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Going International: How Global South Journalists Can Elevate Local Science Stories
For journalists in the Global South, access to local science presents an opportunity to bring this knowledge to a wider audience via international outlets. Regional studies and perspectives can inform broader conversations about science, highlight multinational patterns, and elevate research conducted outside of traditional scientific centers. This story offers strategies to find stories, connect with international editors, and meet the needs of audiences that may know little about the place where a story is unfolding.
Global Health & WASH: October 2026 Funding Opportunities (26 new opportunities)
41 opportunities on the Global Health & WASH page this cycle, 26 of them new. The health money on this page is mostly research money, and much of it is aimed at people early in their careers. Funder after funder, from the TANGO2 Research Foundation’s Research Pathways grants to the South African Medical Research Council’s Early Investigators Programme to the National Ataxia Foundation and Alex’s Lemonade Stand Foundation, is funding early-career investigators and the institutions that host them, with a clear tilt toward researchers based in or from the Global South, from AMBSO in Uganda to Kenya’s CONNECT-VAX network to Ersilia’s AI Incubator for African drug discovery. The money is organized by disease as much as by need: narrow foundations, the Parkinson’s Foundation, NTAP for neurofibromatosis, the RUNX1 Research Program for an inherited blood disorder, each run their own grant, so the question for an applicant is less which health problem you work on than which foundation owns your disease. The largest European cheques go to consortia only, with the European Innovation Council putting up to EUR €4 million behind a single healthy-ageing project and UNITE up to EUR €1 million behind each cross-border digital health team. Water sits apart, almost entirely in applied utility research: the Water Research Foundation’s cluster of USD $250,000 to $500,000 projects, each built around a utility problem from sewer laterals to reuse treatment. And the biggest single pot is public: HRSA is renewing community health center service areas with awards of up to USD $10 million each. This post is for paid subscribers. This helps support the time and effort it takes to curate and organize these opportunities. Subscribe To keep this accessible to everyone who needs it, we’re happy to offer pay what you can rates. You can find more details here. Open Opportunities 2027 Building the Field of Health Advocacy Grant, Georgia Health Initiative. *New!* *Closing soon!* Georgia Health Initiative, a nonprofit private foundation focused on health equity, is opening its 2027 Building the Field of Health Advocacy Grant to strengthen the organizations that push for healthier systems across the state. The Initiative treats advocacy as infrastructure, backing one-year projects that range from urgent responses to shifting federal policy to longer arc campaigns on housing, behavioral health, care access, and food security. It wants coalitions that elevate community voice, apply an equity lens, and arrive ready to deploy concrete strategies, and it deliberately seeks variety in issues, communities, and organizational size. The optional webinar and required lobbying training signal a funder investing in a durable field, not one grant cycle. The strongest fits are Georgia nonprofits and public agencies ready to turn advocacy readiness into systems change. Geographies: United States. Who can apply: Tax-exempt 501(c)(3) public charities, state or local government agencies, or coalitions/collaboratives using a 501(c)(3) fiscal sponsor, that work in Georgia on behalf of Georgians and align with the mission, vision, and values of Georgia Health Initiative. Only one application per organization, though an organization may be listed as a partner or subcontractor on multiple applications. Funding amount: Organizations can apply for up to USD $80,000 per project; the Initiative anticipates investing a total of USD $1.36 million. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Governance, Policy & Advocacy · SDG3; SDG10. Deadline: October 2, 2026. Learn more and apply here. TDD Research Pathways Grant, TANGO2 Research Foundation. *New!* *Closing soon!* The TANGO2 Research Foundation, working with a founding gift from Tango2UK, is opening its TDD Research Pathways Grant to fund early-career investigators anywhere in the world who study TANGO2 Deficiency Disorder. The foundation is using this money to seed pilot work and to build a research community around a rare disorder that few labs currently study. It wants to back emerging scientists, clinicians, and trainees who will stay with this field, not one-off projects, which is why it requires a committed mentor and real institutional support and asks each applicant for a plan for future contributions. The design rewards promise and persistence over track record. The strongest fits are students, residents, postdoctoral fellows, and new investigators ready to commit to TANGO2 research. Geographies: Global. Who can apply: Early-career investigators worldwide, including undergraduate, graduate, and medical trainees, postdoctoral fellows, residents, and clinical or research fellows. Early-career investigators must hold a PhD, MD, or equivalent doctoral degree and be within 10 years of that degree or within 5 years of initiating rare disease research, engaged in postdoctoral research at an academic institution, teaching hospital, or nonprofit research institute. Currently enrolled trainees and transitional PhD candidates beginning a postdoctoral appointment at a nonprofit institution by July 1, 2026 are also eligible. All applicants must identify a qualified mentor with relevant TDD or rare disease research experience and demonstrate institutional support. Funding amount: Up to USD $15,000. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Innovation, Science & Technology. Deadline: October 2, 2026. Learn more and apply here. Call for Expression of Interest (EOI): AMBSO Impact Research Initiative, Africa Medical and Behavioral Sciences Organization (AMBSO). *Closing soon!