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Business internship presentations connect classroom learning to career readiness
Nineteen Penn State Lehigh Valley business students concluded their required summer internships by presenting what they learned to faculty and staff evaluators. The presentations culminated a semester-long process designed to help students connect their academic preparation, workplace experiences and career-readiness skills.
Pistons capitalize on sloppy Cavaliers, take Game 1 to snap 12-game postseason losing streak to Cleveland
Nineteen turnovers proved too many for the Cavs to overcome in Game 1.
What Genres and Streamers Won 2025? And Who Lost? Plus Six Strategy Thoughts
(Welcome to the Entertainment Strategy Guy, a newsletter on the entertainment industry and business strategy. I write a weekly Streaming Ratings Report and a bi-weekly strategy column, along with occasional deep dives into other topics, like today’s article. Please subscribe.) Okay, time for the tenth and final article in my ten-part series recapping 2025. As I wrote two articles ago, my barometer for whether these articles are worth writing/publishing is whether they yield strategic insights, and once again, every subsection in this article has a strategic takeaway (or two). Honestly, these are the most important takeaways, since I step back and look holistically at the streaming wars in 2025. After I declare which streamers won and lost the year and which genres won and lost the year, I have six bonus thoughts. If you’d like to review the whole series... You can find the film flops here and here. You can find the TV shows flops here and here. You can find the top films here. You can find the top TV shows here, here and here. Then I declared my winners and losers in various categories here. You can find my 2024 recaps here. You can find the 2023 recaps here and here. And my 2022, 2021 and 2020 are all stored here. Yeah, it’s halfway through the year, and I’m just finishing this series up now. This year, I tried to space things out to not clog up my writing calendar, plus I had to wait for Fallout to (finally) drop off the charts. Well, that ended up pushing this series wayyyyy too far back on the calendar. Oh well. Next year, the goal will be to finish this series in March, but frankly, I just need more staff to make that happen. So please subscribe. Or, if you’re an advertiser (movie studio, FYC firm, or other), please reach out. Subscribe Streamer of the Year: Netflix Honorable Mention: Paramount (and CBS) So, just last week, I wrote about how Netflix has lost seven of its top twelve scripted shows in the last year. And I shared two very dour looks at Netflix’s potential slowdown this year and last. Guess what? They’re still the number one streamer in America. In 2025, they dominated new streaming shows (even if most of those new hit shows aren’t coming back for future seasons), they had the two biggest films, and they had the top returning TV show by a mile. The world is complicated, nuanced and messy. There may be warning signs of a future Netflix slowdown, but in 2025, Netflix was still the number one streamer. Note what I didn’t say? That Netflix has “won” the streaming wars, because obviously the streaming wars are still ongoing and, more importantly, YouTube is still growing—so now YouTube has “won” the streaming wars?—while Netflix’s share of TV consumption has stalled out. Avoid simplistic talking points, especially if they’re constantly repeated and could fit on a bumper sticker. I had trouble picking the second-place streamer this year, because all of the candidates for second place—Prime Video, HBO Max, and Paramount+—had some hits, but no one stood out. Then I saw this update from Nielsen on the top shows on TV in the 2025-206 season. Sure enough, Netflix had five of the top ten shows! And they had ten of the top 31 shows and fifteen of the top fifty. But CBS/Paramount+ actually had more shows in the top thirty and the top fifty. Paramount+/CBS had twelve of the top thirty shows and nineteen of the top fifty. Let me emphasize that: CBS/Paramount+ had more top shows in the 2025-2026 season than Netflix. And this look was just for TV shows, not live sports, an arena Netflix barely plays in. Meanwhile, Paramount-Skydance’s market cap is a fraction of Netflix’s. That’s weird, right? Streaming Loser of the Year, TV… We’re just getting started with this issue, but the rest is for paid subscribers of the Entertainment Strategy Guy, so if you’d like to find out… ...what streamer lost the year in TV... …whether Netflix could win the title for “film” streamer too… …who won the Disney vs Warner Bros. battle for theaters… ...what TV genres won and lost the year... ...what film genres won and lost the year... ...what film genre people think is thriving on streaming but isn’t… …why F-BOSSS TV shows don’t hold the same sway in the 2020s… …what it means to “flop” as a film on streaming… …UK shows underperforming on streaming… And a lot more... ...please subscribe! We can only keep doing this great work with your support. If you’d like to read more about why you should subscribe, please read this article about the Streaming Ratings Report, why it matters, why you need it, and why we cover streaming ratings best.
Science Research Students Present at Terra NYC Semifinals
By DORIS CHEN and YUEHAN DAI Nineteen Midwood students showcased months of independent research at the Terra NYC STEM Fair on March 1 at Stuyvesant High School, with 12 groups being part of the semifinals and one group making it to the finals. Seniors Charlotte Maloney and Karen Zevelev
Memory Politics in Dnipropetrovsk, 1991–2015
This is an excerpt from Ukraine’s Outpost: Dnipropetrovsk and the Russian-Ukrainian War. Free to download from E-International Relations. This chapter is the first scholarly study of memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk between 1991 and the 2013–2014 Euromaidan Revolution. The Russian-speaking city of Dnipropetrovsk has been traditionally viewed as pro-Russian while at the same time, results from elections over this period show a gradual but steady increase in the share of votes won by pro-European parties. Memory politics and de-Sovietisation played an important role in the decline of pro-Russian political forces in Dnipropetrovsk. In this chapter, historical memory is defined as the interaction of family and public memory. Family memory is transmitted mainly in the form of traditional stories and folklore from the older generation to youth, not necessarily within one family. This type of memory can be learnt from the experience of the older generation who are recognised as an authority by the recipient. Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work. Subscribe Pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian actors fashioned memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk. Each of them has its own vision of what constitutes memory. Those considered pro-Ukrainian were liberal and conservative while pro-Russian actors were nostalgic for the Tsarist Russian Empire and Soviet era. Scholarly research has analysed how each of the two groups interpreted three key historical periods: the Cossack era, Tsarist Russian Empire and Soviet Union. In analysing pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian memory politics it is important to bring in policies by state and local authorities. Scholarly Research on Memory Politics in Dnipropetrovsk Since 1991, memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk has been a neglected field of academic research. Despite the importance of Dnipropetrovsk to Soviet and Ukrainian politics, scholars have largely ignored the city and region, preferring instead to focus on the Lviv-Kyiv-Donetsk axis. Among the few exceptions is the collective monograph Historical memory of the Dnipropetrovsk region which includes a chapter devoted to memory politics undertaken by the regional authorities during the celebrations of the 75th and 80th anniversaries of the region, as well as the activities of institutions such as the Dmytro Yavornytskyy Dnipropetrovsk National Museum. Another chapter analysed the transformation of historical memory in the region through the development of historical and local lore (Svitlenko 2012, 344–427). An interesting analysis of different approaches to the problem of the emergence of the city was provided by Andrii and Tetiana Portnova (2015, 223–250). They outlined the main approaches to the founding of the city of Dnipropetrovsk within the ‘imperial’ paradigm, noting that typologically, celebration of the city’s 100th anniversary in 1878 and the city’s 200th anniversary in 1976 were very similar. Their theory is based on the idea of Russia’s civilising role for the region. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some historians in Dnipropetrovsk began to substantiate the idea of the emergence of the city from settlements in the Cossack era, an approach aimed at searching for a Ukrainian identity for the city. Memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk was analysed in Politics and Memory. Dnipro - Zaporizhzhya - Odesa - Kharkiv. From the 1990s to the present by several authors, including myself (Kasianov 2018, 20–21, 39, 54–56, 67–68, 78–79, 84–85, 87, 94–95, 100–101, 108–110, 133–135, 138–140, 202–219). This detailed study identified the main contours of memory policies undertaken by the authorities and public figures during historical events. The material on each of the cities is divided into sections, with authors analysing the ‘myths of the foundation,’ the Tsarist Russian Empire in memory politics and memory politics in the twentieth century. The study (Kasianov 2018) analyses competition between Cossack and imperial myths of Dnipropetrovsk’s emergence, uncertain perceptions in the nineteenth century and controversial approaches to events in Soviet history. The authors emphasise that controversy is inherent in all areas of Ukrainian memory politics, with a specific focus on the period after World War II when the city was closed to foreigners and became the centre of Soviet nuclear missile production. Textbooks on the history of the region describe the post-Soviet era as a period of prosperity. The second part of the study is devoted to analysis of public opinion polls conducted in 2013 and 2015 in several Ukrainian cities, including Dnipropetrovsk, which showed attitudes to Ukrainian history and memorialisation of history in public spaces. The study included several interviews with Dnipropetrovsk residents from different generations who outlined their perception of the city and memory politics. Researchers have found that the most dramatic historical event in the city is World War II. Perceptions of Historical Memory in Dnipropetrovsk To understand the mechanisms of memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk one must first analyse the perceptions of its residents about the history of their region. In general, there are two images of the past, Cossack and Tsarist Russian imperial with Soviet memory divided into several components. If we discuss oral traditions, the Cossack past continues to be developed through two types of legends, family through ancestors of Cossacks, and toponymic, through the origin of names associated with events or figures from the Cossack era. The Tsarist Russian imperial era is represented somewhat more broadly. There is also a living tradition; for example, legends about landlords and their influence (both negative and positive) on the life of a particular village. Memory politics of the Soviet era is very different in terms of how it is evaluated and very much dependent upon a family’s experience of the communist system. The key historical moments are in 1917–1921; the Holodomor, collectivisation, and political repression; and the Second World War. Memory politics of the post-Stalin era is divided into when the USSR was led by Nikita Khrushchev (1953–1964), Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) or Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991). Here, to a certain extent, we find a public perception that during the second half of the twentieth century there was a gradual improvement of standards of living, a myth of a ‘golden age’ in the 1970s and deterioration of living standards in the second half of the 1980s. Another approach to the interpretation of historical memory in Dnipropetrovsk is by dividing public opinion into on the one hand pro-Ukrainian (both conservative and liberal) and on the other, pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet. Despite the existence of certain differences within these two large groups (pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet), they are quite clear in how they identify themselves when discussing with the competing ‘Other.’ Now let us attempt to instrumentalise the history of these two groups. There is a certain consensus between them in recognising the Cossack era. At the same time, those with a pro-Ukrainian identity emphasise the place of Cossacks in their historical memory while those holding a more Imperial and Soviet identity typically display, with certain exceptions, an ignorance about them (which is discussed below). Interest in Cossacks had always existed in the region; Ukrainian Communist leader Petro Shelest had praised them in his 1970 book Ukrayina nasha radyanska (Ukraine. Our Soviet Land) for which he was accused of ‘national deviationism’ and removed two years later (Tillett 1975). It was not surprising that interest in Cossack history was revived in the late Gorbachev era during the uncovering of ‘blank spots’ in Ukrainian history. This came to the fore in 1990 during the 500th anniversary of the formation of Ukrainian Cossacks when Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhhya hosted events which gathered upwards of 20,000 people from the region and visitors, mainly from Western Ukraine and Kyiv. Rallies were held and a monument to a young Taras Shevchenko was unveiled. A striking event was the march by thousands of people along the central avenue of Dnipropetrovsk to the D. Yavornytskyy Museum and a rally at the end of the commemoration in the Taras Shevchenko Park. There were minor skirmishes in the city with Soviet veterans from the Afghanistan war who opposed the Ukrainian national revival. This commemoration not only revived and reclaimed the Cossack past, but also other national liberation struggles in 1917–1921 by the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and in the 1940s by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[1] Since the early 1990’s the Dnipropetrovsk region has registered 49 so-called ‘Cossack’ pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Cossack organisations. Most of them were interest clubs who occasionally gather a small number of their members and undertake respectable activities. Kodak Palanka of the Zaporizhzhyan Cossack Army, which stands out among the pro-Ukrainian organisations, regularly participates in the ‘Sokil-Yura’ regional competition, has defended a school playground from illegal construction, created a 400-strong Maidan self-defence group, and defended state buildings in Dnipropetrovsk in spring of 2014 from their take-over by Party of Regions and pro-Russian vigilantes.[2] The most successful pro-Russian Cossack organisation is the Ekaterinoslav Cossack District, ideologically based on the not so historically important Ekaterinoslav Cossack army which fought for the Tsarist Russian Empire. They strongly support the concept of the Russian World and have organised processions with the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine in honour of military victories by the Tsarist Russian Empire. They established a Cadet Corps for young Cossacks and organised visits by Cossacks from Russia. Since 2014, they have been not surprisingly inactive.[3] Cossack organisations in Dnipropetrovsk traditionally celebrate the Intercession, the Day of Remembrance of Hetman Ivan Sirko on 14 October. In 2000–2010, the Samarska Pokrova festival took place on the territory of the Old Samara fortress (located in the modern village of Shevchenko in Dnipropetrovsk). On 1–2 August, commemorations of Hetman Sirko are traditionally held at his gravesite in the village of Kapulivka. During celebrations prior to 2014, there were often conflicts between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Cossack organisations, with the latter supported by the authorities during Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency (2010–2014).[4] Competition Over Who Founded Dnipropetrovsk One of the important areas of conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet memory politics is the founding of the city of Dnipropetrovsk. The year 1776 was celebrated by the Soviet regime in the 1970s as a way of deliberately coinciding with the 70th anniversary of Brezhnev’s birth. This replaced the previously dominant date of the founding of Dnipropetrovsk during the visit of Tsarist Empress Catherine II in 1787 which was traditionally used by historiography as the city’s foundation year. Since the 1990s, attempts have been made to revise these Tsarist and Soviet dates and, more importantly the context by expanding discussion into the media. In the 1990s, the most prominent scholar who regularly addressed this topic was Yuriy Mitsik who argued that the history of the city should be dated earlier from the construction of the Cossack Kodak Fortress in 1635.[5] Discussion about the origins of the city of Dnipropetrovsk intensified following the 2004 Orange Revolution when several civic organisations and academic centres (e.g., Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Institute of Social Research), appealed to scholars and local historians to begin research into the Cossack era foundation of Dnipropetrovsk. Based on the monograph Palimpsest: settlements of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in the history of Dnipropetrovsk, they launched a public campaign to redefine the origins of Dnipropetrovsk by proposing 1645 as its founding year. Press conferences in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv, round tables, petitions to the city’s mayor, billboards on streets, and the unveiling of a memorial on the territory of Novyy Kodak were used to popularise the Ukrainian claim to having established the settlement of Dnipropetrovsk. The city authorities moved towards the Ukrainian claim to having founded Dnipropetrovsk through symbolically recognising the Cossack component of the history of Dnipropetrovsk by naming one of the streets in the centre of the city of Polovytska in honour of the settlement of Polovytsya established around 1743. Interestingly, the names of districts within Dnipropetrovsk, such as Mandrykivka, Diyivka, Kamyanka, and others are linked to Ukraine’s Cossack past. The biggest revival of Cossack historical names took place during the process of decommunisation in 2015–2018 which is analysed in the next chapter by Kocherhin (see Repan 2007).