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Flavio Bolsonaro faces graft probe weeks before Brazil vote
Brazilian Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, Lula's top rival in next month's election, is under investigation for alleged corruption linked to financing a biopic about his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro.
Flavio Bolsonaro Courts Investors With Vague Pro-Business Pitch
Brazilian presidential hopeful Flavio Bolsonaro pitched himself as a market-friendly alternative to Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva at an event packed with investors Wednesday, but offered few specifics about his plans or how he’d achieve them.
Flavio Bolsonaro Inches Ahead of Lula in Brazil Election Poll
Flavio Bolsonaro edged ahead of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the run-up to October’s election, with a new poll showing for the first time that the right-wing senator is leading the race.
Brazil’s former president Bolsonaro allowed to serve 27-year sentence at home due to poor health
The decision follows Bolsonaro’s hospitalization for pneumonia, one of several health problems he has faced since he was stabbed by a man in 2018 before he was elected president.
Brazil's presidential race heads to Lula–Bolsonaro run-off as right gains ground
Now there are two: Brazil heads into a runoff after a first round that failed to fully energize voters, setting the stage for a more polarized contest that Washington is watching very closely.
Two Brazilian political dynasties clash again
Brazilians vote Sunday in a tight race between two familiar political forces, with plenty at stake beyond the presidency. Here’s what to watch.
Trump’s tariff threats spark political storm in Brazil
President Lula lashes out at lead election rival Flávio Bolsonaro over US lobbying effort
Brazil Heads to Lula-Bolsonaro Runoff as Right Gains Ground in First Round
With nearly 99 percent of votes counted, Bolsonaro had about 47 percent of valid votes, compared with 44.9 percent for Lula.
Bolsonaro and Lula head to a runoff in Brazil's presidential election
Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro, an ally of President Donald Trump, and Brazil’s incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will face off in a runoff Oct. 25 for the top job of Latin America’s powerhouse economy after neither won a majority in Sunday's vote.
Bolsonaro Adviser Says Fiscal Bill to Be Focus
Daniella Marques, an adviser to Brazilian right-wing presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro, said in an interview with SBT News that, if victorious in this year’s elections, his eventual government would propose a constitutional amendment focused on controlling spending and the debt trajectory right from the start. The goal would be to restore confidence and facilitate an adjustment in the benchmark interest rate.
In run for Brazil's presidency, Flavio Bolsonaro tests staying power of his father's legacy
By Luciana Magalhaes SAO PAULO, Sept 28 (Reuters) - From the bare-walled, 12-square-meter cell where he was serving a 27-year sentence for a failed coup plot, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro
Former Brazilian leader Bolsonaro's health improves and he could serve sentence under house arrest
One of his doctors says former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has been transferred to a regular hospital room in the capital of Brasilia as he continues to recover from pneumonia
How Anti-Corruption Politics Destroyed Brazil
Brazil’s upcoming election pits President Lula da Silva, eighty, against Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, forty-five. If he wins, Lula will serve a record fourth (non-consecutive) term.
Brazil's big political rematch: What to know
Four years after President Lula narrowly defeated Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil is back at the ballot box. This time, Lula faces Bolsonaro's son, Flávio, in a high-stakes rematch.
Bolsonaro allowed to serve 27-year sentence at home due to ill health
The decision by Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes follows Bolsonaro’s hospitalization since March 13 for pneumonia.
How a Jim Caviezel film got mixed up in a Brazilian political scandal
American actor Jim Caviezel's upcoming feature "Dark Horse," a biopic about former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, has been billed by a movie industry publication as a thriller about the far-right firebrand's battle "against a corrupt establishment."
Brazil's Flávio Bolsonaro leans into Trump connection as scandal shakes his presidential bid
Brazilian Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro is in Washington, leaning on his family’s connection with former U.S. President Donald Trump
Brazil's Bolsonaro to continue his sentence at home because of poor health
Brazil's former President Jair Bolsonaro has been discharged from a hospital in the capital and will continue serving a 27-year sentence for a coup attempt at his residence in an upscale gated community.