* The Africa Medical and Behavioral Sciences Organization is inviting expressions of interest for its Impact Research Initiative, which funds early-stage pilot studies and proof of concept work on priority health challenges. AMBSO is a Ugandan research organization backing bold ideas that can grow into larger studies, and its tracks span antimicrobial resistance, epidemic preparedness, artificial intelligence for diagnostics, HIV prevention, climate and health, cancer, maternal and child health, and non-communicable diseases. The small award size and direct-cost-only rule point to a funder that wants evidence rather than overhead, and that favors projects able to attract follow-on money or use AMBSO’s own research infrastructure. Eligibility runs worldwide, welcoming researchers and institutions inside and outside Africa. The strongest fits are researchers with a feasible pilot that generates policy-ready evidence. Geographies: Global. Who can apply: Open worldwide to researchers, academic institutions, and research organizations whose work aligns with generating high-impact health evidence. Independent researchers are eligible if affiliated with an academic or research institution. Doctoral students are encouraged to apply as part of a research team led by a faculty Principal Investigator. Community-based organizations and other eligible entities may apply. Projects may be implemented inside or outside Uganda. Funding amount: Up to USD $10,000 per project, with no minimum funding threshold. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: SDG3. Deadline: October 2, 2026. Learn more and apply here. Entrepreneurs for Resilience 2027 (E4R27), Swiss Re Foundation. *Closing soon!* Swiss Re Foundation is opening the tenth edition of Entrepreneurs for Resilience, which backs healthcare social enterprises expanding affordable, quality primary care for low-income communities across low- and middle-income countries. The Foundation is using catalytic, blended funding plus multi-year advisory to take risk out of scaling, helping proven models reach more people sustainably rather than stay stuck at pilot size. It looks to back brick-and-click enterprises that pair physical care with digital tools and build affordability through savings, payments, or microinsurance, ideally integrated with public health systems. Requiring earned revenue, real customer scale, and gender-inclusive teams signals that this is growth capital for commercially serious ventures, not seed money. The strongest fits are established, revenue-generating healthcare enterprises ready to scale access for underserved populations. Geographies: Global. Who can apply: For-profit and hybrid healthcare social enterprises serving low-income and underserved populations in low- and middle-income countries, using combined physical and digital (brick-and-click) healthcare delivery models. Applicants must demonstrate measurable social impact, generate at least 50% of income through earned revenue, have been established no later than December 2023, already serve at least 50,000 people with potential to scale, and have at least 30% low-income customers. Preference for gender-inclusive enterprises with at least one female founder or at least 30% women in management. Funding amount: Pilot funding of up to USD $45,000 for the 6-8 shortlisted social enterprises; up to USD $1 million in blended funding (up to USD $600,000 unconditional plus up to USD $400,000 conditional) shared among 3-4 finalists over a two-year implementation period; total programme funding approximately USD $1.3 million. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Innovation, Science & Technology · SDG3; SDG5. Deadline: October 4, 2026. Learn more and apply here. Horizon HealthTech 2026, IIITD Innovation & Incubation Center. *Closing soon!* IIITD Innovation and Incubation Center is opening Horizon HealthTech 2026, a nine-month MedTech incubation cohort run under the aegis of BIRAC EDGE for founders building medical devices, diagnostics, surgical and interventional tools, or remote monitoring. The center is backing teams that already hold a validated proof of concept and want to reach a tested prototype, pairing each founder with a named expert and clinical validation through a hospital partner. What they seek to back is Indian health technology that can survive real clinical scrutiny and regulatory review, not slideware. The structure, with lab access, CDSCO guidance, IP support, and investor connects, signals a program built to make startups ready for follow-on capital. The strongest fits are early-stage MedTech teams with defensible IP and a working path from bench to bedside. Geographies: India. Who can apply: Early-stage teams/startups with a validated idea/proof of concept (TRL 3 onwards) working on medical devices, diagnostics, surgical/interventional technologies, or remote monitoring, holding IP or with potential to generate IP. Funding amount: No cash award amount is stated on the official program page. Benefits are in-kind: prototyping lab and equipment access, clinical/hospital validation (Max Healthcare), expert mentorship, CDSCO regulatory guidance, IP filing support, workspace, cloud credits and tools, and investor connects. Run under the aegis of BIRAC EDGE and builds a path to follow-on Government/VC/Angel funding. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Innovation, Science & Technology · SDG3; SDG9. Deadline: October 5, 2026. Learn more and apply here. OpenAI AI and Teen Development Research Grant Program, OpenAI. *New!* *Closing soon!* OpenAI is opening its AI and Teen Development Research Grant Program to fund independent studies of how generative AI shapes the lives of young people ages 13 to 17. OpenAI wants a stronger evidence base on how teens actually use these tools and what that use does to their social and emotional development, so that product teams, policymakers, and regulators can act on findings rather than assumptions. It seeks work on emotion regulation, relationships, belonging, and the safeguards that keep teens safer, welcoming interdisciplinary teams and any methodology. That it will fund research whose conclusions may not favor AI providers, and prioritizes studies touching ChatGPT, signals a genuine appetite for credible outside scrutiny. The strongest fits are research groups grounded in adolescent development, well-being, and AI safety. Geographies: Global. Who can apply: Researchers aged 18 or older who are affiliated with a research institution or organization, and/or have significant experience relevant to child or adolescent development, well-being, human-computer interaction, AI impacts, or a closely related field. Multiple institutions may collaborate. OpenAI is seeking to fund research rather than for-profit initiatives and will not prioritize for-profit organizations. Funding amount: Individual research grants up to USD $1 million, totaling up to USD $5 million; maximum 10% of each grant for overhead or indirect costs. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Social Inclusion & Community Wellbeing; Innovation, Science & Technology. Deadline: October 6, 2026. Learn more and apply here.
