 60 posts in the space of 10 hours, many of them AI-assisted images portraying him as a hero – or showing Iceland as part of the US (outrageous!!!). It was also during that slew of schlock that he explicitly backed the AfD with an “MGGA” post. In Germany, though, the outrage cycle remains in full swing, with much of the focus on those who would dare to vote for the AfD. They are alternately portrayed as being dim-witted, ungrateful, backward, racist or all of the above. That, argues DER SPIEGEL columnist Sabine Rennefanz, is not particularly helpful. “Everywhere on election night, people spoke of a watershed moment, a rupture, a turning point. But what is that supposed to mean in concrete terms? A watershed would imply an interruption, a moment of pause – perhaps even a willingness to rethink and learn. At first, there was little sign of that in the main television panels. Instead, the familiar rituals that had already shaped the election campaign continued: outrage, lecturing and abuse.” “That’s just the tone, one might object. They’re only talk shows. Given that the party’s state branch has been classified by domestic intelligence officials as confirmed right-wing extremist, there are more important problems than hurt feelings on television. Yet although the condescending tone is not the cause of the AfD’s success, it is an expression of the broader mood within the so-called political center – a kind of institutional blindness that too often treats material concerns as a communications problem.” “People have a pretty good sense of whether you like them – whether you approach them with curiosity or merely study, lecture and manage them as a problem group. They notice whether you genuinely want to understand their fears and pain, or whether you are simply waiting for the chance to correct them. They can also tell whether someone still has the energy to change things, or whether they have barricaded themselves behind platitudes and empty phrases.” “Anyone who wants an egalitarian democratic society cannot promise equality only to those whose language, tastes and moral convictions they share. They must also acknowledge the wounds, resentments and fears of those whose political conclusions they consider wrong. Acknowledging them does not mean agreeing with them. But a democracy that communicates with almost half its citizens only through warnings and labels gives up on political debate before it has even begun. An atmosphere must be created in which people can express their opinions without fearing that they will be canceled. We are currently a long way from that.” East-West? One of the clear undercurrents in the election last Sunday was, of course, Germany’s ongoing east-west divide, particularly as it pertains to the success of the AfD. Historically, the party has been far stronger in the former East German states than in former West German states. The fact that this generalization no longer reliably holds is certainly one of the primary concerns that many have about the party’s growth. And yet, there is still a distinct flavor of “stupid easterners, they don’t understand democracy” to the coverage. In the weeks before the vote, there was even a rather interesting back-and-forth in Germany’s culture pages about how ungrateful eastern Germans allegedly are for being pulled out of their pre-reunification backwardness and into the light of the West. DER SPIEGEL’s Jochen-Martin Gutsch has had enough. “Ten years ago, in 2016, elections were also held in Saxony-Anhalt. The AfD won more than 20 percent, which at the time rightly provoked outrage and incomprehension in western Germany. Today, in 2026, the AfD is also polling at around 20 percent in western German states, but this no longer provokes outrage and incomprehension. Instead, it is now regarded as proof of democratic conviction and civilizational resistance. After all, in the east, it’s 40 percent!” “This allows people to continue feeling morally superior to the East, but the wiser course would be to admit: if something doesn’t happen soon, the West will turn AfD-blue too. Or bluish.” “But will anything happen? The truly depressing thing about election night was not so much the AfD leaders intoxicated by their own success. It was the representatives of the other parties, who once again said that they were utterly shocked, needed some time to digest the result and would, of course, not simply return to business as usual. The SPD, a former big-tent party, celebrated its ‘stable’ result of 9.3 percent. Congratulations!” “For 10 years, the AfD has gone from one electoral success to the next. And still, the established parties remain ‘shocked’ and scratch their heads in astonishment. How long can they keep being shocked? Friedrich Merz says he may need to communicate his reform ideas in a more ‘emotional’ way. So the CDU’s political professionals sit down together after the election, mull over a strategy, and in the end come up with this: Fritz, try to be a little more relaxed, charismatic and emotional – or something. Beyond that: no political plan, no defiance, no promise of a future. That is frightening.” What was good, what was bad for democracy? Good: Voter turnout in Saxony-Anhalt was 77.8 percent, the highest ever recorded in the state. Whatever one thinks of the result, that figure is encouraging. Democracy needs citizens to take an interest. Bad: Although a strong AfD result had been expected in Saxony-Anhalt, many politicians from the mainstream parties – including in Berlin – appeared confused, helpless and overwhelmed in their initial reactions. That is not how they will win back voters’ trust. Last Week’s Highlights: 🗳️ Meet the Germans Who Voted for the AfD: Why would voters in a country like Germany, with its Nazi past, vote for a right-wing party? It’s a question only an editor in Berlin could come up with. On the ground, the view is different. 