Brazil's Bolsonaro backs eldest son's bid for presidency
Senator Flavio Bolsonaro declared himself heir to his father's political dynasty, saying he'll run for president in 2026.
Jair Bolsonaro granted temporary house arrest in Brazil for poor health
Former President Jair Bolsonaro was moved from his cell to hospital earlier this month with pneumonia.
Brazils presidential race heads to Lula–Bolsonaro run-off as right gains ground
Now there are two: Brazil heads into a runoff after a first round that failed to fully energize voters, setting the stage for a more polarized contest that Washington is watching very closely.
Flavio Bolsonaro: political heir in his father's shadow
Flavio Bolsonaro inherited his father's surname and powerful political base.Michelle Bolsonaro accepted a public apology from Flavio Bolsonaro, but did not appear at any of his rallies.
Brazil's Bolsonaro to continue his sentence at home because of poor health
BRASILIA, Brazil (AP) — Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro was discharged from a hospital in the capital on Friday to continue serving a 27-year sentence for a coup attempt at his residence in an upscale gated community.
Keeping up with the Bolsonaros: Flávio’s surprise first-round election win heralds rise of a political dynasty
Four members of disgraced ex-president Jair Bolsonaro’s family have been elected to office, most notably his wife and son Flávio, who won the first round of voting to be Brazil’s new president
Brazil: Lessons from a Disaster
By Antonio Martins (Outras Palavras) Defeats become deeper and more prolonged when we misunderstand what caused them, avoid correcting course, and embrace “solutions” that only compound our mistakes. Lula’s government and the Brazilian left suffered a disaster in Sunday’s election. Contrary to every poll, the president finished the first round 2.2 million votes behind Flávio Bolsonaro—and, more significantly, 3.4 million votes below his total four years ago, when the machinery of the state was working against him and in favor of his opponent. His vote share declined in 98 percent of Brazil’s municipalities. The PL, the main party of the far right, elected 121 deputies and 28 senators, becoming the largest caucus in both houses of Congress. The parties aligned with the Centrão—Brazil’s bloc of transactional center-right parties—were somewhat diminished, but will still hold roughly 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 in the Senate. That will make it easier to assemble the majorities needed to amend the Constitution or impeach Supreme Federal Court justices. If elected, Flávio Bolsonaro could appoint four members of the Court, substantially altering its internal balance of power. What produced these results? How can the far right be prevented from consolidating them into a prolonged political hegemony? And what is the essential change of direction the left now needs? Explaining the Disaster Across the commercial media and the exuberant chaos of digital platforms, interpretations are multiplying. Some focus on specific episodes: Lula’s absence from the Globo debate, his very close relationship with Alexandre de Moraes, or his emphasis on issues supposedly remote from most people’s everyday concerns, such as rare earth minerals. Among the more systemic interpretations, three seem especially questionable. One argues that the principal defeat was not the left’s, since its congressional representation declined only slightly. The decisive movement captured at the ballot box, according to this view, was a shift within the right itself—from the more moderate and transactional forces of the Centrão toward the more ideological and radicalized forces of the PL and Novo. A second interpretation holds that the nature of electoral and political processes has changed. The material interests and aspirations of society, it argues, no longer play the central role they once did; they have given way to forms of subjective self-identification that the left has yet to understand. And a third concludes that, because of these two developments, we should expect a political winter: a prolonged period in which the far right and the broader right dominate Brazilian political life. There are important elements in all three interpretations. The problem lies in what they deny or leave out: Lula’s third government was a small-bore government. It offered the majorities that elected it neither a clearly better life nor reasons to believe again in politics and its power to transform society. These failures flowed from two fatal accommodations, which I will examine below. As a result, the government suffered a slow but steady erosion of support. And, as has happened in so many Western countries, it gave the far right the opportunity to present itself as anti-system and to benefit from popular frustration and distress. The interpretation that emphasizes the migration of votes from the center-right and traditional right toward the far right has been advanced, among others, by the courageous journalist Leonardo Sakamoto. In his UOL column on Monday, October 5, he highlights the miserable behavior of the