Whose Tradition? The Global South and the Politics of the Tradwife Narrative
The fundamental question is not just whether the tradwife is anti-feminist, but what happens when one model of the "ideal woman" becomes a global aspiration through digital platforms.
Want to Do Business With the Chinese? Here’s What You Need to Know
China’s growing commercial footprint across the Global South is creating new opportunities, but major knowledge gaps remain over how Chinese businesses build trust, negotiate, and form partnerships. Guanxi, institutional norms, and long-term relationships can matter as much as contracts and competitive pricing. At the same time, Chinese companies are still ...
Chartbook 464 The"China squeeze" - the politics of development counterfactuals.
There are three types of China shock discourse. Each has a distinct temporal register. China shock 1.0 was a phrase coined by US academics in the 2010s to retrospectively summarize the impact on particular US labour markets, which they identified through painstaking empirical investigation. China shock 2.0 on everyone’s lips in Europe in the mid 2020s is an alarm raised by trans-Atlantic policy thinkers warning of a coming disaster which they project onto Europe’s ailing car industry. The third type of China shock discourse - commonly known as the “China squeeze” launched most recently by Indian economists Shoumitro Chatterjee and Arvind Subramanian in the pages of Foreign Affairs - mobilizes a different, more speculative temporal register: the counterfactual realm of alternate history. The China squeeze argument asks not what has happened, or what is going to happen, but what might have been. Specifically, what options for economic development might have been open to Global South economies like India or the economies of sub-Saharan Africa, had it not been for China’s spectacular industrialization since the late 1990s and the persistent competitiveness of China’s manufacture in low-skilled segments. Chatterjee and Subramanian’s argument is that whilst China has built a powerful position in electrical machinery and other high-skill manufacturing, which is now delivering China Shock 2.0, it also continues to run a trade surplus in low-skill, labour-intensive manufacturing. This surplus is large and has remained largely unchanged in fifteen years. Indeed, in the 2010s, in trade with low-income countries, China’s surplus rapidly increased. On their reading, this squeezes low-income producers in low-skill sectors in which they “should” be able to compete. Source: “China’s Mercantilist Squeeze on Developing Countries” Shoumitro Chatterjee and Arvind Subramanian. Peterson Institute for International Economics 26-7 May 2026 Chatterjee and Subramanian’s wording is telling: (emphasis mine) The canonical trajectory of economic development in the post-World War II period is for countries to transition from agriculture to manufacturing, first in low-skilled manufacturing and then later on to high-skill manufacturing (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2013). At the global level, this implies that high-income countries (HICs) that once specialized in low-skilled activities cede manufacturing export space to poorer countries that come along to occupy that space. In 1965, advanced economies accounted for about 60 percent of global value-added exports in four key low-skilled manufacturing sectors, i.e., apparel, leather, textiles, and footwear. Over time this share declined and began to be occupied first by the East Asian tigers and, beginning in the late 1990s, by China. Today China accounts for about 50 percent of the global market. The question is whether China, with its rising prosperity, is continuing to behave like its richer counterparts and ceding export space to poorer followers or to behave unlike them and continuing to occupy space. In terms of the conceptual maneuvers it performs, of the three China shock discourses, the “China squeeze” argument is by far the most ambitious. After all, it bases its critique of China on a counterfactual imagining of the world. Like any counterfactual argument, to construct this alternative reality it must rely on a heuristic model. To make their argument Chatterjee and Subramanian mobilize two key claims. The first reference point is the actual history of rich-country industrialization, what they refer to as the “canonical path”. The idea is that countries transition from agriculture to light industry and low-skilled manufacturing and from there up the value chain. To make this useful as a standard of comparison and a means to construct a normative standard, they adjust sectoral export shares for two factors: 1. the underlying level of economic development of the exporting country, as measured by national income and 2. the degree to which the sector in question is internationalized. The idea being that for a high income country to have a high export share in low-skill sectors is anomalous and even more so if that particular product is highly internationalized and thus suitable for being “conceded” to lower-income competitors. Where should this process end? Here Chatterjee and Subramanian introduce their second benchmark. Their normative idea of a global development path is one in which, in due course, low-skill manufacturing exports are distributed in proportion to a country’s share in the global labour force. They imagine, in other words, a world of proportional, polycentric global development without much national specialization in low-skill