[6] Pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet memory politics on the founding of Dnipropetrovsk is weakly endowed with scholarly support; nevertheless, it was dominant among the city’s political elites prior to the 2014 crisis. The History of the City of Dnepropetrovsk, which was commissioned by the City’s Council, uses 1776 as the date of the founding of Dnipropetrovsk which influences the city’s annual Day of the City holiday and the celebration of other anniversaries. Even between 2014–2015, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, social advertising was embellished in the city centre with the foundation year of 1776 – supposedly to promote local unity in the face of the threat from foreign invasion (Bolebrukh 2006). At the heart of the pro-Russian Imperial approach is a thesis of the civilising influence of the Tsarist Russian Empire on the development of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Tsarina Catherine II and Prince Potemkin allegedly aimed to fashion Katerynoslav into the third capital of the Tsarist Russian Empire. In the 1990s, this thesis was used to justify the uniqueness of Dnipropetrovsk. The costumed characters of Tsarina Catherine II and her favourite courtiers participated in the Day of the City celebrations and were aired in television commercials. Local businessman Hennadiy Balashov named his chain of ‘Moskva’ shops after figures from the Tsarist Empire, such as Katerininsky, Potemkin, Orlovsky and others. These shops were part of the city landscape for a long period of time.[7] In 2005–2006, following the Orange Revolution, a heated debate broke out in the local media over the erection of new monuments. Attempts to erect monuments to Tsarina Catherine II were successful in several Ukrainian cities and in Dnipropetrovsk there was an initiative to install a monument to her next to the building of the Central Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The head of the Dnipropetrovsk state administration Yuriy Yekhanurov, appointed by President Viktor Yushchenko, was opposed to this proposal, arguing it represented homage to the Tsarist Empire and demanded an end to its construction. Supporters of the pro-Russian Imperial approach to memory politics actively promoted ‘St. Catherine’ by attempting to provide the Empress with a saintly image.[8] The importance of the mythology about Tsarina Catherine II was demonstrated during the 2012 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political technologist Konstantyn Zatulin, who was accompanied by a team of historians and a film crew from the Russian Kultura television channel to Dnipropetrovsk and other cities in Eastern-Southern Ukraine. The visit was to mark the 225th anniversary of the so-called ‘Great Journey’ of Tsarina Catherine II and to promote her memory as that of a ‘civilising mission’ into so-called ‘wild lands.’ The Party of Regions organised several supporting events in Dnipropetrovsk oblast library, promotions in the media, and presentations by Party of Regions deputy Oleh Tsarev (who in the 2014 crisis became a separatist leader). Subsequently published Russian media reports and pseudo-academic work by Russian historians were of low scholarly quality, primarily consisting of disinformation about the life of ‘Russians’ living in Dnipropetrovsk.[9] This view of ‘Russians’ inhabiting Eastern-Southern Ukraine had already been propagated by Putin in 2008 to a NATO audience.[10] Not all historic figures were unacceptable in the competition over the origins and identity of Dnipropetrovsk. Two historical figures, Dmytro Yavornytskyy and Olexandr Pol, were acceptable to pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet memory politics of Dnipropetrovsk. They were both represented in the public space with monuments. During the decommunisation process the central avenue of Dnipropetrovsk was renamed after Yavornytskyy while a large avenue on the right bank of the city was named after Pol. Besides a monument to him as a historian on Dnipropetrovsk’s central avenue the city’s Historical Museum also bears his name.[11] Yavornytskyy satisfied supporters of the pro-Ukrainian interpretation of Dnipropetrovsk history because he was a populariser of Cossacks, an archaeologist, and activist of the Ukrainian cultural organisation Prosvita. His work made him a legendary figure during his lifetime and following his death, positive memories were published of Yavornytskyy which were incorporated into the city’s folklore. Consequently, his legacy did not provoke opposition from civic groups. Pol’s memory was revived after it had been banned in the Soviet era. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pol was influential as a historian who imbued a self-confident identity to Dnipropetrovsk. Pol was traditionally supported by those holding a pro-Russian Imperial identity of Dnipropetrovsk because he was an aristocrat, had taken part in the Zemstvo movement, and actively lobbied for the construction of a railway through Ekaterinoslav which had assisted the development of the region’s metallurgical industry. At the same time, he was favourably received by those upholding a pro-Ukrainian identity of Dnipropetrovsk because he identified himself as a ‘Little Russian’ with Cossack ancestry and because he was interested in Ukrainian ethnography. Pol’s memory was revived through many newspaper articles, publication of a monograph and a popular scholarly book, opening of a monument to him near the City Council’s building, and the re-naming of a street after him. In 2020 on the initiative of Dnipro Mayor Boris Filatov his anniversary was honoured in official ceremonies (Kocherhin 2002; Platonov 2002). Ukrainian National Liberation Struggle in Dnipropetrovsk Memory Politics The 1917–1921 national liberation struggle was not actively debated in Dnipropetrovsk during the first two decades of Ukrainian independence. Dnipropetrovsk inherited street names which commemorated the Soviet interpretation of the ‘Russian civil war,’ such as the plaque on the Holovposhti (Main Post Office) which commemorated the Bolshevik victory against ‘counter-revolutionaries.’ Prior to, and especially since 2014, there have been attempts to rethink the 1917–1921 period of Ukrainian history. A crucifix was installed at the burial place of UNR soldiers on Zhovtnevyy (re-named Sobornyy) Square in the upper part of the city of Dnipro. Initially, the city authorities did not allow the installation of the crucifix memorial and dismantled it, but it was replaced by a stone cross unveiled by Mayor Filatov.[12] Other memorials to UNR officers installed by civic activists were unveiled in the villages of Dniprovokamyanka (Spyrydon Tropko) and Verkhnodniprovsk (Nykyfor Avramenko).[13] Reviving the memory of anarchist leader Nestor Makhno was less problematical. In the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhhya regions many legends about Makhno continued to persist with one of the most common being his mistress had lived ‘in our village.’ A memorial plaque was erected at the Ukrayina Hotel where Makhno established his headquarters during his occupation of Katerynoslav. A Makhno Public Bar also operates on a street in the centre of Dnipro. A monument to Makhno was erected in Nikopol.[14] Other ways in which historical memory has been revived is through the romanticisation of the 1917–1921 Ukrainian national revolution through the songs of the Dnipro Vertep (travelling drama theatre). The ‘ultras’ (football club extremists) of the Kryvyy Rih football club Kryvbas are fond of the UNR Hetman Kost Pestushko who was one of the most ardent anti-Bolshevik leaders in the Dnipropetrovsk region.[15] The Holodomor was denied by the Soviet regime until 1990. Knowledge about the Holodomor was revived during the Gorbachev era’s unveiling of blank spots in history and of course from 1991 in independent Ukraine. President Viktor Yushchenko devoted a good deal of attention to reviving memory of the Holodomor and mobilised an international campaign to persuade governments it constituted a genocide against Ukrainians. A memorial to the victims of the Holodomor in Dnipropetrovsk was unveiled in 2008.[16] Yanukovych’s presidency adopted a Russophile stance on the 1933 famine as an all-Soviet tragedy (not a Ukrainian genocide) leading to a decline in interest in the Holodomor by state institutions. In the public arena the Holodomor continued to be of interest to civic groups and scholars. Great Patriotic War and World War II In 2000–2010, the most heated discussions in memory politics dealt with the myth of the Great Patriotic War and OUN and UPA. Dnipropetrovsk had many Soviet memorial plaques and monuments upholding the Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War. Ukraine inherited celebrations of the Liberation Day of the city and Victory Day (9 May). The Party of Regions exported to Dnipropetrovsk the transformation in Putin’s Russia of the Great Patriotic War into a quasi-religious cult and promotion of the St. George ribbon. This was especially evident in the ‘Immortal Regiment’ of people marching on 9 May with portraits of Soviet heroes from their families; in reality, they were often teachers and state officials ordered to attend. In 2013, the cult of Victory Day was promoted by a huge injection of resources into the re-staging of the crossing of the Dnipro River in 1943 during the Great Patriotic War during which hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers died.[17] In May 2013, a march by pro-Ukrainian civic groups and activists was attacked by young vigilantes from a sports club funded by the Party of Regions.[18] Memory politics aimed at honouring the memory of OUN and UPA was systematic but slow. The Dnipropetrovsk branch of the Brotherhood of Soldiers of UPA had operated since the 1990s and public commemorations of UPA on 14 October were regularly held. Publications in the mass media and scholarly conferences devoted to the Ukrainian nationalist movement led to bitter debates in the city. Supporters of the pro-Ukrainian memory politics and nationalist groups publicised OUN and UPA through torchlight processions in Dnipropetrovsk. After 2014, ‘ultras,’ civic activists and patriots held portraits of OUN leader Stepan Bandera in marches to demonstrate their hostile attitudes to Putin and Russian military aggression against Ukraine.[19] Negative attitudes towards Ukrainian nationalism in response to Russian military aggression waned and since 2014 more Ukrainians have had a positive view of OUN and UPA (Oliinyk and Kuzio 2021, 831–832). An ethnic Russian fighting in Ukraine’s armed forces compared volunteers like himself with the volunteers who had joined OUN and UPA. Bandera had, Anatoliy Lebidyev believed, in the same manner as they were, defended their own land, seeing nationalism as ‘vaccine’ against genocide by Ukraine’s neighbours and believing that if there had been no nationalism in Western Ukraine there would have been ‘genocide’ against the local Ukrainian population (Reva 2020, 250). Jewish Life in Dnipropetrovsk Memory Politics The Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies ‘Tkuma’ and the Museum of the History of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine, both located in the city of Dnipro, were created, and headed by historian and author of school textbooks Ihor Shchupak (see the chapter by Ishchenko). They became a public platform which provided an opportunity for dialogue and presentation for supporters of both the liberal and conservative wings of pro-Ukrainian memory politics. Their premises were used by the Dnipro Historical Club[20] which regularly invited Ukrainian historians, such as Vladyslav Hrynevych, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, Ivan Patrylyak, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Paul R. Magocsi, Sergei Zhuk and Timothy Snyder. The contents of their lectures expanded discussed of Ukrainian history in the local media.[21] The museum’s exposition presented materials which demonstrated a moderate stance towards Ukrainian nationalism while seeking to advance understanding between Jews, who had no love for the USSR, and Ukrainian patriots. The exhibition included examples of cooperation between the OUN and Jewish community during World War II, participation of Ukrainian nationalists in the Holocaust, rescuing of Jews by Ukrainian nationalists and participation of Jews in the UPA. The museum exhibition presents far more than the Holocaust with visitors experiencing the Jewish world of Ukraine which preceded the Shoah. The museum does not attempt to show the history of the Jews in an unblemished manner, and they are represented as both victims and perpetrators. Ukrainians are similarly presented not as one homogenous group of murderers or patriots, but as either participant, indifferent to what is taking place around them, and rescuers in the Holocaust. It is noteworthy the museum’s exposition presents the tragedies of a broader number of peoples who include Armenians, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars who have also suffered genocides.[22] Euromaidan Revolution and Russian-Ukrainian War Historical debates over memory politics subsided during the Euromaidan Revolution. The exception was how the greeting ‘Glory to Ukraine! Glory to its heroes!’ became popular at that time. Dnipropetrovsk experienced its own Maidan which was savagely attacked by Party of Regions vigilantes in January 2014. After Yanukovych fled from office in February 2014, the situation in the city became precarious. At a time when there were demoralised and paralysed state structures, following the disintegration of the Party of Regions, the vacuum was filled by Euromaidan Revolution supporters and Ukrainian patriots. On a symbolic level, the removal of the large Vladimir Lenin monument in the central square of Dnipropetrovsk was an early symbolic victory. Its removal over eight hours was broadcast live by several local television channels.[23] St. George’s ribbons were worn by supporters of the anti-Maidan and Party of Regions vigilantes. Annual 9 May Victory Day celebrations often experienced fierce confrontations between those holding a pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet identity who insisted on the right to wear the St. George’s ribbon and those holding a pro-Ukrainian identity who interpreted the ribbon as a symbol of the Russian World and Russian military aggression against Ukraine. In 2015, after the adoption of four decommunisation laws, poppies dominated the public space in Dnipropetrovsk and a far smaller number of supporters of the Opposition Bloc (one of two successor parties to the Party of Regions) continued to wear the St. George ribbon. In 2017, and therefore beyond the scope of this chapter, Ukraine’s only exposition dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Museum of the ATO[24], was opened in Dnipro.[25] Conclusions In 1991–2015, memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk resembled that found on the national level, but with some local differences as memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk were often inconsistent and schizophrenic prior to the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko’s presidency officially promoted the Holodomorand a pantheon of heroes of Ukrainian nationalism. Yanukovych’s presidency attempted to undertake a counter-revolution against pro-Ukrainian memory politics and imported approaches to the 1933 famine and quasi-religious cult of the Great Patriotic War propagated in Putin’s Russia. Yanukovych and the Party of Regions built on pre-existing Soviet memory politics. Post-Soviet local elites in Dnipropetrovsk had tolerated the Cossack past of the region but strongly objected to memory politics of the UNR and especially OUN, which had operated a sizeable underground in the city during World War II. The only significant event which was firmly entrenched in the public space was the Holodomor because of support given by the central government coupled with a strong memory of the tragedy which had survived in local family history. Fundamental changes occurred in response to the victory of the Euromaidan Revolution, 2014 crisis and Russian military aggression. Prior to then there had been a gradual growth in pro-European and Ukrainian patriotism and those holding this identity came to power in 2014. This was ironically personified in Deputy Governor and (from 2015) Mayor Filatov, Governor Ihor Kolomoyskyy and Deputy Governor Hennadiy Korban, an ethnic Russian and two Jewish-Ukrainians respectively, leading the counter-offensive against pro-Russian forces and Russian military aggression. Their support made Dnipropetrovsk and Dnipro the most radical implementor of decommunisation in Eastern-Southern Ukraine. The roots of the gradual change in electoral sentiment and coming to power of pro-Ukrainian forces is to be found in the revision and de-Sovietising of identity and promotion of pro-Ukrainian memory politics which had taken place since 1991. Other important factors were a pluralistic approach to the Ukrainian past (unlike in neighbouring Donbas), diversity of activists and scholars working in the field of memory politics and official support given to a pro-Ukrainian identity by government institutions. Supporters of Soviet memory politics were clearly at a disadvantage during the bulk of the period from 1991–2013, except during Yanukovych’s presidency, and were completely defeated in 2014–2015. The smaller influence of pro-Russian memory politics is explained by two factors. Firstly, their activities were to a great extent inspired by external support through funding from the Russian World Foundation or the Donetsk-based Party of Regions, rather than from local support. Secondly, their activities most often relied on the support of state institutions (such as during Yanukovych’s presidency) or the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine — rather than from local civil society. References Bolebrukh, Anatoliy. ed., (2006). Istoriya mista Dnipropetrovska, Dnipropetrovsk: Grani. Kasianov, Heorhiy ed., (2018). Polityka i Pammyat. Dnipro - Zaporizhzhya - Odesa - Kharkiv. Vid 1990-x do syohodni, Lviv: FOP Shumylovych. Kocherhin, Ihor. (2002). Oleksandr Pol: mrii, spravy, spadshchyna, Dnipropetrovsk: NHA. Platonov, V. (2002). Chelovek-legenda: Aleksandr Pol, Dnipropetrovsk: Prospekt. Portnov, Andriy and Portnova, Tetiana. (2015). ‘The ‘Imperial’ and the ‘Cossack’ in the Semiotics of Ekaterinoslav-Dnipropetrovsk: The Controversies of the Foundation Myth,’ In: Igor Pilshchikov, ed., Urban Semiotics: The City as a Cultural- Historical Phenomenon, Tallinn: TLU Press, 223–250. Repan, Oleh. (2007). Valentyn Starostin and Olexandr Xarlan, Palimpsest poselennya XVI–XVIII st. v istoriyi Dnipropetrovska, Kyiv: Ukrayinski propiley. Svitlenko, Serhiy. eds., (2012). Istorychna pamyat Dnipropetrovshchyny, Dnipropetrovsk: Monolyt. Tillett, Lowell. (1975). ‘Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest,’ Slavic Review, 34, 4: 752–768.