traditional conservative parties. Over the past four years, they repeatedly joined forces with the “neo”-fascists, helping to “normalize” them—a criticism that could equally be directed at almost the entire corporate media. Believing they could use the far right as a stepping stone, they instead ended up partly devoured by it. This was especially true in the Senate, where the PL’s gain of 13 senators and Novo’s gain of two came at the expense of the PSD, which lost nine; the MDB, which lost two; the PSDB, which lost two; and the PP, which lost one. Sakamoto’s observation is accurate and necessary, but it leaves uncomfortable questions unanswered. Why did the erosion of the Centrão benefit the far right rather than, for example, producing growth for the left—as has happened so many times before, both in Brazil and elsewhere? The answer is not difficult. Throughout its four years in office, Lula’s third government was almost invariably associated with the Centrão. Here lies its first accommodation: accepting the limits imposed by conservative institutions; avoiding, as much as possible, any attempt to strain those limits through popular pressure; and believing only in the modest changes that could be squeezed through openings in Congress. The failure of the campaign to end the six-day workweek is emblematic. Lula could have electrified the presidential race by pairing it with a popular campaign for passage of the measure. Instead, he chose to place his hopes in the hands of Senate president Rodrigo Alcolumbre. He generated no mass mobilization, did not force his opponents onto an uncomfortable defensive, and won no victory. In September 2025, the government squandered the greatest of its many opportunities to shake up conservative power in Congress. Popular opposition to the so-called Shielding Amendment—which, if approved, would have restricted criminal proceedings against members of Congress—brought crowds into the streets, mobilized primarily by artists and social movements. This opened the possibility for a broader political education: a campaign that could begin exposing the limits and dysfunctions of Brazil’s political system while putting Bolsonaro’s movement on the defensive for its predictable support of political privilege. The amendment was defeated. But the executive branch then backed away from the fight. It remained associated with an institutional world widely seen as corrupt, elitist, and indifferent to ordinary people’s struggles. In doing so, it forfeited its credibility as a vehicle for the protest vote. On Sunday, it reaped the bitter fruits. Are We Doomed? Taking a different approach from Sakamoto, the philosopher Moysés Pinto Neto and other writers have drawn attention, in their first analyses of October 4, to the fragmentation of the public sphere produced by Big Tech platforms. Through their algorithms, these platforms present each person with a different view of social reality. As a consequence, it becomes much harder to identify common material problems and demands—for example, the fight for labor rights or for a properly funded public health system. Voters no longer embrace such demands, these authors argue, because they no longer see themselves as part of a collective. Instead, they tend to value the identities assigned to them by neoliberal subjectivity—the role of the entrepreneur, for example. On this interpretation, the left’s possible error lies in clinging to outdated illusions. Moysés’s warning is highly relevant and resonates with arguments such as Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor’s “Apocalyptic Fascism and the Billionaires’ Bet.” Unlike a century ago, the far right no longer promises a radiant future. It concentrates instead on resentment—especially that of young men. “They belong to a generation that fears it may never own a home, but compensates with the pleasure it gets from constantly provoking progressives online. Convinced their future has been stolen, they share memes romanticizing historical authoritarian regimes,” the authors write. But Moysés seems to confuse this danger with inevitability. He fails to see that the left’s answer cannot be adaptation. On the contrary, it must strengthen the possibility of politics as collective action. Nor does he recognize that precisely such a reversal is already becoming possible in some of the most promising mobilizations of the twenty-first century: the election, at the end of 2025, of the young Muslim Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York, on a platform centered on the intensely material fight for an affordable city; the Left Party’s victory in Berlin two weeks ago, built around the demand to expropriate private real-estate corporations; and the very recent wave of demonstrations in Spain—including an occupation of Madrid’s Puerta del Sol—in which tens of thousands of young people mobilized by the Tenants’ Union have demanded limits on rents. By putting itself in the straitjacket of the “fiscal framework” in the first months of 2022, Lula’s third government adopted the second fatal accommodation of its term. Faced with conservative institutions and a