🟦 How the AfD Wants to Expand Its Power Across Germany: The far-right AfD is planning to decimate public broadcasting in Saxony-Anhalt, revamp education and install extremists in positions of power. And it is eyeing victory on the national stage as well. 🕯️ The Continuing Reverberations of September 11: It was a generational shock, and the consequences can still be felt today - from massive surveillance and significant increases in presidential power to violent excesses at ICE. 🤝 “For Europe, Canada Is the Preferred Partner in Trans-Atlantic Relations”: In an interview with DER SPIEGEL, Canadian Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne discusses his country’s failed trade deal with the US and why Canada is looking to Europe. 🏛️ The True Historical Roots of the AfD: During the Weimar Republic in the 1920s, there were numerous parties on the extreme right espousing “Germany first” nationalism. The Nazis may not be the best comparison for today’s AfD. 🌊 AfD in a Landslide: Merz Is the Wrong Leader for Germany: The right-wing Alternative for Germany won in a landslide in Saxony-Anhalt state elections on Sunday. What does that mean for the country at large? Thank you for your continued support and have a wonderful week! Subscribe Share Leave a comment Your SPIEGEL Substack Team Compiled and edited by Charles Hawley
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The States Try to Topple WarnerMount…Thus Begins the Local Antitrust Era
(Welcome to the “Most Important Story of the Week”, my bi-weekly strategy column analyzing the most important (but often not buzziest) news story of the last two weeks. I’m the Entertainment Strategy Guy, a former streaming executive who now analyzes business strategy in the entertainment industry. Please subscribe.) Well, it looks like it’s time for another strategy column. Can I finally avoid writing about M&A? No, it seems I cannot. Admittedly, I’m a week early with this column, since I usually put it out every other week. But this news couldn’t wait. This will make three “Most Important Stories” in a row with a merger or acquisition as its centerpiece. First, Roku-Fox (an acquisition), then Comcast-NBCUniversal (a divestment!), and now the State AGs and the WGA’s lawsuits against Paramount’s pursuit of Warner Bros. Discovery (antitrust). M&A is usually the “most important” topic any given week, simply because a giant company merging or breaking up (or preventing those outcomes) can have the biggest impact on the streaming board. If you think about these companies as players in a game, changing the number of players is one of the biggest changes you can make. I shouldn’t really complain, either, since this lawsuit is very good news for customers and suppliers (econ speak for talent, workers and indie studios in Hollywood). So let me answer some questions about this potential trial, along with (shudder) making some heavily caveated predictions. I’ll also look at whether Hollywood must consolidate, whether or not the states can win, trouble at X-Box, Netflix’s YouTube binge, and more. Plus, I have five images that visualize this merger and the harm, including three brand new data looks you’ve never seen before. Subscribe Most Important Story of the Week - Can The States and the WGA Stop Hollywood’s Consolidation (Crisis)? If every other newsletter and news outlet is writing about the same story, I try to avoid writing about it as well, but I can’t ignore a story this consequential. The story of the last year was the fate of Warner Bros. Discovery, and this development potentially extends that saga into 2027. As I tried to figure out my angle, I realized, like my last column, I’m again faced with a series of questions. These questions, though, are much more forward-looking. Will the states win? Will the WGA win? If so, what happens to Warner Bros. Discovery? Either way, will this chill the market for future mergers? So you know what that means: predictions. About the future, no less, the hardest thing to predict.1 Just remember: nothing here comes with a guarantee. And the more confident someone is in their predictions, the less you should trust them. This situation is incredibly fluid, nuanced, uncertain and tenuous. So let’s try to explain what may happen. Question: Why File this Lawsuit? I’ll admit, a few months back, I was fairly pessimistic about the fate of this lawsuit. Rumors had started bubbling up that the state Attorneys General (in particular California) wanted to settle with either some minor divestments (usually CNN) or behavioral remedies. And that tracked for me: the states usually settle lawsuits, like the recent John Deere right-to-repair suit. Yet, they plan to fight this. (As they did the LiveNation-Ticketmaster monopolization trial and the Nexstar-Tegna merger.) Honestly, that also makes a ton of sense. Frankly, this move is just good politics for these State AGs. Most are still running for higher and higher office in blue states—some folks have emphasized that only Democratic AGs joined this suit, but given the Ellison/Trump ties, and fears of retribution, that tracks—and a high profile case like this will help them move up the electoral ladder, especially since Paramount and its leadership (the Ellisons, father and heir) have sided with the other side of the political aisle. That makes them unsympathetic to Democratic voters and Hollywood workers in particular. Why did this lawsuit happen? In addition to the very real concerns about industry consolidation, this is why. That said, I don’t think we would have seen this lawsuit for Netflix and Warner Bros., simply because they’re more sympathetic and aligned with Democrats. But those consolidation concerns are real. The “town”—meaning Hollywood and such—really is seeing the damage of mergers on this industry. That’s why the WGA also filed its own