These superbugs pose the biggest threat to Americans, CDC says
Nineteen drug-resistant germs cause an estimated 9.7 million infections and 50,800 deaths in the country each year.
Fernando Alonso Says Car Is Improving Despite Starting in P19
The Spaniard suffers a lock-up in Q1 that leaves him nineteenth and he will start last due to engine penalties. He acknowledges that the AMR26 has improved in the corners but warns that the lack of top speed is an insurmountable burden in Azerbaijan.
5 Key Facts on Adolescent Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders
Nineteen percent of adolescents experience moderate to severe anxiety and 2 million have a substance use disorder. This analysis covers the latest data on adolescent mental illness, suicide and drug overdose trends, and access to care.
Classic Rock Orchestra Will Present Anthems Of ‘70s, '80s
Nineteen musicians from the Plymouth Philharmonic Orchestra will join singer and multi-instrumentalist Joe Boucher and Classic Rock Orchestra on stage for “Anthems of the ’70s and ’80s” on Thursday, November
New book: Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics
I am happy to say that on 26 November my new book “Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom” will be published with Hart. The book focuses on topics I have been interested in for several years; namely, how the executive branch internally structures the way it receives legal advice; how respect for legality is made concrete and practically institutionalized within the executive branch; how legal advice can act as a Janus-faced source of executive constraint and empowerment; and how different design choices and cultural norms profoundly shape the extent to which government lawyers, as a class of constitutional actor, restrain or facilitate public power. I am also interested in the ways in which a polity’s system of government lawyering can contribute to, or hinder, good governance for the common good. In what follows, I offer a short introduction to the main topics of the book, in the off chance it might be of interest to some of our readers. I am conscious, of course, that this work is a good deal more “wonky” or “Dryasdust” than we usually feature at the New Digest. But for those few who might find it of interest, the book can be found here: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/government-lawyers-in-the-united-kingdom-9781509989270/ Introduction to Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics (Hart, 2026) Public lawyers in the UK rightly devote enormous attention to the exercise of public power. We study judicial review, statutory interpretation, parliamentary sovereignty, devolution, human rights law, and so on. All of this concerns how public power is generated, channelled, and constrained. But despite this focus, we spend far less time examining the most powerful branch of government—the executive—especially its internal workings. That includes the actors and mechanisms that shape executive action. Within the executive, there is a group that have been particularly neglected in the literature: government lawyers. Over the last several decades, there have been only a handful of monographs and a few dozen articles on the subject. Some of that work is excellent, but much of it is now outdated, and none of the contemporary work systemic or comprehensive. The field is not entirely terra nullius, but it is certainly not occupied by a bustling town. One reason I wrote this book, then, was to address what I see as a significant gap in our understanding of how the executive is internally constituted and regulated, how it relates to law and legality in practice, and what role government lawyers play in how it exercises power. Who are our government lawyers? What does that system look like today? The vast majority of domestic legal advice—well over 90 percent—is provided by around 2,500 civil servant lawyers in the Government Legal Department, headed by the Treasury Solicitor. This is an office with origins in the seventeenth century that expanded in size as the Attorney and Solicitor General became unable to handle the sheer volume of government legal work. These lawyers are organised into advisory teams aligned with individual government departments. They are, in effect, the front line of government lawyering. For international law, the primary source of advice is the Legal Directorate in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. It has roughly 100 lawyers. Where specialist input is required, where legal questions are particularly tricky or raise the prospect of litigation—or where officials seek a second opinion—government lawyers may turn to panel counsel. These are barristers appointed by the Attorney General through a competitive process to undertake government work. This is a distinctive feature of the UK system: a considerable amount of specialist legal advice is provided by private practitioners, who may also act against the government in other cases. For more significant or contested issues, matters can be escalated. Advice may be sought from the Treasury Solicitor, or from the First Treasury Counsel—the so-called “Treasury Devil”—a senior barrister who works exclusively for the government for a fixed term. At the highest level sit the Law Officers: the Attorney General and Solicitor General. They deal with the most important, sensitive, and politically salient legal questions. They are also the only genuinely political lawyers in the system. They are ministers, drawn from Parliament, and when they advise, that advice constitutes the government’s definitive legal position. Running alongside this advisory structure is the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel—an elite group of around 50 lawyers responsible for drafting primary legislation. They too may refer issues to the Attorney General where necessary. That, in outline, is the current ecosystem of government lawyering. The structure of the book It opens with a discussion of its aims, my reasons for writing, the methodology, and the limits of its scope. The main limitation is that I focus on lawyers advising the UK Government and its core departments. I do not examine devolved governments or their internal legal arrangements. I also focus on advisory and drafting work—the civil side of government lawyering. I do not deal in detail with prosecutorial functions carried out through bodies like the Crown Prosecution Service or the Director of Public Prosecutions. The book is in large measure an exploratory work, mapping underexamined constitutional terrain. Accordingly, it makes a range of claims along the way. Some are descriptive, and aimed at capturing how government lawyering works in practice. Some are constitutional—identifying conventions that structure the relationship between lawyers and officials. And some are normative, particularly toward the end, where I assess the contribution government lawyers make to constitutional government. It is, in short, more a fox than a hedgehog of a book. Chapter 2 provides a brief history of the relationship between law, lawyers, and executive power in the English—later UK—constitution. It also sketches how the current institutional system of government lawyering emerged. We often say that the Crown is bound by the law of the land. That is true enough. But how has that principle been realised in practice? Most monarchs were not trained lawyers. They did not have law reports on their desks. Some—James I, for example—saw themselves as capable jurists. But most relied on legal professionals to explain the limits of their authority and how to pursue their objectives within those limits. This chapter shows that government lawyering has a deep constitutional history. Government lawyers did not suddenly appear in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. In one form or another, they have always been present. It traces who monarchs relied on for advice, and how certain offices—most notably the Attorney General and Solicitor General—rose in prominence and came to eclipse other sources of legal advice. The chapter then turns to the development of the current system. Like much of British public law, this system evolved incrementally, rather than being designed from first principles. I give a series of vignettes showing how the system we have took shape. In addition to telling the story of how we have the system we have today, another point of the chapter is to show that today’s government lawyers are heirs to a long constitutional tradition. They have long had to navigate a set of enduring tensions: between advancing the executive’s objectives and stating the law faithfully; between loyalty to ministers and commitment to broader notions of constitutional propriety and principle. After Chapter 2, the book turns to its core: a sustained analysis of how legal advice is produced and used within government. Chapter 11, toward the end, deals with legislative drafting. The greater focus on advisory work reflects not greater importance, but greater complexity. Drafting is equally significant but more structured and therefore easier to describe in a more compressed way. Chapters 3 to 6 examine the main institutional actors I have just introduced: the Government Legal Department, the Legal Directorate of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the barristers on the Attorney General’s panels, and the Law Officers. These chapters go into what may, depending on your taste, seem either like rich detail or dense description. But I think the detail is necessary. There is no comprehensive contemporary treatment of these actors: how they are organised, how they are internally structured, their professional ethos, their sense of role morality and place in the constitution, and how they all interact with one another. These are important constitutional actors, and so it matters that we know who they are and how they are organised. Those chapters, then, are intended to be rich in detail and information so that we can have good answers to such questions. Chapters 7 and 8 examine how the system of government lawyering works in practice: how legal advice is sought, how it is formulated, and how it is communicated within government. I also look at how legal materials and sources are analysed by government lawyers, how legal risk is assessed and presented, how disagreements over legal advice are resolved, and how second or third opinions are obtained where officials want them. I think readers of these chapters will come away with a much sharper picture of how government lawyering operates in practice. In my view, several features stand out from examining the procedures and substantive principles that govern their work. First, most of the legal advice is not given by the Attorney General or the Treasury Devil—the figures one is most likely to see mentioned in the press. It is given by civil servant lawyers in the Government Legal Department. They are very much the foot soldiers of government lawyering, the rock on which the overall system is built. Second, the legal advice process is highly iterative. It is highly collaborative and deeply embedded in policy-making from a very early stage. The back-and-forth between government lawyers and policy officials does not happen only at the end of the policy process, when legal sign-off is sought for an already settled policy. It happens from the beginning. Policy is shaped by legal considerations from the outset. The process of generating advice is also highly collaborative. It is rarely the product of a single mind but will have input from several actors. The rules concerning the escalation of legal questions, when it should be referred to a more senior source of advice, or when it should go to the very top, to the Law Officers, are largely unwritten. But they are nonetheless generally well understood and internalised by government lawyers. It is also understood that any government lawyer can go directly to the law officers with an issue, without permission of their relevant minister. This is very rare but seen as an important safeguard. The advice of the Law Officers has unquestioned primacy within government. I argue that there is a constitutional convention that it cannot be sidestepped. Once the Law Officers decide a legal question, that is the government’s legal position. The government cannot go elsewhere. It cannot forum-shop once the issue has reached the Law Officers. I also argue that there is a constitutional convention that if the Law Officers advise that there is no respectable legal basis for a proposed course of action in domestic law, the government cannot proceed. Paradoxically, however, despite the unquestioned primacy of Law Officers’ advice, there is no sophisticated or well-developed system for treating their past advice as internal precedent for government. There are a few domains in which something like precedent operates—war powers, European Union matters, and devolution—but in most areas the authority of advice is time-bound. In some respects, it stays with the incumbent office-holder and does not travel far beyond their time in office. That contrasts with systems such as that of the United States and how the opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel are treated within the executive branch. Substantively, government lawyers approach legal analysis through a combination of a court-centred approach and a risk-based approach. It is risk-based in the sense that government lawyers do not present their opinions like courts. They do not simply say: this is my best professional judgment of what the law is, your policy does not match it, and therefore it is unlawful. That is not how they operate. To be sure, their starting point is to ask: what would a competent court make of this issue? What is the best view of the law? That is their fixed point for analysing legal materials. Around that fixed point, however, analysis then turns to the legal risk associated with alternative arguments. You have the best view of the law in mind—but what about the alternative arguments that support the policy? How persuasive are they? What are the risks involved? Can we say there is a 50% chance the legal arguments for the policy will be accepted? 40%? These are their bread-and-butter questions. So they combine elements of both approaches. They do not merely ask whether there is some reasonable argument available to support the government’s position. But nor do they simply identify what they take to be the single best view of the law and insist that only this can be acted upon as a legal basis for action. Government lawyers are encouraged and trained to be constructive, solution-oriented, and practically minded. They want to help the government achieve its objectives by suggesting ways of making policy more legally robust. But it must be stressed that they are not trying to develop a separate executive jurisprudence. They are not departmentalists, to use a term much in vogue in constitutional theory. The anchor of their analysis remains what a competent court would decide. In that sense, they work within a horizon of judicial supremacy over what the law is and requires. I also highlight that there is very little evidence that government lawyers are pressured to slant their advice, or that they would yield to such pressure if it were applied. Respect for the independence of their professional judgment is deeply embedded within government. That applies not only to civil servant lawyers and panel counsel, but also to the Law Officers. The Law Officers have both legal and political functions, but there is vanishingly little evidence that they succumb to political bias or are subject to pressure, even in moments of acute political difficulty or high stakes for the Prime Minister. I also challenge the idea that government lawyers, as a class of public servants, are excessively risk-averse or unduly cautious. More often, I think, the real risk aversion lies with the officials who receive the advice. These officials may be told that there is a respectable legal basis for a policy, but also that there are serious litigation risks. A Government lawyer might say that we have a legal argument that is 40 per cent likely to be upheld and 60 per cent likely to fail. Officials may simply not want to run that risk. So the real caution often lies there. At the same time, government lawyers are operating in an environment of much greater legal uncertainty than they did several decades ago, owing to developments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the broader expansion in both the grounds and intensity of judicial review. This makes it unsurprising if they are regularly identifying a range of legal risks. But the choice to remove the sources of these legal risks can only lie with ministers and with Parliament. Chapter 9 then considers the impact of legal advice: the weight given to it in executive decision-making. This was a difficult chapter to write, because it is notoriously hard to pin down how much weight decision-makers actually give to legal advice, especially where it appears to conflict with their first-order policy objectives. I do not attempt anything like an empirical or quantitative account. My account is impressionistic and suggestive. It is built from anecdote, biography, and narrative accounts offered by both officials and government lawyers. That is a limitation. But I also think the evidence displays such consistency, over time and across different actors, that it points to a real cultural and political phenomenon: namely, that law and legality are taken very seriously within the United Kingdom government. I think there is good evidence that there is a standing approach within government whereby, if government lawyers say there is no respectable legal basis for a policy, the government will not proceed. What usually happens instead is that the policy is abandoned, modified to make it more legally robust, or the issue is escalated to more senior sources of advice, until it reaches the Law Officers. And when the Law Officers advise that a policy is unlawful in domestic law, I think there is a convention that the government will not proceed. It understands itself to be constitutionally bound. Where the issue concerns international law, the position is more complicated. I do not think there is an equivalent convention, because there are too many examples of governments proceeding, with the blessing of the Attorney General, in circumstances where the legal basis is contested. But I do think there is a strong presumption against proceeding where the Attorney advises that there is no respectable basis in international law. One point I am at pains to stress in the book is that the work of government lawyers should not merely be seen as a constraint on executive power. That is certainly an important aspect of what they do, but it is not the whole picture. The work of government lawyers is also critical to enabling the effective deployment of public power by the executive. It is critical in several respects. Legal advice, for one thing, helps clarify what the executive can lawfully do. In a specialised and highly complex modern society, the law constitutes a domain of semi-autonomous discourse and practice. Government lawyers possess the expertise necessary to enable the executive to navigate this domain—to understand the extent of its powers, how far those powers can be pushed, and, critically, to help transform governmental will, preferences, and policy aims into legally effective decisions, orders, rules, bills, statutes, and so forth. In a constitutional system such as that of the United Kingdom, where there is a strong cultural premium placed on legality and an expectation of lawful conduct, that form of legal validation—the ability to say that one’s position rests on a respectable legal basis articulated by professional legal advisers—is essential to political legitimacy and credibility. The work of government lawyers, in these ways sense, has a distinctly power-generating quality. Chapter 10 examines the confidentiality and privilege associated with government legal advice. It considers the tight control that government can exercise over the advice it receives. I broadly accept the justification for maintaining confidentiality in respect of the full legal advice. Preserving a strong measure of confidentiality allows the executive to legally stress-test its policies and helps to avoid timidity, excessive risk aversion, and indecision, by ensuring that ideas can be rigorously examined in private before being exposed to parliamentary scrutiny. At the same time, there are clear risks associated with a policy of total opacity in respect of legal advice. These risks are documented in the chapter. The central argument of the chapter, however, is my revisionist account of the dominant understanding of what is known as the Law Officers’ Convention—namely, the circumstances in which the advice of the Law Officers may be disclosed outside government. Governments have increasingly asserted to Parliament that the convention not only prohibits disclosure of the full terms of Law Officers’ advice, but also extends to the gist or summary of that advice, and even to the fact that advice was given at all—save in the most exceptional circumstances. My argument is that this account is far too broad and unduly restrictive of parliamentary scrutiny and debate. The better reading of constitutional practice is that the scope of the convention is considerably narrower. There is, in my view, a strong and justifiable convention against disclosing the full terms of the advice—the actual memorandum, email, or record of advice. However, constitutional practice and history do not support the existence of any constitutional bar on disclosing either the fact that advice was given or the broad terms of that advice. What the government has here is a permissive power to withhold or disclose this information, a straightforward privilege, one that is not contingent on needing exceptional justification to waive. Accordingly, parliamentarians act entirely with constitutionally proper when they seek disclosure of the fact or general content of legal advice, in order to hold government to account on contentious matters. The chapter therefore seeks both to outline the law governing legal professional privilege and to challenge some of the more expansive orthodoxies surrounding the convention. Chapter 11 offers an account of the various roles and responsibilities played by government lawyers in the legislative process—from the initial formulation of policy, through the conversion of policy into a bill, to the bill’s passage through Parliament and its enactment as a statute. I examine the role played by actors already encountered, such as the Government Legal Department and the Law Officers, but place particular emphasis on the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, who are the most prominent and important government lawyers in the legislative process. These lawyers are essential to the government’s ability to exercise public power in areas such as raising taxes, appropriating revenue, and altering the law of the land—each of which requires ministers to act through statutory authority created via a highly specialised legislative process. If statutes and regulations are to have their intended legal and practical effect, they must be drafted with precision. They must use the right words in the right order, be intelligible to those tasked with implementing them—such as officials and judges—and cohere with the existing body of law and its canons, presumptions and so on. Parliamentary Counsel are therefore indispensable as a specialist cadre whose expertise lies in translating the executive’s policy intentions, normative preferences, and ideological commitments into legally effective legislative form. They are a critical source of governmental power. At the same time, there is an important sense in which Parliamentary Counsel also channel—and at times limit—the exercise of governmental power. They do so by shaping the form and mode through which executive will is legally expressed in statute. In our constitution, there is a very longstanding tradition within the Office of embedding rule of law values into drafting practice. In practical terms, this includes a presumption against facilitating retroactive legislation; against rapid commencements that deprive individuals of the opportunity to understand the new legal position; against the use of vague language in criminal offences; and against conferring broad Henry VIII powers—namely, powers enabling ministers to amend primary legislation by statutory instrument. The institutional authority of the Office means that when Parliamentary Counsel raise concerns that a proposal conflicts with rule of law values, that pushback is taken seriously. While not always determinative, it is often influential and frequently prevails. Chapter 12 concludes the book by offering a normative evaluation of the work of government lawyers in the United Kingdom. The account is broadly positive. The book argues that the work of government lawyers can be understood as an institutional and practical instantiation of the United Kingdom’s longstanding commitment to legality and the rule of law. As noted, Parliamentary Counsel have long contributed to this commitment by shaping legislation in accordance with rule of law values, thereby channelling and constraining the exercise of governmental power. Respect for legality is also reflected in the deep integration of government lawyers into the policymaking process, the protection of their independence and non-partisanship, and the weight accorded to their advice within executive deliberation. Government lawyers are therefore central to what might be described as the executive’s practice of constitutional self-restraint: the internal organisation of government in a manner that promotes lawful and constitutionally attentive decision-making. At the same time, government lawyers are also essential to the executive’s ability to exercise public power effectively in pursuit of the common good. Legal reasoning about the scope and limits of governmental power is highly technical and requires mastery of legal sources and methods—statutes, prerogative powers, regulations, conventions, and precedent. Their specialised expertise enables lawyers to help the government to navigate the demands of the law and translate policy into legally authoritative and constitutionally legitimate forms—into legally valid political orders, decisions, and statutes. This is the power-generating dimension of their role. In conclusion, government lawyers operate at the intersection of law and politics. To fulfil their constitutional role, they must respond to demands arising from both domains. They must respect the integrity of the law and their professional obligations, while also assisting the government of the day in realizing its political objectives. The system of government lawyering in the United Kingdom contributes to good governance by cultivating lawyers capable of maintaining this delicate balance—between enabling the effective use of public power and ensuring that such power is exercised lawfully and in accordance with constitutional principle; between advancing governmental aims and providing candid, independent legal advice that may not always align with political preference. So long as this balance is maintained, government lawyers remain a critical component of good governance within the United Kingdom’s constitutional order.