manufacturing. A useful benchmark is that, in labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, a country’s share of world exports should be broadly commensurate with its share of the world’s low-skilled labor endowment. … In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, this would be true if value added per worker and export propensities, i.e., fraction of output that is exported, are the same across countries. It is this pleasant liberal vista of orderly global development, progressing towards a general distribution of low-skilled manufacturing against which they judge reality and conclude that the low-income countries are suffering a “China squeeze”. China is not exiting low-skill sectors fast enough Allowing for its gdp level and the degree of globalization, China’s share of low-skill manufacturing exports is far higher than it “should” be. Relative to population, its low-skill share of exports is far too high. That in turn yields the conclusion that huge numbers of jobs - the authors suggest tens of millions - are being hoarded by China. For the four sectors captured in figure 4, this excess in value-added exports is $110 billion in 2022. For all low-skilled sectors overall captured in appendix figure D.1, excess value-added exports amount to $365 billion. The crowding out of LMIC exports by China is therefore substantial. Both these claims have in common that they are strong structuralisms. The first is that development paths ought to resemble each other. The second is that broadly speaking as far as low-skilled manufacturing is concerned, all countries are alike. If the world currently diverges from the distribution of trade implied by these assumptions, if China is not following the advanced economy path and has huge exports, this must be the result of “policy”, which the authors then put in question as illegitimate or unfair. Thus the naturalistic construction of a canonical path leading to a “level” distribution of low-skilled manufacturing reveals itself to be a polemical tool. From the point of view of China shock polemics, this discourse is no doubt welcome. But as an account of economic history, it must surely be regarded as nothing short of bamboozling. Development paths do not follow a regular, natural sequence. As David Fishman put it aptly, “development is not a queue”. They are always and everywhere, through and through political. Development is not so much a process, as a project. Each such project is more or less well adjusted to its context. As Gerschenkron taught uneven and combined development implies differentiation rather than simple imitation on a single parth. It may be true that Europe and the US exited relatively early from low-skill work. But clearly technology has changed. As C&S themselves point out, China no longer enjoys a low wage environment. Do they really believe that such huge differences can be accounted for either by industrial policy, which as they admit does not operate powerfully in low-skill sectors, or by exchange rate manipulation? What is overwhelmingly dominant in explaining the persistence of “low-skill” manufacturing in China are surely the network effects of complex supply chains. Indeed the label of “low-skill” may miss the point. The degree of globalization which Chatterjee and Subramanian decide to conjure away in their model of the development path - to allow for the fact that Europe and American textiles exporters did not enjoy just-in-time logistics in the 1950s - obscures the point that the networks through which Chinese factories supply the world are themselves key parts of the low-skill industrialization project. China isn’t knocking out 1970s style “cheap”. It has redefined the entire product cycle. C&S’s casual reference to “T-shirts” is telling. In today’s “fast fashion”, there is weight on both terms. Fashion and fast. China’s success in delivering on both at unprecedentedly high speed and at unprecedentedly low cost, isn’t a low-skill operation at all. If we see development trajectories not as the serial repetition of the same, but as distinctive, crafted projects that cumulate in complex agglomerations of skill, technology and labor, then this explains why the assumption that low-skilled manufacturing should follow the distribution of population flies in the face of all experience. As countless cases attest, low-wage, low-income developed economies are not by themselves the makings of a competitive production base. As Leon Liao puts it quite fairly: “International trade has never been allocated according to population. A country’s population gives it no natural claim to an equivalent share of global exports." And the remarkable fact is that Subramanian alone and with co-authors has long been making this point, not to pillory China, as is the case of the tendentious _Foreign Affair_s and Peterson pieces, but to highlight the great counterpart to China’s industrial success, namely India’s relative failure. The much-quoted Foreign Affairs piece showed low-skill export shares only for China, not for India. If you put both countries in the picture as Chaterjee and Subramanian have done on other occasions, the picture looks like this. China is far above the line, but India, almost as large in terms of population, is no less anomalous, just in the opposite direction. As far as global populations are concerned, and the imagining of tens of millions of “squeezed” jobs, it is this Sino-Indian pair that account for a huge share of the action. What this graph reveals is