lawsuit in defense of workers as well. (Wildcard: What about Europe? Will they try to stop the deal, too? There have been some rumors out of the UK they may try to fight the deal, and UK enforcers just stopped a Getty Images-Shutterstock tie up, so there is precedence. This argument could go either way, though. On one hand, the EU doesn’t need to step in, cause they states are handling it. On the other hand, this could make the EU’s case easier. Just imagine if both sides coordinated. I’ll simply say, “We’ll see!”) Question: Will The State AGs or the WGA Win? Can the state AGs play David to Paramount-Skydance’s Goliath here? That’s really the whole thing, isn’t it? If you know this result, you could make a lot of money. When things are uncertain, it’s tempting to shrug and say, “Eh” meaning it’s a 50/50 proposition. I wouldn’t, though. When in doubt, you should expect that the merging parties succeed. AT&T did successfully buy Warner Bros., after all, and Disney bought Fox without any challenges. Many judges are extremely sympathetic to mergers, and I’d bet the state AGs get a judge who will allow the merger. (Even Obama-appointed judges often allow mergers.) As I understand it, we’ll see two main attacks. First, theatrical films. The AGs are arguing that, when it comes to share of box office and the number of both “wide releases” and blockbuster (or “tentpole”) films, the merging parties will have over 27% market share. Now, the Supreme Court once ruled from on high that any merger that exceeds 30% is presumptively illegal, but that’s guidance, not an ironclad bar. Still, the states will have to argue that this is close to having too much power, and with that power, this will likely further worsen the theater/studio splits in particular. Indeed, as Matthew Stoller pointed out, “just five studios are responsible for 95% of all blockbusters; if this merger goes through, then Paramount and Disney will control 60% of that.” So yes, movie studios will be very concentrated after this merger. Want me to visualize some of that? Well, here’s the share of films that grossed over $200 million at the domestic box office since 2022. (Note: this isn’t all films released in over 3,000 screens, but it is a good look at market power.) First, here are the 43 films by studio: Notice all the blue (Disney), orange (Universal), and purple (Warner Bros)? Yeah, those studios are powerful, and this combines Paramount with one of them. Here’s the look by studio and share of the films that grossed over $200 million: Now, if you look at that and also think, “Huh, should we break up Disney?” I’m with you. I’ve seen some folks poo-poo this idea that this is a real category, but it is! For an upcoming article, I’ve been pulling data on the share of top 100 films at the box office as a share of total box office, and it’s massive. Here’s the chart: (This analysis looks at The-Number’s top 100 films and total domestic box office each year.) To be clear, tentpoles make up 80.7% of the box office each year, so I do think it’s a genuine market. (To be clear, films grossing over $50 million make up 80% of the domestic box office, and films grossing over $100 million make up 64.1%.) I mean, the top 100 films at the box office make up 95% of each year’s grosses. Worse, the combined studios will likely cut output to flex that market power. Everyone can just look at what happened to Disney and Fox to see the precedent. (With fewer films, the remaining theaters have to give more for those few films that remain.) Here’s an image I’ve used a lot, the share of wide-release films from Disney and Fox over time: The AGs will also argue that this consolidation will also impact the cable industry. In this case, the consolidation is actually worse, but that environment is…complicated. Paramount will argue that the cable industry is shrinking. That said, predictions that cable will “go to zero” also don’t look very well supported by the data, as the declines are shrinking, meaning “cable” or “vMVPDs” will likely stabilize at some point. Can the state Attorneys General win on those two main arguments? I honestly don’t know. Again, I’d bet no, since history in general supports that, but it depends on the judge/jury and how they interpret the arguments. Notably, Paramount won’t face accusations about monopoly power in other areas, like streaming, news, sports rights, or vertical integration. I tend to disagree with leaving out sports rights, but I also see the appeal for a simpler case. The states also aren’t really pushing novel theories about labor harm either, which should help. (By the way, Sean McNulty at The Ankler wrote a great run through of potential options, and Capitol Forum also wrote a great paper on theatrical consolidation. Both these pieces predated the lawsuit. Matthew Stoller is also out with his analysis of the pros and cons of the case too.) In some ways, the WGA’s case is even stronger. Quoting Sean McNulty’s summary: “The WGA is citing WARNAMOUNT as crossing a 30% market share in multiple sectors, a number that the Supreme Court has precedent for deeming “presumptively anticompetitive” in a market. According to the WGA numbers, WARNAMOUNT would have represented: - 35% of film writing jobs between 2021 and 2024 - 36% of TV writing projects between 2022 and 2025 - 38% of overall deals between 2021 and 2024” Notably, antitrust enforcers did win recently in the Penguin-Simon & Schuster merger by focusing on labor impact, so don’t count this thinking out. (Wildcard: Will the states try to get a jury trial? Most likely no, they’ll let a judge handle it. If I’m them, though, I’d try to put this in front of a jury. Juries tend to understand monopoly power in a more realistic way than judges faced with legions of economists.) Question: What if They Win? What if They Lose?
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