Will Howard hasn't played since Ohio State's national title run. The Steelers can't wait for that to change.
It has been a while since Will Howard played a football game. Nineteen months and counting. Nearly 560 days. Not since Ohio State’s national championship...
19 defendants charged in Pennsylvania home healthcare fraud schemes
Nineteen defendants are facing criminal charges following an investigation into healthcare fraud in Pennsylvania, officials said.
Caesars Entertainment, Inc. (NASDAQ:CZR) Stock Has Average Target Price of $30.71
Caesars Entertainment, Inc. (NASDAQ:CZR - Get Free Report) has been assigned a consensus rating of "Hold" from the nineteen ratings firms that are presently covering the stock, Marketbeat reports. One equities research analyst has rated the stock with a sell recommendation, sixteen have assigned a h
These superbugs pose the biggest threat to Americans, CDC says
Nineteen drug-resistant germs cause an estimated 9.7 million infections and 50,800 deaths in the country each year.
19 charged in $4M Pennsylvania home health care fraud schemes
Nineteen people were charged in Medicaid fraud cases involving more than $4 million in alleged false home care billings, authorities said.
Intel Panther Lake Teardown, 18A, BSPD, GAAFET, SemiAnalysis STEEL
Panther Lake debuts the first commercial implementation of backside power delivery (BSPDN), introduces Intel’s first iteration of gate-all-around (GAA) transistors, and showcases their advanced packaging capabilities with its Foveros-S assembly. With Panther Lake, Intel’s manufacturing arc has shifted from nebulous roadmaps to shipped silicon, a significant milestone on their long road back to competitive semiconductor manufacturing. To evaluate the extent of Intel’s comeback, we tore down Panther Lake. The SemiAnalysis STEEL teardown lab breaks down advanced datacenter and AI hardware. To learn more about our pipeline or to commission a teardown, contact sales@semianalysis.com. WE’RE HIRING: Architecture, floorplan, packaging, manufacturing, and labs experts. Opportunities from system to transistor and everywhere in between. Check out our Careers page. Our teardown traces 18A from its four-sheet RibbonFETs (Intel’s marketing name for GAAFETs) and gate stacks through contacts, frontside and backside wiring, and the bonded carrier. We explain how these material and integration choices improve gate control and reduce resistance, while adding capacitance, thermal resistance, and process complexity. Our measurements put Panther Lake’s 18A compute logic and TSMC N3E GPU logic at similar logic density. However, 18A does not lead TSMC N3P, N2 or Samsung SF2 in peak density. Panther Lake’s CPU cores are incremental updates, and the high-end GPU still uses TSMC N3E. Panther Lake assembles one compute tile, one GPU tile, and one I/O tile atop a passive base tile using Intel’s Foveros-S advanced packaging. Both compute tile variants use Intel 18A. The Xe3 GPU options are a 4-core GT1 tile on Intel 3 and a larger 12-core GT2 tile on TSMC N3E. Both I/O tile variants use TSMC N6. [1], [2] Our analysis centers on the PTL-U compute tile, both the 4-core and 12-core GPU tiles, as well as the 12-lane I/O tile. In conventional chips, power and signal are routed through the same frontside metal stack towards the device frontend. Power rails consume scarce routing resources near the transistors, while tall via stacks carry VDD and VSS from the coarse upper wires to local rails. Backside power delivery (BSPD) moves the main power network behind the transistor layer, to the backside, separating it from frontside signal routing. We covered BSPD and its impacts in 2024. [3], [4], [5] Intel’s BSPD implementation, branded as “PowerVia”, routes power through dedicated backside metals to nano-TSVs, which connect those rails to local source/drain (S/D) contacts. Implementing that separation requires Intel to build the interconnect stacks from both sides of the wafer. The frontside comprises the M0-M14 signal stack, while the backside comprises the BM0-BM5 power stack. M0 and BM0 are closest to the transistors. The nano-TSVs connect the two sides, but Intel patterns and etches each via from the front after forming the contacts. A narrow via runs from the side of the contact deep into the silicon substrate. Intel then completes the frontside signal metal stack, bonds the wafer to a carrier, flips it and removes the original substrate until the buried via tips are exposed. The backside metal stack is then deposited directly on the revealed vias. The nano-TSV and backside-via profiles taper in opposite directions because Intel forms them from opposite sides of the wafer. The transistor structures form the FEOL. Local contacts and nano-TSVs connect them to the wiring. M0 begins the frontside interconnect stack. The silicon carrier remains attached above the frontside interconnects. It supports the device wafer during substrate removal and backside processing and remains part of the finished chip’s thermal path. PowerVia removes the main power distribution from the congested frontside metals, routing supply through shorter and wider backside wires. Its lateral landing still occupies area in the standard cell, so it recovers less cell area than a direct backside contact. [3] Nano-TSVs beside the logic devices carry VDD or VSS from the backside power network, while signal connections continue upward through the frontside metals. Backside Interconnects Samsung SF2 data is included for comparison to Panther Lake’s within this article. SF2 is the incumbent GAA foundry node but lacks BSPD, serving as a useful reference to evaluate 18A. A full teardown of Samsung’s S26 products, processed on SF2, will be shared soon.Nanosheet-cut EDS comparison. The PowerVia supply path runs from the backside Cu rails through Mo-lined W nano-TSVs to the local transistor contacts. In this cross section, the tapered connection spans roughly 150 nm from the contact level to BM0. The Ta liner confines Cu and promotes adhesion to the surrounding stack; the AlOₓ etch stop controls the next dielectric etch above the rail. Dielectric beneath the ribbons electrically separates the devices from the backside wiring and removes the conducting silicon body below the channel. [6] AlOₓ serves as an etchstop (ES), enabling endpointing and protecting the underlying layers. Low-volatility aluminum fluoride reaction products resist the fluorinated plasma, allowing a thin AlOₓ film to protect the metal while the surrounding low-k dielectric is removed. [6], [7]. While the BM0 and layers above the M1 lines show double AlOx layers, Our SMIC N+3 teardown showed single AlOₓ layers. SMIC uses a simpler local AlOₓ substack, while the remaining cap and etch sequence provide the required landing protection. So why double layers? The closely spaced AlOₓ doublets provide two protected endpoints in the etch sequence. Intel documents an AlOₓ/SiN/AlOₓ stack that explains the benefit. The main dielectric plasma etch stops on the first AlOₓ film; a selective wet clear opens that film; a second plasma etch removes the intermediate SiN and stops on the second AlOₓ film. The final wet clear exposes the metal landing surface. SiN is the intermediate dielectric in Intel’s published example. [8] The second stop protects the metal through a cap breakthrough. Wide openings can etch faster than narrow ones, and etch depth varies across the wafer. Metal under an early-clearing opening would otherwise be exposed while other openings still need more etching. Staged protection widens the process window and reduces metal erosion, corrosion and void formation. [8] TSMC documents AlN/AlOₓ/SiOC/AlOₓ above Cu, with AlN blocking Cu diffusion, and a simpler AlN/SiOC/AlOₓ variant that omits one AlOx film. [9] Levels with different opening sizes, aspect ratios, pattern densities and cap materials need different etch margins. A double AlOx stop is useful where another protected endpoint justifies the added processing. The extra film adds formation, selective opening and cleaning steps, plus another set of interfaces to control adhesion, moisture, and stress. These blanket films are opened through the existing via pattern, so each film does not require another lithography mask. AlOₓ adds parasitic capacitance when it replaces lower-k dielectric; two thin AlOₓ films can nevertheless contain less AlOₓ than one thick film. Total thickness, placement, and theintermediate dielectric determine the electrical cost. Deposition chemistry also changes AlOx permittivity and residual hydroxyl content, which can oxidize the underlying metal. [7], [8], [10], [11] The backside stack separates into relatively fine BM0-BM2 wiring near the devices and coarser BM3-BM5 power distribution. The largest pitch increase occurs between BM2 and BM3. BM0’s pitch closely matches the logic-row height, fitting local power delivery to the cell rows. Higher levels aggregate current through larger conductors: routing density becomes less important than low resistance and current capacity as the network approaches the package. This hierarchy provides wide power wiring for the power delivery network without consuming scarce frontside signal-routing resources. [3] The SemiAnalysis STEEL teardown lab breaks down advanced datacenter and AI hardware. To learn more about our pipeline or to commission a teardown, contact sales@semianalysis.com. WE’RE HIRING: Architecture, floorplan, packaging, manufacturing, and labs experts. Opportunities from system to transistor and everywhere in between. Check out our Careers page. Frontside Interconnects Intel 18A combines Mo-lined W contacts and nano-TSVs with a separate backside Cu power network. Samsung SF2 keeps power on the frontside, using Ti-based contact interfaces and Ta-based barriers and Co liners around Cu wiring. In 18A standard-cell rows, backside power rails supply the devices through nano-TSVs within the cells, freeing frontside routing resources. Samsung’s M0 accommodates both power and signal connections. From the device toward M0, the connection runs through a Ti-based S/D interface, W contact fill, a Mo-lined W via, and the Cu M0 wire. Mo supplies a conductive nucleation and adhesion layer for W, replacing the resistive TiN liner used in conventional W integration. This increases the effective conduction volume within the feature while retaining W fill and its established polishing, cleaning and etching processes. Intel’s Mo/W patent describes this integration tradeoff. The nano-TSV uses the same Mo-lined W construction in the backside supply path. [12] The move from TiN to Mo is an incremental change. While a full Co or Mo fill can also reduce the volume lost to liners in very small features, it requires new integration schemes that increase complexity and risk. Cu remains attractive for wider wires due to its low resistance. As wires and vias shrink, the diffusion barrier consumes an increasing fraction of their cross-section. [12], [12], [14] Intel uses Co/Ru liners at M0-M1, Co at M2-M4, and Nb at M5-M9. The lower-level liners help Cu adhere and reduce void formation during trench fills. Applied Materials’ Endura has new thermal control that facilitate wetting process, so the thin film continuity is good enough that good capillary pressure will drive Cu atoms to the via bottom without voiding. Intel’s choice to use Nb is particularly interesting. Intel’s Nb patent describes a conductive diffusion barrier intended to reduce the barrier’s contribution to resistance relative to conventional Ta-based barriers, particularly at via bottoms where all current crosses the barrier. The patent pairs Nb in coarser levels with the option of lower-cost PVD processing. [15], [16] The upper metal layers support thicker barriers formed through physical vapor deposition (PVD) despite its worse coverage and uniformity. Meanwhile, the lower metal layers require thinner barriers deposited through conformal atomic layer deposition (ALD). Co/Ru adds another material interface and requires controlled deposition and Cu fill. Changing liners and barriers by metal layer allows Intel to optimize interconnect resistance, process complexity, and reliability. [15, 16] RibbonFET, Intel’s name for its gate-all-around FETs (GAAFETs), replaces the FinFET’s vertical fins with four stacked horizontal silicon nanosheets, allowing the gate to surround the channel on every side. The path to GAAFET begins with the planar transistor. A planar MOSFET places the gate above the channel between its source and drain. Pairing an NMOS with a PMOS transistor creates a CMOS inverter, in which the NMOS pulls the output low for a high input, and the PMOS pulls it high for a low input. The gate must retain electrostatic control of the channel to ensure clean switching. As gate lengths shrank, the drain began to compete with the gate for that control, increasing off-state leakage. Electrostatic control was restored through an architectural evolution that raised the channel into a vertical fin and wrapping the gate around three sides. Called “FinFET”, this new architecture packed more effective channel width into a smaller footprint. Further scaling made it harder to maintain both drive current and leakage within smaller cells, and reintroduced the same problems planar MOSFETs faced. Nanosheet GAAFETs close the fourth side by replacing the vertical fin with a stack of horizontal nanosheets, each surrounded by the gate. The tighter electrostatic control suppresses leakage at shorter gate lengths while stacking adds effective channel width within the cell footprint. In a FinFET process, channel width changes in discrete steps as designers must add or remove whole fins. Nanosheet width can instead be adjusted continuously within the process’s design rules. Wider sheets increase drive current, while narrower sheets reduce capacitance at the cost of drive current. Intel 18A uses stacks of four nanosheets each and varies their widths across logic and SRAM. At the process level, adding more sheets to each stack increases effective channel width and drive current, but complicates fabrication. RibbonFET vs MBCFET Samsung began GAAFET production in 2022 with SF3E, following with SF3 and now SF2. Its ‘MBCFET’ provides a useful structural comparison with Intel’s first RibbonFET implementation. [17] STEEL is digging deeper into SF2, used in the Exynos 2600, and TSMC’s GAAFET N2, used in Apple’s A20 Pro, in upcoming newsletter articles. We’re throwing some teasers on X. Let’s compare Samsung SF2’s MBCFET with Intel 18A’s RibbonFET. Subscribe Even to the untrained eye, Intel’s extra nanosheet is obvious. Intel stacks four ribbons to Samsung’s three. Samsung’s sheets are much wider in these fields, so both sheet count and width matter to the available channel perimeter. Sheet width also changes which silicon surfaces carry current. On conventional (001) silicon, wide nanosheets emphasize the broad top and bottom surfaces, favoring electron transport; the larger sidewall contribution in a narrow sheet favors hole transport. Thinner sheets improve gate control but increase confinement and scattering. This makes width and thickness part of the NMOS/PMOS balance, alongside strain and threshold voltage. [18], [19] GAAFET designs like 18A use different work-function-metal (WFM) stacks for NMOS and PMOS. Around each ribbon, a thin SiOx interfacial layer separates the silicon channel from the HfOx high-k dielectric, with La providing dipole tuning and the WFM wrapping the dielectric. NMOS uses a TiAl-based stack, while PMOS uses TiN WFM. W fills the remaining gate trench, providing a lower-resistivity path where the work-function layers are no longer needed. In this field, the PMOS stacks leave room for W between ribbons, while the NMOS stacks occupy more of those gaps. A silicon-based dielectric marks the P/N boundary, allowing the PMOS and NMOS gates, sharing the same gate trench, to be processed sequentially. Fast logic paths, retention circuits, and SRAM need a family of threshold options. Changing threshold without substantially changing device dimensions, capacitance or fabrication complexity is valuable. FinFET processes typically use different work-function-metal stacks. In a four-ribbon GAA stack, the narrow sheet-to-sheet gap limits how much WFM can fit around each channel. La in the gate dielectric creates interfacial dipoles at the SiOx/HfOx boundary, shifting effective work function and tuning threshold voltage. This gives Intel another control alongside its NMOS and PMOS WFM stacks. Low-threshold devices improve critical-path drive; higher thresholds reduce leakage elsewhere. Dipole tuning is especially useful in GAA because it changes threshold without consuming the narrow intersheet gap with thicker WFM. Precise control of La incorporation, diffusion and interface quality has long been a challenge, limiting viability in high volume production but is now seen from every leading-edge foundry. Intel’s patent