not China’s cheating, but India’s “greatest development failure”, at least this is the argument made Arvind Subramanian, this time in co-authorship with Devesh Kapur, in their major book, A Sixth of Humanity. Independent India’s Development Odyssey which appeared with Oxford University Press earlier this year. In this highly critical work on India’s development, China is repeatedly evoked, not to criticize but as a benchmark against which to illuminate what India’s political economy has not delivered i.e. large-scale formal employment for hundreds of millions of citizens. Kapur and Subramanian leave no doubt, if you want to understand why China, not India was the main driver of manufacturing globalization from the 1980s, don’t look to slots opening up in the division of labour thanks to the liberal mindedness of advanced economies, look to the contrasting political economy of the Maoist PRC and India’s post-independence political economy. As Kapur and Subramian note: The great divergence between China and India did not begin in 1978 with the Deng reforms—it was well underway by then. In one of the great ironies of modern history, the conditions created by Maoism turned out to be a great launching pad for industrial globalization. As the comparison of India and China in 1980 makes clear, to imagine manufacturing would be equally distributed when populations are so differently endowed in terms of educational and nutritional is fanciful. Here is the data from Kapur and Subramanian, data which I explored back at the very beginning of Chartbook. As Kapur and Subramanian insist, the striking fact is that even as India’s growth accelerated from the 1980s, structural change has not. Formal employment in India lags woefully behind. Why? As Kapur and Subramanian note, the path-dependent impact of India’s poor early start was devastating. The list of factors they mention is long and weighty: We argue for a new five-fold explanation applicable at different stages of Indian history: in the initial stages, the legacy of two key pre-1980s policies, the neglect of agriculture and the strangling of the domestic private sector, were critical. The failure of broad-based agricultural growth militated against rural industrialization, which would have been devoted to satisfying local needs that would have necessarily been labour intensive. Then, when the boom came after 1980, the thicket of regulation and broader labour protections that were legislated prematurely in a nascent democracy, underpinned by a deep ideological aversion to private capital in general and big capital specifically, became a barrier to attaining the size that would be necessary to compete globally. Similarly, the reforms after 1991, while wide-ranging, did not quite encompass non-tradeable inputs critical to manufacturing, namely, land, logistics infrastructure and power. A combination of low investment (logistics infrastructure), regulation (land) and the continued monopoly supply by state governments (power), combined with residual socialism, kept costs at 75–100 per cent above efficient supply. These factors were compounded on the supply side by the government, which dominated the formal labour market and established exorbitantly high wages at the lower end of the skill spectrum. This made their employment in the labour-intensive sector by the private sector less attractive. Finally, when the services sector and its exports boomed, wages soared even further via a Dutch Disease effect: one successful tradeable sector killed and cannibalized another less-skilled tradable sector, namely, manufacturing. Thus, scarcity-inducing policies of the planning era, precocious democracy and a Gandhian aversion to size; inefficient, monopolistic supply of critical non-tradable inputs; the behemoth of government; and super-successful skill-intensive services successively undermined India’s unskilled labour employment opportunities. The employment failure seems to have been over-determined. … Less quantifiable but no less important are some of the sociological factors that have undermined manufacturing and factory jobs. Take the impact of the success of the IT sector—located in urban areas with better working conditions, such as air-conditioned offices, good schools for children and attractive entertainment options. It became a more attractive place for engineering and management graduates to flock to. … Consider manufacturing and female employment. Indian society makes it difficult for women to work, reflected in India’s unusually low female labour force participation (elaborated in Chapter XIII). Indian society, in particular the routine harassment of women in public spaces, makes it even more difficult for them to travel long distances to take up work.37 Combined with onerous regulations on creating hostels and dormitories for women—which, in turn, prevents multiple shifts of operation—factories need to be located in areas with a large female labour pool. While firms can take apparel plants to female labour or bring them to the plants by building large-scale dormitories, this raises costs. If there was a case for subsidies to encourage labour-intensive manufacturing, housing subsidies to build dormitories for women workers would be a good place to start. All of this meant, that when opportunities did open up, in part thanks to adjustments in China, India was in no position to take advantage. Here is the account of the 2020s from Kapur and Subramanian. It stands in dizzying contrast to the one-sided, “China