country devastated by four years of Bolsonaro, increased public investment was the government’s remaining weapon for offering a more dignified life to the majority and forging an anti-conservative pact with them. The same state that disburses 1 trillion reais a year to enrich a small class of rentiers could instead spend money to extend the Family Health Strategy to every Brazilian, at a cost of 30 billion reais; provide full-day public schooling and childcare to all adolescents and children—and, especially, relief to their mothers; achieve universal sanitation while cleaning up polluted urban rivers; multiply metro systems; begin transforming the urban peripheries; and undertake many other urgently needed projects. In April 2023, an article in Outras Palavras warned that the fiscal framework could “shrink the Lula government and preserve the forces that condemn the country to inequality and regression.” A year later, another article showed that restraints on public spending were strangling policies vital to ordinary people and undermining the president’s popularity. In November 2024 came a reality check, in the form of the government’s humiliating defeat in the municipal elections. Even then, the fiscal lock was neither removed nor loosened. On the contrary: throughout the government’s four years, fiscal restraint remained central to its political narrative. The administration proudly proclaimed that it had “put the state’s accounts in order,” without grasping either how misleading that phrase was—given the payment of 1 trillion reais in interest—or how badly the message was hurting it politically. Lula finally woke up in September 2026. The increase in Bolsa Família benefits, after four years of being frozen; the announcement that anti-obesity drugs would be offered through Brazil’s public health system; and the ban on online betting showed that the state has the power to act decisively on behalf of the majority when those in government are willing to confront obstacles. The huge marches that closed the campaign in Fortaleza, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo on the eve of October 4 showed how such initiatives can mobilize activists and the broader public. But it was too late—and too little to change the outcome of the first round. History has not ended The possibility of a turnaround in the three weeks leading up to November 25 cannot be ruled out. It will not be simple or easy. Lula must not only make up a deficit of 2.2 million votes; he must also offset the movement of voters who backed other right-wing candidates in the first round, most of whom are likely to move toward Flávio Bolsonaro. Pulling that off will require a broad, grassroots effort to win over voters, potentially reinforced by new initiatives from Lula. The coming hours and days will be decisive. If Bolsonaro’s movement also wins the presidency, the result will create a high-risk situation for Brazilian sovereignty and democracy. The enormous challenges posed by such an outcome would require the left to reexamine, in depth and with a genuine willingness to engage in self-criticism, its political projects—or its lack of them—and its practices. But would that mean we are condemned to the long winter of far-right hegemony that some analyses are beginning to forecast? It is far too early to say, suggests a recent text by Álvaro García Linera, the thinker who served as vice president of Bolivia under Evo Morales. His central hypothesis is that this political current will prove short-lived. At a moment when the entire world is once again talking about sovereignty and protecting national economies, the far right offers a stale, recolonizing neoliberalism. Its submission to the United States is as blatant and pathetic as Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro’s overtures to Donald Trump. Its project amounts to something like every man for himself: greater inequality, capitalism without limits, devastation, and supremacism. Will it work? In the United States, just two years into his second term, Trump himself is reaching record levels of unpopularity and may be on the verge of losing Republican control of both the House and Senate in November. Every new beginning is difficult. Whatever the outcome of the second round, the defeats of October 4 show how profoundly the Brazilian left will have to rethink and rebuild. But just as it would be foolish to underestimate the seriousness of its mistakes, it would be equally foolish to conclude that rebuilding a political project is no longer possible. History has not ended. The times are moving faster than ever. Originally published in Portuguese by Outras Palavras. English translation by Eric Blanc; I’ve added the subtitles. More We can’t stop the far right at home or abroad without a revitalized labor movement, which is yet another reason why you should become a sustaining supporter of the Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) — one of US labor’s pivotal bright spots. Relatedly, Jacobin published a short piece of mine reflecting on a decade of Bernie Sanders inspiring a whole new generation of young worker organizers.