describes depositing a dipole-forming oxide above HfOx and annealing it toward the interfacial oxide before completing the work-function and fill metals. This separates threshold tuning from the space available for metal. Newer research addresses the thermal cost: imec’s 2026 dipole-middle research inserts the shifter between two HfOx depositions, shortening the diffusion path while protecting SiOx during patterning. [20], [21]Matched-cut EDS, Intel 18A (left) vs. Samsung SF2 (right). Intel retains raised source/drain epi beneath its contacts, while Samsung recesses W deep into the epi to form a V-shaped Ti-lined interface. The deeper contact increases metal-to-semiconductor area and shortens the current path from the lower sheets, reducing contact and spreading resistance. It also removes epi volume and brings the contact etch closer to the channel ends. Retaining more epi preserves the material available for strain transfer, especially from SiGe into PMOS. These geometries balance contact access against stress engineering and etch margin. [22], [23] Samsung stacks three sheets to Intel’s four ribbons, and both processes use sheet width to tune drive strength. In our Samsung cross-sections, widths range roughly from 19 to 30 nm in the NPU rows and 37 to 50 nm in the CU cell. The Samsung nanosheets taper, with the widest sheet at the bottom and the narrowest at the top. Both processes use HfOx gate dielectric and Ti-based work-function stacks, with Al in the NMOS stack. In the Samsung devices shown here, the dielectric and WFM occupy the intersheet gaps, leaving W above the top sheet. Intel’s PMOS stack leaves more room between ribbons, and W fills those gaps while the thicker NMOS stack leaves W mainly in the upper trench. Gate-stack EDS maps. The W between Intel’s PMOS ribbons provides a conductive path close to the lower gates. Where WFM fills the entire gap, the gate still surrounds the channel, but voltage reaches it through the more resistive work-function films. Thinner WFM and dipole tuning preserve room for low-resistivity fill; Mo and Ru are alternative fill metals being developed for further scaling. [24] A masked, sequential WFM flow explains the different gate heights and inter-nanosheet fill. The proposed sequence below shows how separate NMOS and PMOS work-function steps produce that geometry. Enabled by the BSPDN process, Intel replaces the dense-logic silicon subfin with dielectric, removing the parasitic conduction path below the ribbons and reducing substrate-related capacitance. A retained silicon body as in classical, non-SOI, planar and FinFET designs needs junction and punchthrough-stop engineering to suppress leakage. Dielectric isolation makes that leakage less sensitive to the subfin doping profile but adds removal and fill steps. It also weakens the direct thermal path through silicon, making the contacts, metal stacks and package more important for heat extraction. [24], [26] Fluorine is concentrated around selected Intel device structures in the maps. WF6 is a standard precursor for W nucleation and fill, while barrier films protect adjacent dielectrics from fluorine attack. Low-fluorine W processes reduce the residual-F burden. Chloride-based precursors avoid introducing F during W deposition, but require control of chlorine attack, nucleation and fill quality. The integration target is a continuous, low-resistance W path with a thin protective liner and minimal chemical damage to the surrounding stack. [20], [27], [28] The SemiAnalysis STEEL teardown lab breaks down advanced datacenter and AI hardware. To learn more about our pipeline or to commission a teardown, contact sales@semianalysis.com. WE’RE HIRING: Architecture, floorplan, packaging, manufacturing, and labs experts. Opportunities from system to transistor and everywhere in between. Check out our Careers page. We measured cell height, gate pitch, metal geometry, and ribbon dimensions at the XTEM sites shown below. The tables group these dimensions by site and device polarity. Our “sheet cuts” cross the silicon channel and show the ribbons end-on. “gate cuts” run along the channel through successive gates. The 18A logic cell dimensions point to a five-track logic library while the N3E and Intel 3 cell dimensions evidence a seven-track logic library. The DDR-PHY uses wider M0 wires and much larger spacing than core logic. That trades routing density for lower wire resistance and weaker coupling between neighboring nets. The geometry suits the current delivery and coupling requirements of analog, clock, and I/O circuitry. PowerVia lets 18A combine a compact cell height with wider M0 geometry by moving the main power rails off the signal-routing tracks. That relaxes local wire scaling while preserving a small cell footprint. Cell height and gate pitch set the geometric density; pin access and routability determine how much of it a real block can use. [29] The biggest takeaway from our gate-pitch measurements is that Intel 18A compute logic and TSMC N3E GPU logic have similar density in the Bohr representative-cell model. The 18A example is 18.6% denser than the Intel 3 GPU example. Gate pitches are nearly identical across the three sites, so cell height drives most of the difference. The Bohr model combines a four-transistor NAND2 spanning three gate pitches and a 32-transistor scan flip-flop (SFF) spanning nineteen pitches, weighting their densities 60:40. The sensitivity column shows how independently changing cell height and gate pitch by ±1 nm changes the result. This compares representative cell geometries; whole-die density also depends on cell mix and placement. The 18A P-core gives M0 substantially more metal cross section than the N3E vector engine. Treating each profile as a trapezoid gives 2.63 times the area per line and 1.84 times the area after normalization by routing pitch. The larger section reduces the geometric contribution to line resistance and lowers current density for a given current. Taller and wider wires also add capacitance, so circuit delay depends on the balance of resistance and capacitance. The DDR-PHY has less metal area per routing width than the 18A core fields, while remaining above N3E. [30] Area = height × (top CD + bottom CD) / 2, including liners. Area/pitch normalizes by routing width. Taper is the symmetric sidewall angle from vertical, with the largest angle belonging to the DDR-PHY. Compute tile The measurements show how ribbon dimensions and gate-stack geometry vary across the compute tile and between NMOS and PMOS to balance channel drive, gate load and the space needed for the dielectric/WFM stack across logic, SRAM and the DDR-PHY. Width mainly changes available channel perimeter; thickness also changes electrostatic control and carrier confinement. Gate-stack thickness then determines the space left for low-resistivity fill P-core and LP E-core logic Both the P-core and LP E-core use multiple nanosheet widths. Widths are measured on high-magnification XTEMs while wider-field images demonstrate additional width choices within the LP E-core. Multiple widths are expected even within an LP E-core. Timing-critical paths, buffers and cells with different fanout need different drive strengths. The lower-magnification fields show this width diversity beyond the sites quantified in the table. L2 and L3 SRAM GAA gives SRAM designers another way to balance the pull-up (PU), pass-gate (PG), and pull-down (PD) transistors. FinFET bitcells set device strength through fin count while GAA adds nanosheet width as a sizing knob. In a 6T SRAM cell, a strong pull-down relative to the pass-gate limits read disturbance, while a strong pass-gate relative to the pull-up improves writability. During a write, the pass-gate and write driver pull the node storing “1” below the inverter trip point. During a read, the pull-down holds the node storing “0” low. Bias, threshold voltage, mismatch and assist circuitry set the remaining margin. FinFET high-current cells commonly use a PU:PG:PD fin-count pattern of 1:2:2, a device-sizing ratio rather than a current ratio. Ribbon width lets Intel balance SRAM strengths without adding whole fins. The L2 cell uses its narrowest ribbons for PU and widest for PD, improving writability and read stability respectively. Intel’s disclosed HCC operates without assist; its denser HDC uses negative-bitline write assist. Pulling the selected bitline briefly below ground increases pass-gate overdrive so it can overpower the pull-up at lower supply voltage. That buys density and low voltage writability at the cost of boosting circuitry, switching energy, and additional voltage stress that must be controlled. [31], [32] Four rectangular ribbons give the perimeter = 8 × (width + thickness), before corner rounding. PG/PU is 1.49 and PD/PG is 1.16. The L3 structures closely resemble L2 in layout and cell height. Fewer L3 nanosheet widths are tabulated because fewer high-magnification images were available. DDR PHY The DDR-PHY trades density for controlled analog behavior and reliable off-chip signaling. It contains drivers, receivers, delay circuits, and calibration logic that set drive strength, sampling time, and voltage margin. Repeated four-sheet devices with similar widths fit the use of regular transistor units for matching and programmable drive. Its wider local wiring provides room for current delivery and separation of sensitive signals, while consuming more area than a dense core-logic grid. The layout serves the memory channel’s electrical requirements as well as digital logic density. [33] The SemiAnalysis STEEL teardown lab breaks down advanced datacenter and AI hardware. To learn more about our pipeline or to commission a teardown, contact sales@semianalysis.com. WE’RE HIRING: Architecture, floorplan, packaging, manufacturing, and labs experts. Opportunities from system to transistor and everywhere in between. Check out our Careers page. Intel 3 GPU devices Vector engine logic Intel 3’s XVE logic uses two-fin PMOS and NMOS devices with power rails in M0. Its cell height and M0 pitch give a seven-track geometry, two tracks more than the 18A logic. One-fin groups also appear among the two-fin devices. Intel 3 L2 SRAM The Intel 3 L2 SRAM uses the familiar HCC sizing pattern: one PU fin, two PG fins, and two PD fins. N3E GPU devices Vector engine logic The N3E XVE field contains repeated two-fin devices with seven-track cell geometry. N3E remains a FinFET process, giving Panther Lake a direct FinFET-to-RibbonFET comparison. N3E L2 SRAM The N3E L2 SRAM uses the same PU:PG:PD fin-count pattern of 1:2:2. Panther Lake-U follows Lunar Lake’s floorplan quite closely. Both pair 4 P-cores with 4 LP E-cores and NPU, media and display engines in similar locations. Lunar Lake also uses Xe2, the direct predecessor to Panther Lake’s Xe3 GPU. This makes Lunar Lake the most direct basis for our comparisons. Arrow Lake differs in core count and uses the older Xe-LPG GPU architecture, so we only use it where it offers a more direct component-level comparison. Compute tile Panther Lake compute-tile floorplans remain sparse even months after launch. Intel 18A’s backside metal and dielectric stack must be removed without damaging the underlying structures before a clean transistor-level floorplan can be imaged. Most published die shots hide or heavily process the background, but we are quite proud of the die shot we achieved and are excited to show the work we have done. We measured the areas of the key components on the compute tile and compared them with their Lunar Lake predecessors on TSMC N3B. These help us to capture changes in block area and compare the two chips across process nodes and designs. Our total tile areas exclude the scribe-line area. The compute-plus-GPU subtotal below uses the PTL-U compute tile and GT1 GPU; it excludes the I/O tile and passive base. Individual block areas use the boundaries marked on the floorplans The compute-plus-GPU row is recomputed from the displayed PTL-U and GT1 areas. Component rows use their stated per-region counts and are not an additive partition of the whole tile. The P-core area remains almost unchanged between Lunar Lake and Panther Lake, despite L2 capacity increasing from 2.5 MiB to 3 MiB. Arrow Lake uses the same Lion Cove core as Lunar Lake but also has a 3 MiB L2. Cougar Cove fits 20% more L2 into the same P-core area. The larger private cache keeps more of each core’s working set close to its execution units, reducing access to shared L3 and DRAM. Extra capacity adds storage leakage and lookup energy, so designers balance it against avoided lower-level accesses. The shared P-core L3 cache also shrank by 14.8%. [2] Cougar Cove combines a similar footprint with Intel’s reported power-efficiency improvements. RibbonFET’s tighter channel control reduces leakage, while PowerVia reduces supply droop and allows tighter voltage guardbands. [1] Darkmont’s four-core LP E-core cluster is 5.0% smaller than Skymont’s on Lunar Lake, with most of the reduction in its L2 regions. The 1 MiB region shrank by 8.4% and the 1.5 MiB region by 14.9%. The tag arrays also use one fewer visible row. Tags identify which memory addresses the data array holds, so rearranging them changes the cache’s layout and wiring without requiring less data capacity. [2] The LP E-cores share one L2. This pools capacity and avoids duplicating all the cache machinery, but the four cores contend for its banks and bandwidth. Their separate cluster also keeps light work away from the performance cluster and its L3, allowing that larger domain to sleep. [1], [2] Cache area includes more than the storage cells. Tags identify each line, decoders select rows, sense amplifiers read the small bitline signal, and wires connect to the banks. Splitting an array into smaller sections shortens wordlines and bitlines, improving access speed, but duplicates peripheral circuits. Panther Lake’s smaller cache regions therefore reflect the complete memory implementation, including how much of each region is devoted to storage. [34] Unlike Meteor Lake and Arrow Lake, Panther Lake has no separate SoC tile. The NPU, LP E-cores, memory controllers, PHYs, media and display engines now share the compute tile. This removes an active die and keeps CPU memory traffic on one die. The cost is moving PHY and I/O-related circuitry onto 18A: drivers, receivers and analog circuits must still meet external voltage, loading and signal-integrity requirements, so their area does not shrink like dense digital logic. [1], [2] The biggest shrink comes from the NPU, which occupies 36.9% less area. NPU 5 consolidates the same total INT8 MAC count into half as many neural compute engines. Each of the three NCEs has a larger MAC array to make the complete NCE envelope 22.6% larger than an NPU 4 engine. Consolidation also halves the number of scratchpads and SHAVE DSPs, from 12 to 6. The MAC array handles matrix multiplication and convolution, while SHAVE executes vector and custom operations that fit the array poorly. [1], [2], [35] The paired floorplans identify each NCE envelope and its scratchpad, MAC, and SHAVE regions. Each measured MAC polygon is counted once per NCE in the area accounting below. The scratchpads store weights, activations, and intermediate results near the MAC arrays, allowing repeated use without fetching them again from DRAM. Halving their number delivers the largest measured area saving but leaves less local storage for the same total MAC count. Layers that no longer fit locally require smaller working tiles or more transfers of intermediate data. The benefit depends on keeping the enlarged arrays busy while managing that tighter storage budget. [36] NPU 5 also adds native FP8. Using half the operand width of FP16 reduces storage and transfer demand, helping workloads fit the smaller local memory budget. Lower precision and format-dependent range make scaling and model validation part of deployment. Hardware activation functions further reduce work that would otherwise occupy the programmable DSPs. [1], [2] Microsoft requires an NPU to deliver at least 40 TOPS for Copilot+ PCs. Both Lunar Lake and Panther Lake meet this threshold, but Panther Lake uses significantly less silicon. GPU tiles Panther Lake is Intel’s first product with Xe3, its latest GPU architecture. It offers two different GPU tiles: a smaller GT1 tile with 4 Xe3 cores on Intel 3 and a larger GT2 tile with 12 Xe3 cores on TSMC N3E. Panther Lake allows us to compare the same GPU architecture across both Intel 3 and TSMC N3E. Wildcat Lake adds a third Xe3 implementation on Intel 18A. A future newsletter will detail Xe3 and its implementation differences across all three process nodes. GT2 scales Xe3 to a different physical layout, with render slices arranged vertically instead of GT1’s horizontal arrangement. Slice placement sets the distances to shared cache banks and the D2D interface. Those wires consume area and add delay, so scaling