squeeze” argument delivered in the Peterson and Foreign Affairs pieces: In 2022, for example, India’s share of global exports in clothing (the canonical labour-intensive sector) was 3.1 per cent compared to 32 per cent for China. This is extremely disappointing because China started vacating export space in this sector after the Global Financial Crisis as its wages started rising; it then vacated further space in the aftermath of geopolitical developments that led investors to seek alternative investment locations. Between its peak and today, China lost about 7.5 percentage points of global export share (worth about $43 billion in 2022); over this period, India’s export share remained stagnant at 3 per cent, while that of Vietnam and Bangladesh rose by 3.5 to 4 percentage points. China’s loss did not translate into any gain for India in terms of low-skill exports and employment. Put differently, when the conditions for dynamism and prosperity were established after 1991, and even more tantalizingly when the global export opportunities opened up, it was as if India was a high-wage economy and only skilled labour could benefit from the dynamism. It had converted its physically abundant unskilled workforce into an economically expensive resource, penalizing its use. It is not my mission here to argue for or against Kapur and Subramanian’s interpretation of India’s development trajectory. The point in this context is simply that the “China squeeze” such as it is can only be understood, in relation to the heavy burden of domestic constraints that Kapur and Subramanian so unsparingly enumerate. I am concentrating here on India because it is the great counterpart to China and the unspoken reference point of the “China squeeze” discourse. But the point is more general. Can anyone with a straight face suggest that the main problems afflicting the development of South Africa or Nigeria, the great centers of mass underemployment in sub-saharan Africa, are cheap competition from China driven by Beijing’s industrial policy and an undervalued RMB? Likewise, is the main problem of the American working-class the threat of Chinese competition or the manifest crisis of social reproduction in the United States itself? The point here, as in the discourse around China shock 2.0 in Europe, is to insist that we should not normalize the world and pathologize China, without actually investigating what is going on in America’s industrial wastelands, the German car industry, or India’s lopsided labour market. One-sided pathologization should be understood for what it is, a polemical gesture. Concepts like China shock and China squeeze are, what Reinhart Koselleck, following Carl Schmitt, would have described as “asymmetrische Kampfbegriffe”, or “asymmetrical counter-concepts” or “asymmetrical combat concepts”. If the function of arguments like the “China squeeze” is to alert elites in the rest of the world of the need to rejuvenate and energize their development projects, so be it. But let us see the resulting discourses as the mobilizing interventions that they are. Interestingly, a significant slice of China’s public sphere - the so-called industrial party - have been obsessed for the last twenty years with precisely these questions of counterfactual economic history. Since the mid 2000s, a massive online discourse developed around an alternative history in which Chinese techno-patriots were asked to imagine how they would proceed if they had the possibility of traveling back in time to transport modern technology into the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) thus averting the “great divergence” of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is a fantasy of course, but also a goad. The point was not directed at Westerners. The alternate history is dramatically nationalist, but few n the West had even heard of it until recently. The adherents of the industrial party are not liberal moralists. They don’t project natural ladders of international development and ask why others don’t cede space. They take the Realpolitik of global economic development for granted. Their pointe was directed against fellow Chinese. The rallying cry of the alternative narrative was this: Now that we are beginning to gain steam and push forward on our national development path, now that we are breaking out of the inferior position assigned to us even in the early years following WTO accession, do not lose yourself in humanistic imaginings about better futures. In the spirit of Deng, they called on China to embrace the hard truth of development. Perhaps one might of the Industrial Party as a cultural trend born out of desire for symbolic revenge against those who had inflicted the century of humiliation. In terms of the various temporalities of the “China shock” - retrospective, prospective and counterfactual - one might think of the Industrial Policy discourse as truly speculative, conjuring up the China shock that never was. Or perhaps one might better think of it as imagining a world in which a powerful China was no shock at all, but simply a defining fact of modern history. I love putting out Chartbook. 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Kaouther Ben Hania on How Every Movie Is Political: SXSW London 2026
The Oscar-nominated Tunisian director behind 'The Voice of Hind Rajab,' during a SXSW London appearance, also discussed the Western thirst for Global South trauma.
Global Health & WASH: May 2026 Funding Opportunities (14 new opportunities!)