the number of Xe cores also requires a new balance of cache placement, routing and timing. [1] What’s immediately obvious is that the GT2 tile on TSMC N3E has much smaller Xe cores than GT1. These block areas include logic, caches, and routing. An Xe core on the GT1 tile is ~69% larger than one on Lunar Lake, and ~55% larger than one on GT2. Intel 3 therefore uses substantially more area per Xe core. The block-area gap exceeds the measured logic and SRAM density gaps, bringing routing, timing targets, cell mix, and floorplan allocation into the comparison. The measured vector/matrix engine region is almost unchanged between Lunar Lake and Panther Lake’s GT2 tile. Xe3 retains eight 512-bit vector engines and eight 2048-bit XMX engines per core. Its gains also come from feeding those engines more effectively: more resident threads hide stalls, and variable register allocation lets shaders trade registers per thread against the number of threads kept active. [1] The shared L1/SLM capacity increased by 33% from 192 KiB to 256 KiB, while its area increased only 5%, raising effective density by 27%. L1 retains reused cache lines, while software-managed SLM lets a thread group share data locally. Both reduce traffic to more distant memory. Allocating more SLM per group can also limit how many groups reside on a core at once. [1], [37] The GT1 tile carries 4 MiB of L2 against 16 MiB on the GT2 tile. GT1 divides its L2 cache into four 1 MiB banks, while GT2 uses eight 2 MiB banks. Each bank contains 128 macros, but each N3E macro stores 16 KiB, twice the Intel 3 macro’s 8 KiB capacity. The N3E macro is only 54% larger while holding twice as many bits, giving it 30% higher density: ~23.7 Mbit/mm² versus 18.3 Mbit/mm². Including bank-level circuitry, the gap widens to ~16.9 Mbit/mm² on GT2 versus ~10.4 Mbit/mm² on GT1. GT2 gains density with its macros storing more bits per unit area, and those macros occupy more of each cache bank. Larger macros spread decoder and sense-amplifier overhead across more storage, while a more compact bank layout reduces the share spent on control and routing. The compromise is longer wordlines and bitlines that carry more capacitance. [34] I/O tile Panther Lake uses two I/O tile variants, both fabricated on TSMC N6. The smaller one provides 4 PCIe 5.0 and 8 PCIe 4.0 lanes and serves lower-tier systems as well as those without a discrete GPU, while the larger one adds 8 PCIe 5.0 lanes, bringing the total to 20 lanes, for discrete-GPU connectivity. Panther Lake SKUs with the larger 10- or 12-Xe GPUs use the smaller I/O tile. [38] The smaller I/O tile adds a PCIe 4.0 block and a Thunderbolt block to Lunar Lake’s I/O layout, providing four additional PCIe 4.0 lanes and another Thunderbolt 4 port. Its repeated N6 blocks retain nearly identical areas and layouts. Reusing these proven PHYs and controllers avoids porting and requalifying external interfaces on 18A, where faster digital logic offers less benefit to circuits constrained by the off-chip link. [38] SemiAnalysis’s teardown lab (STEEL) dives deep into the world’s advanced datacenter and AI hardware. To learn more about our pipeline or to commission a teardown, contact sales@semianalysis.com. We’re hiring technical experts from system to transistor and everywhere in between. Check out our Careers page. Panther Lake offers scalability and modularity through its disaggregated packaging that partition compute, GPU, and I/O silicon into separate tiles allowing for a suite of tile configurations. This partitioning makes the package part of Intel’s node economics as it determines how much leading-edge wafer area each product consumes, which functions can remain on other processes, and how much configuration freedom Intel can offer from a shared set of tiles. Furthermore, fabricating the compute and GPU tiles separately confines the new 18A process to the compute tile and allows graphics and I/O to use other, more established, and more cost-effective processes. For Panther Lake, the GPU and I/O tiles are assembled alongside the compute tile on a passive silicon base using Foveros-S. Intel’s current technology brief lists a nominal 36 µm pitch for Foveros-S. Through-silicon vias (TSVs) in the base connect the fine wiring above to the larger package connections below. The functional tiles sit side by side on that passive base in a 2.5D configuration. [39] Our cross-section through the compute and GPU tiles shows the package’s wiring hierarchy. Microbumps connect each active tile to the passive silicon base; its fine redistribution layer (RDL) carries the short, dense tile-to-tile links. TSVs carry connections through the base to the package substrate, which fans them out to the much coarser motherboard solder joints. The base supplies interconnect, while computation remains in the active tiles above it. [39] At the compute-tile edge, the higher-magnification inset shows a local microbump spacing of approximately 25.24 µm and a feature width of 12.33 µm. These local spacings are finer than Intel’s nominal Foveros-S value. The X-ray fields further confirm tighter neighboring bumps, consistent across every die-to-die area found on each tile. Additional X-ray analysis is offered after the paywall. Putting the memory controller beside the CPU removes the D2D transfer that CPU memory requests required in Meteor Lake and Arrow Lake. This avoids the extra transmitter, receiver, and link traversal, saving interface energy and latency. Panther Lake’s separate GPU still crosses a D2D link to reach DRAM, so its larger local caches also help contain package traffic. [1], [40] Smaller dies are less likely to contain a random fatal defect, and screening them before assembly prevents one bad tile from consuming a complete package of good silicon. Reuse also spreads design and qualification work across more products. Against those gains, Intel pays for the passive base, D2D circuits, extra bonding and test steps, and losses during assembly. Cost per working product across the portfolio captures the combined effect of wafer yield, reuse, test, and assembly. [29] Wildcat Lake packaging Intel launched Core Series 3, formerly Wildcat Lake, on 16 April 2026 for value mobile and edge systems. Wildcat Lake keeps 18A but removes the passive base and combines more functions on one die to simplify the package. The two products therefore reveal two distinct ways to commercialize the same leading-edge process. [41] Wildcat Lake’s 18A die combines up to two Cougar Cove P-cores, four Darkmont LP E-cores, two Xe3 cores and a smaller NPU. A separate platform-controller die supplies I/O, connected through UCIe, Intel’s first processor implementation of the standard. Consolidating graphics remove a tile boundary and the passive base, reducing assembly complexity for a modest-bandwidth value product. It also ties CPU and graphics scaling to the same die, giving up Panther Lake’s ability to swap in a much larger GPU. [42], [43] In July 2021, Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger set out an ambitious process roadmap aimed at regaining performance leadership by 2025, later described as five nodes in four years. Five years and one CEO later, Intel’s comeback story is not as unambiguously positive as Pat may have hoped. [44], [45] Intel once set the pace for process technology, bringing high-k metal gate technology and FinFETs into volume production years ahead of the rest of the industry. Its 22 nm FinFET process reached consumers with Ivy Bridge in 2012. [46] Intel’s integrated device manufacturing (IDM) model allowed its architects and process engineers to co-optimize products and processes. Starting with Sandy Bridge, Intel dominated x86, while AMD struggled with Bulldozer. That lead faltered at 14 nm and broke at 10 nm. Intel targeted a massive 2.7× density increase, but the node arrived years late and required several revisions before it could support Intel’s full lineup. This delay forced Intel to stretch 14 nm across six generations, while TSMC moved ahead in process technology and AMD recovered in x86. By 2019, Intel was still shipping 14 nm across most of its product stack, with its 10 nm client ramp focused on Ice Lake mobile processors. Meanwhile, TSMC was shipping N7 and N7+, and AMD’s Zen 2 compute chiplets used N7 to raise core counts and improve efficiency. Intel’s process failures were central to its decline, but unsound business decisions furthered their downward slide. Product delays compounded product mistakes, pushing client, server, and FPGA roadmaps off schedule. Several attempts to enter AI (Nervana and Gaudi) and networking (Tofino) also failed to establish lasting businesses. Intel’s recovery has focused on consumer CPUs and advanced packaging. Tiger Lake, Alder Lake, Lunar Lake and now Panther Lake have restored Intel’s consumer roadmap. On the process side, Intel 4 shipped with Meteor Lake, Intel 3 with Granite Rapids and Sierra Forest, and Intel 18A with Panther Lake. Intel has also made advanced packaging part of its foundry offering. However, Intel is still playing catch-up in servers. Several Xeon generations arrived years late and trailed contemporary AMD and Arm server CPUs in performance, efficiency, and core count. The process roadmap is back, but Intel does not hold the same process-technology leadership position it held prior to 10 nm. The introduction of gate-all-around nanosheets and backside power delivery are two of the biggest changes to transistor integration in a decade. Intel took on both changes at once: 18A paired its first RibbonFET with PowerVia in Panther Lake. Panther Lake is a substantial manufacturing milestone. Our cross-sections show how RibbonFET and PowerVia reshape local contacts and wiring, while the floorplans show where architectural consolidation and process choices save area. A sustained competitive lead depends on product performance, cost, yield, and the next implementation. The SemiAnalysis STEEL teardown lab breaks down advanced datacenter and AI hardware. To learn more about our pipeline or to commission a teardown, contact sales@semianalysis.com. WE’RE HIRING: Architecture, floorplan, packaging, manufacturing, and labs experts. Opportunities from system to transistor and everywhere in between. Check out our Careers page.. [1] Intel, “Intel Tech Tour 2025 Panther Lake recap,” Doc. 866361, 2025. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://cdrdv2-public.intel.com/866361/ITT_2025_Panther_Lake_Recap1.pdf [2] Intel, “Core Ultra processors Series 3 datasheet, volume 1,” Doc. 872188-001, Jan. 2026. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://cdrdv2-public.intel.com/872188/872188-001.pdf [3] N. Horiguchi and E. Beyne, “Backside power delivery: How to power chips from the backside,” imec Reading Room, Nov. 25, 2022. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.imec-int.com/en/articles/how-power-chips-backside [4] W. Hafez et al., “Intel PowerVia technology: Backside power delivery for high density and high-performance computing,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. VLSI Technol. Circuits, Kyoto, Japan, Jun. 2023, pp. 1–2, doi: 10.23919/vlsitechnologyandcir57934.2023.10185208. [5] K. Fischer et al., “Intel 18A platform technology featuring RibbonFET (GAA) and PowerVia for advanced high-performance computing,” in Proc. Symp. VLSI Technol. Circuits, Kyoto, Japan, Jun. 2025, pp. 1–3, doi: 10.23919/vlsitechnologyandcir65189.2025.11075006. [6] K.-F. Cheng, C.-L. Teng, H.-Y. Huang, and H.-C. Chen, “Metal oxide composite as etch stop layer,” U.S. Patent 12 176 247 B2, Dec. 24, 2024. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/US12176247B2/en [7] S. W. King, “Dielectric barrier, etch stop, and metal capping materials for state of the art and beyond metal interconnects,” ECS J. Solid State Sci. Technol., vol. 4, no. 1, pp. N3029–N3047, 2015, doi: 10.1149/2.0051501jss. [8] A. V. Mule’, D. J. Towner, D. Seghete, C. R. Ryder, and A. A. Gonzalez, “Multi-layer etch stop layers for advanced integrated circuit structure fabrication,” U.S. Patent Appl. 20220102343 A1, Mar. 31, 2022. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/US20220102343A1/en [9] C.-C. Wang and J. H. Wang, “Interconnect structure with dielectric cap layer and etch stop layer stack,” U.S. Patent Appl. 20230253247 A1, Aug. 10, 2023. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/US20230253247A1/en [10] Y. J. Wu, K.-F. Cheng, C.-C. Lee, H.-K. Chang, and H.-Y. Huang, “Etch stop layer for interconnect structures,” U.S. Patent Appl. 20240332070 A1, Oct. 3, 2024. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/US20240332070A1/en [11] M. G. Rainville, N. Shankar, K. S. Reddy, and D. M. Hausmann, “Deposition of aluminum oxide etch stop layers,” U.S. Patent Appl. 20180197770 A1, Jul. 12, 2018. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.justia.com/patent/20180197770 [12] J. S. Leib et al., “Conductive lines having molybdenum liner and tungsten fill for advanced integrated circuit structure fabrication,” U.S. Patent Appl. 20240429126 A1, Dec. 26, 2024. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.justia.com/patent/20240429126 [13] M. Naik, “Cobalt enables power and performance scaling at single-digit logic nodes,” Applied Materials, Dec. 17, 2018. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.appliedmaterials.com/us/en/blog/blog-posts/cobalt-enables-power-and-performance-scaling-at-single-digit-logic-nodes.html [14] Lam Research, “Breaking through AI’s invisible barrier with molybdenum,” Lam Research Newsroom, May 6, 2025. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://newsroom.lamresearch.com/molybdenum-metallization-ai-revolution [15] P. Yashar, G. Malyavanatham, and H. Vijwani, “Integrated circuit interconnect structures with niobium barrier materials,” U.S. Patent Appl. 20240112951 A1, Apr. 4, 2024. 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Mochizuki et al., “Evaluation of (110) versus (001) channel orientation for improved nFET/pFET device performance trade-off in gate-all-around nanosheet technology,” in Proc. Int. Electron Devices Meeting (IEDM), Dec. 2023, pp. 1–4, doi: 10.1109/iedm45741.2023.10413854. [20] D. G. Ouellette et al., “Fabrication of gate-all-around integrated circuit structures having molybdenum nitride metal gates and gate dielectrics with a dipole layer,” U.S. Patent 12 051 698 B2, Jul. 30, 2024. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/US12051698B2/en [21] imec, “Advancing the CFET-based device roadmap with novel integration modules and standard-cell architectures,” imec, 2026. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.imec-int.com/en/articles/advancing-cfet-based-device-roadmap-novel-integration-modules-and-standard-cell [22] A. Reznicek, X. Miao, C. Lee, and J. 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Electron Devices Meeting (IEDM), Dec. 2019, pp. 11.6.1–11.6.4, doi: 10.1109/iedm19573.2019.8993490. [26] C. Yoo, J. Chang, Y. Seon, H. Kim, and J. Jeon, “Analysis of self-heating effects in multi-nanosheet FET considering bottom isolation and package options,” IEEE Trans. Electron Devices, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 1524–1531, Mar. 2022, doi: 10.1109/ted.2022.3141327. [27] S. S. Pradhan, D. B. Bergstrom, J.-S. Chun, and J. Chiu, “Tungsten gates for non-planar transistors,” European Patent Appl. EP 3 506 367 A1, Jul. 3, 2019. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/EP3506367A1/en [28] L. Schloss and X. Ba, “Tungsten films having low fluorine content,” U.S. Patent 9 754 824 B2, Sep. 5, 2017. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://patents.google.com/patent/US9754824B2/en [29] Intel Foundry, “Accelerating AI and HPC with advanced process and packaging technologies,” Doc. 367370-001US, Jun. 2026. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. 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(ISCA), Jun. 2016, pp. 367–379, doi: 10.1109/isca.2016.40. [37] Intel, “Introduction to the Xe-HPG architecture,” Doc. 758306, Nov. 4, 2022. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/introduction-to-the-xe-hpg-architecture.html [38] Intel, “Core Ultra processors Series 3 for the edge,” Doc. 855291. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://cdrdv2-public.intel.com/855291/Intel%C2%AE%20Core%E2%84%A2%20Ultra%20Processors%20Series%203%20for%20Edge%20Overview_2.pdf [39] Intel Foundry, “Foveros technology brief,” Doc. 366411-001US, Feb. 2026. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/central-libraries/us/en/documents/2025-07/foveros-25d-product-brief.pdf [40] D. Das Sharma, “UCIe: Building an open chiplet ecosystem,” UCIe Consortium, 2022. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2026. [Online]. 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More than a third of states sue HHS over a move that could curtail youth gender-affirming care
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, its Secretary, Robert F.
Measles outbreak in Sacramento, Placer counties declared over after 42 days
Nineteen cases were tied to the regional outbreak. Health officials said one key factor helped stop transmission.
Why politicians should pay more attention to the polls (reprise)
Welcome to the 231st edition of The Week in Polls (TWIP), a polling newsletter that always welcomes new readers. So please don’t keep TWIP a secret; share it with your friends and colleagues: Share The Week in Polls With all the stories swirling around Reform, JL Partners and political polling, I am finally tearing myself away from talking about the regulation of polling this week - and instead re-running a previous piece reminding us why the solution to problems with polls isn’t simply to ban or ignore them. Rather, we need them to play a vital role in making our politics - and politicians - better. This is followed by summaries of the latest national voting intention polls, seat projections from MRPs and the most recent party leader ratings. Subscribers who pay for the full edition can also read ten insights from the latest polls and analyses, including: A trio of organisations and a pair of professors have been casting their eyes over the Liberal Democrats ahead of the party’s autumn conference; What impact did the summer heatwave have on views on climate change? and Which wins out between chocolate and cheese? If you are not yet a paid subscriber, you can read all ten by starting a free trial now: Get FREE 7-day trial For more polling news as it comes in ahead of next week’s edition, you can also follow The Week in Polls on Bluesky. Picking up on my doubt last week about whether or not 35% of British train travellers have tried to order a takeaway for delivery to a railway station or carriage, thank you to reader Iain, who has been in touch to say he has done just that… in India. Another quick pair of updates, this time on the controversies around Reform and polling. Politico has a further scoop - “Farage aide caught in donor sting attended Egypt retreat with JL Partners” - and Ian Dunt has written about the problems with polling too: “Seeing the response of many polling experts in the last few weeks suggests that they are nervous about what is happening and keen to mitigate against it. Seeing the response of journalists, which has been basically non-existent, suggests the precise opposite.” My usual reminder as well: please do hit reply if you’ve spotted a poll, focus group or new piece of poll-based research that you think should be in contention for coverage in a future edition. Thank you! And with that, on with the show. How politicians get public opinion wrong I have written before about the benefits that come from widespread availability of high-quality political polling. We need more polls and more good coverage of polls. However, what I’ve not dug into before is the research into how accurately politicians estimate public opinion on issues. Thankfully we have academic research to tell us. First, the bad news: We present results from a study of 866 politicians in four countries.1 Politicians were asked to estimate the percentage of public support for various policy proposals. Comparing more than 10,000 estimations with actual levels of public support, we conclude that politicians are quite inaccurate estimators of people’s preferences. They make large errors and even regularly misperceive what a majority of the voters wants. Politicians are hardly better at estimating public preferences than ordinary citizens. Walgrave, S., Jansen, A., Sevenans, J., Soontjens, K., Pilet, J.B., Brack, N., Varone, F., Helfer, L., Vliegenthart, R., van der Meer, T., Breunig, C., Bailer, S., Sheffer, L. & Loewen, P.J. (2023a), “Inaccurate Politicians: Elected Representatives’ Estimations of Public Opinion in Four Countries”, The Journal of Politics, 85(1): 209-222. The bad news is not quite as bad as that makes it sound because, when asked whether the majority of public opinion was for or against various policies, politicians picked the wrong option ‘only’ 29% of the time. However, this included getting it wrong even when public opinion is far from evenly split on an issue: They do not only get it wrong when the public is divided and hard to read (e.g., when there is a 51%:49% distribution). Seventy percent of the misplacements occur for policies with a relatively clear distribution of at least 60% (dis)agreeing citizens. Moreover, the public scored only slightly worse than politicians, picking the wrong option 2.7 out of 8 times on average, compared with 2.3 times for politicians. Turning to the other measure of accuracy (not which side is in the lead but what the percentage support is for each side), politicians on average were 18 percentage points out in their guesses. Again, this was only slightly better than the public, whose error came in at 21 percentage points.2 Further research, using the same mix of countries, gives a little more comfort about how (in)accurate perceptions are: We show that politicians have a better understanding of public opinion when they think the issue matters to voters. Further, when an issue is personally important to politicians they more accurately estimate their party supporters’ opinions. The results confirm that politicians hold more accurate perceptions of voters’ preferences when they think it is important to do so but not necessarily when the issues actually are important to voters. Butler, C., Walgrave, S., Soontjens, K. & Loewen, P.J. (2024), “Politicians are better at estimating public opinion when they think it is more salient”, Party Politics: 1–13. Even so, it’s not a good picture. The remedy for this? Politicians should spend more time reading the polls. So forward this newsletter to someone you know… Share For a more general argument against banning polls, see my 2024 piece. Is “Let Bartlet Be Bartlet” good advice or not? The latest episode of my Political Fictions podcast heads across the Atlantic for a dip into one of the political TV classics: Mark and Cory talk about a giant of American political drama for the first time this week, as they tackle The West Wing. They talk about Let Bartlet Be Bartlet, the nineteenth episode of series one. In it, Mark wonders if The West Wing is actually the epitome of the “Boris Johnson school of politics”, Cory outmanoeuvres Mark into confirming we will record a Christmas Special about Love, Actually and they debate whether the central message of this episode has been misunderstood. Cory’s email newsletter is Paperback Rioter and Mark has a family of email newsletters. Subscribe to our newsletter for some additional bonus content and to get alerted whenever a new episode comes out. Our theme tune is “Monkeys Spinning Monkeys” by Kevin MacLeod/incompetech.com and licensed under the Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License. You can also listen to our episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, the web or YouTube. Elsewhere from me… [ A Lord's Eye View How to fix the problem of money in our politics Welcome to my latest update on work in the House of Lords. This time I am taking a look at how our political system is regulated, and the protections we need to keep democracy safe from becoming simply a contest to see who has the biggest bank account… Read more 5 days ago · 3 likes · 2 comments · Mark Pack ](https://lordseyeview.substack.com/p/how-to-fix-the-problem-of-money-in?utm_source=substack&utm_campaign=post_embed&utm_medium=web&embedding_publication_id=1269283) If you spot a factual error… Borrowing an idea from Stuart Ritchie and others, if you spot a factual error in an edition of this newsletter, I will give you a free 12-month subscription to the paid-for version (or an extra 12 months on your existing one). Factual errors qualify, but grammatical errors or disagreements over interpretation do not, and my decision is final. Messages about both of those are always welcome, though. Voting intention and leadership ratings Here are the latest voting intention polls from different pollsters. It is all pretty static at the moment, with a small and consistent Labour lead in nearly all the polls. The table is also online here, along with explanations about what is included. It is updated regularly throughout the week as new polls are released. Next are the seat projections from MRPs, also sorted by fieldwork dates, listing those which are based on dedicated fieldwork (rather than models based on averages of other polls). Because such MRPs are published infrequently, some of the entries below are quite old. Finally, here is a summary of leadership ratings, with a graph from PollCheck: Detailed numbers from the latest polls are online here, and both that and the graph are updated regularly throughout the week as new data comes out. For historical figures on both voting intention and leader approval stretching back to the 1930s, including Parliamentary by-election polls, see PollBase. Catch up on the previous two editions [ ](https://theweekinpolls.substack.com/p/a-crisis-point-for-political-polling) [ A crisis point for political polling Sep 13 ](https://theweekinpolls.substack.com/p/a-crisis-point-for-political-polling) [ Read full story ](https://theweekinpolls.substack.com/p/a-crisis-point-for-political-polling) [ ](https://theweekinpolls.substack.com/p/extra-questions-about-the-polls-in) [ Extra questions about the polls in Reform’s funding scandal Sep 6 ](https://theweekinpolls.substack.com/p/extra-questions-about-the-polls-in) [ Read full story ](https://theweekinpolls.substack.com/p/extra-questions-about-the-polls-in) My privacy policy and other legal information are available here. Links to purchase books or other items are usually affiliate links which pay a commission for each sale. Quotes from social media messages are occasionally lightly edited for punctuation and clarity. If you are subscribed to other email lists of mine, please note that unsubscribing from this one will not automatically remove you from the others. If you wish to be removed from all my lists, simply reply to this email to let me know. A quintet of Lib Dem polling analyses, and 9 other polling insights you shouldn’t miss The following ten findings from the most recent polls and analyses are only for subscribers who pay for the full edition, but you can sign up for a free trial to read them straight away. Ahead of the start of Liberal Democrat conference, we have a trio of organisations and a pair of professors with pieces out about Ed Davey’s party:
First Flinders University cohort earn URI certificate in nuclear engineering through partnership
KINGSTON, R.I.—Nov. 13, 2026—Nineteen Flinders University students are the first graduates of Australia’s inaugural undergraduate nuclear engineering major, earning a certificate from the University of Rhode Island through a pioneering partnership with Flinders to help build the workforce needed for AUKUS. The research and education partnership between the two institutions, signed in May 2023, advances […]
Maine among 19 states suing HHS over youth gender-affirming care
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, its Secretary, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., and its inspector general over a declaration that could complicate access to gender-affirming care for young people.
Jaylen Brown Reacts To ‘Weird’ Reunion With Former Celtics Stars
Nineteen months after beating the Dallas Mavericks together in the 2024 NBA Finals, Jaylen Brown and Jrue Holiday shared a court as rivals rather than teammates. Brown’s Boston Celtics hosted Holiday’s Portland Trail Blazers on Monday night at TD Garden. It was Holiday’s first time facing his former team since being traded to the Trail […]
Hackensack Meridian Health signs definitive agreement to acquire Hunterdon Health, commits $230M
Hackensack Meridian Health has signed a definitive agreement to pick up Central New Jersey’s Hunterdon Health, a $230 million deal that would grow the state’s largest health system to 19 total hosp | The announcement did not outline a potential timeline for the merger, which would add a nineteenth hospital to New Jersey's largest health system.