The May update for Global Health & WASH brings new calls that cluster around three distinct shifts: LMIC research leadership moving from funder encouragement into a hard eligibility constraint, pharmaceutical and corporate-linked funders running structurally independent education and use-inspired research portfolios at substantial scale, and AI adoption shifting decisively from speculative tool to operational capability across health and WASH systems alike. In LMIC Research Leadership as Eligibility, Not Encouragement, Wellcome anchors the dominant signal of the month with three separate major calls that all require or strongly center LMIC leadership in their basic eligibility architecture. Wellcome’s ESIC Hubs (£1.5-£1.9M per hub over 3-5 years) explicitly requires an LMIC-based lead applicant, treating Global South leadership as a design constraint rather than a participation goal. Wellcome’s Infectious Disease Clinical Trial Development Award funds transdisciplinary teams whose lead must be a mid-career or established researcher based at an organization in Africa, South Asia, or Southeast Asia. Wellcome’s larger Infectious Disease Clinical Trial Award (£1M-£8M for optimizing licensed interventions) requires the administering organization to be in eligible LMIC regions and at least 50% of applicants based there. Around Wellcome, the same pattern shows up at smaller scale and across funders: CHINNOVA channels $1M into West and Central African research institutions for climate-health work; IBRO’s Neuroscience Training Grants explicitly tier ceilings by region of residence with Africa receiving the highest amount ($5,000); IHME’s GBD Emerging Researcher Award reserves at least one of its two annual awards for an LMIC researcher; Sidaction’s HIV Cure call funds research teams across France, the Netherlands, and eligible African countries with a minimum two-country collaboration requirement. Taken together, these calls signal a meaningful shift in how research equity is being operationalized — not as encouragement language at the bottom of a call, but as a structural feature of who can lead, where the work must be administered, and what proportion of the team must be regionally rooted. In Pharma-Funded Independent Medical Education and Use-Inspired Research, the lineup this month is unusually deep. Pfizer alone runs four parallel calls under independent education and quality improvement frameworks: a Migraine and Women’s Health RFP (200K x 2-year, $500K pool), Migraine IME ($200K, $1M pool), JAK Inhibitor evidence-based education ($100K), and Maternal Vaccination HCP Education in Saudi Arabia ($75K), plus a separate Pediatric Pneumococcal Surveillance research call in Saudi Arabia ($400K per project). Novo Nordisk Foundation runs four parallel calls of its own at substantial scale: Infectious Diseases Catalyst Grants (DKK 60M pool, up to DKK 7M collaborative), Non-Diabetic Endocrinology Collaborative Grants (DKK 53M pool, DKK 5-10M per project), Pioneer Innovator Grant Health (DKK 1.1M), and Distinguished Innovator Grant Health (DKK 6.8M). LEO Foundation deploys DKK 2-4M per project for dermatology research excellence. Pfizer’s framing across calls deliberately separates the funding from product promotion, emphasizing measurable practice-relevant change and structural distance between scientific outputs and commercial activity. Novo Nordisk’s “use-inspired” hard filter pushes researchers toward a credible translation pathway from mechanism to deployable tool. The pattern: industry-aligned funders are running structurally independent portfolios at meaningful $ that fund implementation evidence, not promotion. In AI as Operational Capability, Not Speculation, several calls this month explicitly treat AI adoption as a near-term operational question with real evidence and governance requirements, rather than a speculative trend to be watched. Wellcome’s ESIC Hubs frames AI as “the accelerator” for evidence synthesis, asking hubs to translate technical innovation into adoption-ready workflows that can match real-world policy timelines. UNICEF Venture Fund’s new Climate Tech for Children’s Health call funds for-profit startups deploying AI, machine learning, and blockchain in low-resource environments, with a strict requirement that solutions must already have a working prototype with promising pilot results. The Water Research Foundation has launched two simultaneous AI calls treating reproducibility, cybersecurity guardrails, and human-in-the-loop deployments as core design constraints rather than nice-to-haves: one on GenAI and Agentic AI in water utilities ($200K), one on alternatives to water shutoffs that explicitly screens for implementation economics evidence. Nordic Innovation’s quantum technology call (NOK 4.5M) extends the same logic into life science and healthcare, demanding consortium-stage projects mature enough to test with real users. TEF-Health offers €300K in subsidized testing infrastructure for European healthcare AI and robotics SMEs. The pattern: funders are converting AI pilots into playbooks, requiring transfer evidence and risk controls before AI can move from experimentation to sector-wide operational practice. For LMIC-based researchers in infectious disease or evidence synthesis, the three Wellcome calls together represent the deepest concentration of LMIC-led research capital in recent memory — pair the Infectious Disease Clinical Trial Development Award (£200K, deadline May 19) as a strategic pipeline feeder into the larger Infectious Disease Clinical Trial Award (£1-£8M, deadline June 2), since the development award functions explicitly as a track into the larger trial scheme. For Nordic researchers, the four Novo Nordisk Foundation calls plus LEO Foundation and Nordic Innovation Quantum represent ~$30M in regional research capital this cycle, all with deadlines clustered in May-August. For WASH practitioners, the three Water Research Foundation calls together (each up to $200K) are a cluster worth reading across — one on AI deployment, one on shutoff alternatives, one rewarding applied innovation — and the strongest applicants will articulate how their work bridges utility operations to policy-relevant evidence. For US-based clinical researchers and educators, the four Pfizer calls plus the APF Portfolio’s 80+ programs form an unusually accessible recurring pipeline; APF’s prohibition on indirect costs is a meaningful structural feature for early-career applicants whose institutions might otherwise absorb significant overhead. Snapshot of New Opportunities Total Estimated Funding Pool: $100 Million+ USD The grants are organized into three categories: Open Calls: Current grant and opportunities with a deadline. Grants are listed by closing date. 39 open opportunities- 14 new! Rolling Applications: current grant and opportunities with rolling applications (but it’s still best to submit as early as possible). 14 rolling opportunities- 1 new opportunity! Long term planning: Grants that have closed their current rounds, but are expected to open new windows. 4 long term opportunities! A quick tip for returning readers: if you want to jump straight to the newest additions, use CTRL F to search for “New!” and navigate quickly to the latest funding opportunities This post is for paid subscribers. This helps support the time and effort it takes to curate and organize these opportunities. Subscribe To keep this accessible to everyone who needs it, we’re happy to offer pay what you can rates. You can find more details here. Open Calls: Migraine Competitive Grant Program: Migraine and Women’s Health (Quality Improvement and/or Research RFP), Pfizer.*Closing soon!* Pfizer, in collaboration with the American Headache Society, is seeking independent quality improvement and research projects that close persistent gaps in migraine care for women across the United States. The funding logic centers on measurable, practice-relevant change: proposals should generate actionable evidence, tools, or system improvements that can be shared and used widely, not just within a single site. Priority areas span menstrual migraine and screening in women’s health settings, the role of hormonal fluctuations across the lifespan, sex-specific risk factors, comorbidities and quality-of-life burden, and disparities in outcomes by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. The call is structured as a two-step competitive process with an initial Letter of Intent, with the strongest concepts expected to translate scientific insight into implementable improvements in diagnosis, management, and equity. Geographies: United States. Who can apply: U.S.-based organizations (not individuals), including professional schools, healthcare institutions, professional organizations, and other entities focused on healthcare improvement. Funding amount: Up to USD $200,000 total over 2 years; total pool USD $500,000. Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Health; Focus areas: migraine, women’s health, quality improvement, clinical research, menstrual migraine, health disparities. Deadline: LOI: May 5, 2026; Full proposal (by invitation): August 28, 2026. Learn more and apply here. This RFP rewards “shareable impact”: the most competitive submissions will pair rigorous methods with a clear plan for system uptake and dissemination beyond the originating institution. ReSSARC: Strengthening the Health Sector and Food Security in the Central African Republic (AID 013381/01/0) Call for Proposals, Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS). *Closing soon!* AICS is seeking a limited set of high-capacity humanitarian partners to deliver an integrated package that stabilizes essential health services while reducing acute malnutrition and strengthening food security resilience in priority areas of the Central African Republic. The funder’s logic is explicitly nexus-based: proposals should meet urgent, life-saving needs while reinforcing local systems, coordination mechanisms, and community-level capacity so results persist beyond the emergency window. AICS emphasizes inclusion and protection outcomes, expecting gender-sensitive design and explicit measures for groups facing compounded vulnerability, including women, children under five, internally displaced people, and people with disabilities. The call also signals a localization pathway, encouraging stronger collaboration with national NGOs and balanced partnerships, alongside clear coordination with existing cluster and humanitarian actors to minimize duplication and improve coverage. Geographies: Central African Republic (Bangui, Ombella-Mpoko, Ouham, Ouham-Pende, Lim-Pende, Lobaye). Who can apply: Non-profit organizations registered with AICS, plus eligible non-profits without an office in Italy that have a pre-existing collaboration agreement with an AICS-listed organization. Funding amount: Total pool EUR €1,800,000; max EUR €800,000 (single applicant) or EUR €1,000,000 (ATS). Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Health; Focus areas: malnutrition prevention and treatment, maternal and child health, community health services, food security and resilience, localization partnerships Deadline: May 5, 2026. Learn more and apply here. This call is structured to reward partners who can link frontline service delivery to system durability and localization, not just short-term coverage gains. Contracts for Innovation in drug and alcohol addiction healthcare, Innovate UK. *Closing soon!* Innovate UK, on behalf of the Office for Life Sciences Addiction Healthcare Goals program, is procuring R&D to accelerate innovations that can improve treatment outcomes, strengthen recovery, and reduce harm and deaths linked to drug and alcohol addiction. The competition is positioned as a market-facing readiness push: selected projects are expected to advance solutions toward later-stage validation, generate evidence of user acceptability and UK market fit, and map credible routes through regulatory and certification requirements. Innovate UK signals a preference for innovations that can be field-tested in relevant UK settings and progressed to TRL 6 or 7, with practical plans for commercialization after contract completion. This structure favors applicants that can execute most work in-house, co-develop with service providers and people with lived experience, and translate technical progress into deployable tools for addiction healthcare delivery. Geographies: United Kingdom. Who can apply: Single organizations of any size (including EU, EEA, or international) leading delivery, with most work and key deliverables carried out in the UK; subcontractors for specialist skills only. Funding amount: GBP £200,000–1.5 million per project (inclusive of VAT); Total pool: GBP £20 million (across two strands). Targeted Sectors / SDGs: Health; Focus areas: Mental Health, Health Systems Strengthening, Research & Development, Technology Access. Deadline: May 6, 2026 (11:00am). Learn more and apply here. This call uses procurement to pull near-market addiction innovations toward operational proof and adoption pathways in UK services.
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