How a Monk, an Emperor, and Cave Beetles Built the Science of Underground Life
In the mid-nineteenth century, the study of life in caves was not the work of laboratories or universities but of monks, aristocrats, merchants, and soldiers, all bound together by the ambitions of an empire. A new historical study published in
Communist Party Politics, Rockets and Komsomol Business in Soviet Dnipropetrovsk
This is an excerpt from Ukraine’s Outpost: Dnipropetrovsk and the Russian-Ukrainian War (2022). Free to download from E-International Relations. The Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk (in 2016 the city was renamed Dnipro) was shown on a movie screen in the Soviet Union for the first time in 1981 as a ‘Russian-speaking’ city in Nikita Mikhalkov’s feature film Rodnia. A story of a Russian peasant woman who visited her daughter in the big industrial city was used by Mikhalkov in his movie to emphasise a growing crisis in Soviet family life during the Brezhnev era when former Russian peasants lost their Orthodox Christian identity during the process of socialist industrialisation and modernisation. Paradoxically, Mikhalkov completely ignored the real social and national problems of the city; instead choosing as the setting for his movie Russian peasants’ adjustment to Soviet modernisation. Even now many Russians use this film as evidence of the ‘Russian character’ of Dnipropetrovsk ignoring the real demographic and social history of this Ukrainian region (Elberg-Wilson 2016).[1] Despite Mikhalkov’s picture, the city of Dnipro and the Dnipropetrovsk region had a multi-national and multi-cultural character coupled with the strong influence of Ukrainian and Jewish culture. Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work. Subscribe Using various archival and published documents, this chapter will cover the social, economic and cultural development of the city and the region of Dnipropetrovsk through the period of late socialism after Stalin, showing the ties between the multi-national Komsomol members and business ventures during perestroika and how this influenced the rise of oligarchic clans in post-Soviet Ukraine. Emergence of Soviet Dnipropetrovsk Paradoxically, from the early beginning, the founding of the ‘city of Catherine’s glory’ (Ekaterinoslav in Russian) and its province in 1776 by the Russian imperial administration of the Catherine the Second involved non-Russian ethnic groups, which shaped a historical demography of this region in Southern Ukraine. These ethnic groups included the local Ukrainian Orthodox Christian peasants and Cossacks, Jewish traders and artisans, Armenian Christians, and Tatar Muslim settlers. By the middle of the nineteenth century, thousands of German Protestant and Mennonite colonists also settled in the province. Moreover, by attracting foreign capital, the Russian imperial administration transformed this multi-ethnic and multi-religious region in the booming industrial centre of the Russian Empire by the beginning of twentieth century (Zhuk 2004, 33–96). After the Russian Revolution and civil war, the province of Ekaterinoslav continued to play an important role in the industrial development of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1926 the Soviet administration decided to change the name of Ekaterinoslav which sounded too ‘old fashioned’ and ‘imperial Russian.’ The new name was a combination of the name of the Dnipro River with the last name of Grigorii Petrovskii, head of the All-Ukrainian Executive Committee of the Soviets, and well-known organiser of the working-class movement in the region of Ekaterinoslav before the Revolution. ‘Dnipro-Petrovske’ was later transformed into ‘Dnipropetrovsk’ (Bolebrukh 2001, 156). Both the city and region of Dnipropetrovsk lived through the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.), industrialisation and the Stakhanovite movement. The region lost millions of human lives during collectivisation and the dekulakisation campaign, and especially during the Holodomor of 1932–33. During industrialisation, the Soviet government restored the industrial base of the region. Former metallurgical giants such as the Petrovskii (formerly Brianskii)plant, the Chodoir (formerly Vladimir Lenin) plant and others resumed production of pig iron and steel. During the 1930s, Dnipropetrovsk became an important centre for Soviet heavy industry. In 1932, Dnipropetrovsk regional metallurgical plants produced 20 per cent of the entire cast iron and 25 per cent of the steel manufactured in the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. After the beginning of the campaign of ‘Ukrainianisation’ in 1923, the number of those who spoke Ukrainian grew, reaching 38.5 per cent in the city by the end of the 1920s. Between 1932 and 1939, the number of city dwellers in Dnipropetrovsk increased to over 500,662. The Dnipropetrovsk region became the most urbanised of Soviet Ukraine with more than 2,273,000 people living in the region (Vasiliev 1977, 55; Bolebrukh 2001, 159–164). Dnipropetrovsk also became the cultural and educational centre of Soviet Ukraine. There were ten colleges, including the State University, 97 secondary schools and 19 vocational schools. The Soviet administration restored local drama and music theatres. During the 1930s, Dnipropetrovsk had 120 libraries, five museums, six movie-theatres, 30 clubs and palaces of culture (Bolebrukh 2001_,_159–164). The Leonid Brezhnev Clan Post-war Soviet modernisation influenced the careers of many young and ambitious Komsomol members in the region. One of them, Leonid Brezhnev, was born in 1906 in Kamenskoe, joined the Kommunystycheskaya Partyya Sovetskoho Soyuza (Communist party of the Soviet Union - KPSS) in 1931 and, after graduation from Dniprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute was elected as a council deputy of the city of Dniprodzerzhinsk. The Stalinist purges of the 1930s removed many old Soviet and Communist officials from government positions who perished in prisons and the labour camps of GULAG. Young people such as Brezhnev filled the void created by Stalinist repressions in the region. In 1938, the young Brezhnev was elected as a member of the regional committee of the Soviet Communist party of Ukraine (KPU) and head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda. By the young age of 32, Brezhnev had become secretary of the KPU committee of the most important industrial region of Soviet Ukraine. His career was interrupted by the Great Patriotic War when Brezhnev joined the army as an ideological officer (see Mlechin 2005). From August 1941 to October 1943, the Dnipropetrovsk region was occupied by the Nazis, and Soviet troops liberated the entire region by February 1944 (Berkhoff 2004, 11, 36, 49, 149–150, 152–153, 248–249). The Soviet administration restored the industrial base of Dnipropetrovsk, and by 1950 the main metallurgical and machine-building factories had reached their pre-war levels of industrial production and productivity. During this period, Brezhnev began his political career as a talented and ambitious organizer of the industrial re-birth of Dnipropetrovsk. He was an experienced young army ideologist who had proved his loyalty to the Stalinist leadership during the war and was familiar with Dnipropetrovsk before 1941. The Central Committee of the KPSS sent Brezhnev to Dnipropetrovsk in November 1947 when he was elected first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk regional committee of the KPU, and he ruled the oblast until June 1950 (Vosstanovlenie). His successors were Andrei Kirilenko and Volodymyr Shcherbitskyy, both close friends. Two other young comrades of Brezhnev, Oleksiy Vatchenko and Yevhen Kachalovskii led the region respectively in 1965–1976 and 1976–1983 (Vasiliev 1977, 72; Bolebrukh 2001_,_ 233; Mlechin 2005). Brezhnev promoted the political career of his old friends, many of whom became prominent political figures in Kyiv and Moscow during his leadership of the KPSS. Both contemporaries and scholars who study the ‘Brezhnev period’ call this phenomenon the ‘Dnipropetrovsk mafia’ or rule of the ‘Dnipropetrovsk Family’ (Nahaylo 1999, 36, 69; Wilson 2000, 162). Since the rise of Brezhnev to the pinnacle of Soviet power, the ruling elites of Dnipropetrovsk influenced not only regional, but also republican and All-Union politics. Dnipropetrovsk’s transformation into an important centre of the Soviet military industrial complex was directly related to the sudden rise of Brezhnev to the pinnacle of Soviet power in October of 1964. Brezhnev promoted the political career of his compatriots from the Dnipropetrovsk military industrial complex. Brezhnev’s friends and close colleagues from his post-war years in the Dnipropetrovsk region went to Moscow and became prominent political figures in the Soviet nomenklatura hierarchy during the 1960s and 1970s. Two main industries of the Soviet military industrial complex – metallurgy and missile-building – had important factories in Dnipropetrovsk and therefore provided the Brezhnev clan with new members from 1964 until 1982. Even after the downfall of the Brezhnev clan in Moscow in 1983, when Yurii Andropov began his struggle ‘against corruption and nepotism’ in the Soviet nomenklatura, members of this clan continued to play a prominent role in the political life of Soviet Ukraine. Besides the Physical-Technical Department of Dnipropetrovsk State University, the Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute also assisted the political careers of many of Brezhnev’s close friends who in the 1970s and 1980s became important members of the Kremlin nomenklatura. Nikolai Tikhonov, former head of Dnipropetrovsk Sovnarkhoz during the 1950s, was one of the deputies of the Soviet Prime Minister between 1966 and 1976, First Deputy of the Prime Minister from 1976 to 1980 and head of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1980 to 1985.[2] Nikolai Shcholokov was the Soviet Minister of Public Order in 1966–1968 and from 1968 to 1982 he was Soviet Minister of Interior. Georgii Tsynev was during 1971–1976 a member of the Central Revision Committee of the KPSS and a deputy head of the KGB from 1970 to 1982. In the KGB he was the 1st Deputy Chairman in 1982–1985 as well as he was a Candidate Member of CPSU Central Committee in 1976–1981 and accordingly was a full Member of the said body in 1981–1986. Victor Chebrikov, who graduated from Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute in 1950, was one of the leaders of the city party organisation in Dnipropetrovsk from 1961 to 1971. In 1971 he became the head of the personnel department of the USSR KGB, First Deputy of the Head of this organization and from 1982 to 1988 a chairman of the KGB (Pikhovshek 1996, 11–12, 272–274). Another of Brezhnev’s close friends, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyy, promoted the careers of other people from the region of Dnipropetrovsk. With his support, Oleksii Vatchenko became the head of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Soviet Supreme Soviet from 1976 until 1984 with the assistance of another politician from Dnipropetrovsk, Valentyna Shevchenko. Aleksandr Kapto, who worked as a secretary of both the Dnipropetrovsk Komsomol organization and the Soviet Ukrainian Komsomol in Kyiv in the 1960s, oversaw the Department of Culture in the Central Committee of the KPU; in 1979–1986 he was a Secretary of the Central Committee and accordingly was the main ideologist of the Soviet Ukraine. Many other members of the ‘Kyiv ruling class’ under Shcherbytskyy were also linked to the Dnipropetrovsk metallurgical and military lobby. Shcherbytskyy’s assistant from 1972 to 1984 was Konstantin Prodan who began his career in the Komsomol organisation of the city of Dnipropetrovsk (Pikhovshek 1996, 48–103). As a contemporary political analyst noted, ‘Officially Prodan was put in charge of industrial production, though, according to insiders of the former KPU Central Committee, his principal function was ‘maintaining’ contact with Brezhnev’s assistant Georgii Tsukanov in Moscow’ (Pikhovshek 1996, 33–34). Another important reason for the rise of the ‘Brezhnev Clan’ was the relative independence of Dnipropetrovsk’s local administration from Kyiv. Because of the status of Dnipropetrovsk as a ‘strategically important centre for military industry,’ different branches of the local administration were under the direct supervision of Moscow, rather than Kyiv (Interviews with Tihipko, Markov and Bocharova). The Military Industrial Complex and Ruling Elite of Dnipropetrovsk The city of Dnipropetrovsk was the location of famous metallurgical and machine-building factories in pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union. Before 1941, Dnipropetrovsk became the most urbanised region of the Soviet Ukraine. Almost 53 per cent of this region’s population lived in 16 cities and towns of the region (Vasiliev 1977, 55; Bolebrukh 2001, 159–164). In 1980, the industrial enterprises of Dnipropetrovsk manufactured a significant part of the industrial products and customer goods for the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. A total of 5.4 per cent of steel, 9 per cent of rolled iron, 28 per cent of pipes, 62 per cent of combine beet-harvesters, 27.9 per cent of television sets, and 8.5 per cent of knitted wear in Ukraine were produced in the city of Dnipropetrovsk (Bolebrukh 2001, 219). After 1945, the main centre of economic and financial activities of the region and the city of Dnipropetrovsk became neither metallurgy nor mining. The new centre which changed the status of the region and of the city was a secret military factory in Dnipropetrovsk. The entire ideological and cultural situation in the region, and especially the city, depended on this one industrial plant which became the most important part of the Soviet military industrial complex. In July 1944, the State Committee of Defence in Moscow decided to build a large military machine-building factory in Dnipropetrovsk on the location of the pre-war aircraft plant. In December 1945, thousands of German prisoners of war began construction and built the first sections and shops of the new Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Factory (Markov, 1995). In 1947–1948 this factory produced its first cars and special military vehicles. However, on 9 May 1951 the USSR Council of Ministers decided to transform the main shops and sectors of this factory into ‘secret production’ which included not only special military vehicles, but also powerful rocket engines and different types of modern military aircraft. The former Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Factory was transferred to the Ministry of Armament of the USSR and received a new name – the State Union Plant #586 (Lukanov 1996, 12). Stalin introduced the organisation of special secret training of highly qualified engineers and scientists who were to become rocket construction specialists. He recommended the introduction of a new college degree at Dnipropetrovsk State University which would be a Master of Sciences in rocket construction. In 1952 the university administration formed a new department with the name ‘physical-technical faculty’ which was the largest department at the university, admitting on average four hundred students each year. These students received better accommodation and a higher stipend payment than students from other departments and colleges; the lowest stipend for this department was 450 roubles, while the highest stipend at another prestigious school, the Dnipropetrovsk Medical Institute, was only 180 roubles. A special commission from Moscow selected talented undergraduate students studying physics from engineering schools all over the USSR and sent them to the physical-technical department at Dnipropetrovsk State University, where they resumed their studies as rocket engineers. Simultaneously, the university administration announced the admission of new freshmen students in this department. The promise of a good stipend and a ‘romantic’ career of rocket engineer attracted thousands of talented young people to this ‘secret’ department, which provided training specialists for only the Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Factory (Horbulin 1998, 9, 62–63). In accordance with another decision of the Soviet government, in 1954 the administration of this automobile factory opened a secret design office with the name ‘Southern Construction Bureau’ (konstruktorskoe biuro Yuzhnoe). The main assignment of this office was to construct military missiles and rocket engines. Hundreds of talented physicists, engineers and machine designers moved from Moscow and other big cities in the Soviet Union to Dnipropetrovsk where they joined the konstruktorskoe biuro Yuzhnoe (KBYu). In 1965, the secret Plant #586 was transferred to the Ministry of General Machine-Building of the USSR and the next year it changed its name into the ‘Southern Machine-building Factory’ (Yuzhnyi mashino-stroitelnyi zavod) or simply Yuzhmash (in Ukrainian Pivdenmash). The first ‘General Constructor’ and head of the ‘Southern’ design office was Mikhail Yangel, a prominent scientist and outstanding designer of space rockets who led the design office and factory from 1954 to 1971. Yangel designed the first powerful rockets and space military equipment for the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Yangel worked with talented engineers who later became the leaders of military production in Dnipropetrovsk and the official directors of Pivdenmash. Two close collaborators of Yangel were the Pivdenmash directors Leonid Smirnov (1952–1961) and Aleksandr Makarov (1961–1986). Makarov’s successor was Leonid Kuchma, the Director General of the Pivdenmash in 1986–1992, who later became one of the most prominent political leaders in independent Ukraine and was and still is the only President of Ukraine (1994–2005) elected twice (Strazheva; Platonov and Horbulin; Romanov and Gubarev; Baikonur; Baikonur, Korolev, Yangel). In 1951 the Southern Machine-building Factory began manufacturing and testing new military rockets with an initial range of only 270 kilometres. By 1959 Soviet scientists and engineers developed new technologies, and as a result, the KBYu launched a new machine-building project producing ballistic missiles. Under Yangel, KBYu produced very powerful rocket engines which dramatically increased the range of ballistic missiles and from the 1960s, began to be used as launch vehicles for Soviet spaceships. Pivdenmash designed and manufactured four generations of missile complexes which included space launch vehicles Kosmos, Interkosmos, Tsyklon-2, Tsyklon-3 and Zenith. The KBYu created a unique space-rocket system called Energia-Buran and manufactured 400 technical devices which were launched as artificial satellites (Sputniks). For the first time in the world space industry, the Dnipropetrovsk missile plant produced space Sputniks. By the 1980s, Pivdenmash manufactured 67 different types of spaceships, 12 space research complexes and four defence space rocket systems. These systems were used not only for purely military purposes by the Ministry of Defence, but also for astronomical research, for global radio and television and for environmental monitoring. Pivdenmash initiated and sponsored the international space programme of Eastern European socialist countries, called Interkosmos. Twenty-two of the 25 automatic space Sputniks of this programme were designed, manufactured, and launched by engineers and workers from Dnipropetrovsk. Pivdenmash and KBYu became not only an important centre of the Soviet space industry and Soviet military industrial complex, but also the main rocket producer for the entire Soviet bloc. (Hall and Shayler 2001, 316ff; Siddiqi 2003, 97, 113, 114, 164, 177, 285) The military rocket systems manufactured in Dnipropetrovsk created the base for the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces (Dnepropetrovskii raketno 1994; Bolebrukh 2001_,_ 209–211, 229; Lukanov 1996, 13). On the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, KBYu had nine regular and corresponding members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 33 full professors and 290 scientists holding a Ph.D. More than 50,000 people worked at Pivdenmash. Pivdenmash was ‘a state’ inside the Soviet state. In 1969, after a long competition with Moscow’s V. Chelomei Centre of Rocket Construction, Pivdenmash rocket designs won, and from then leaders of the Soviet military industrial complex preferred only Pivdenmash models. The Soviet state provided billions of Soviet roubles to finance Pivdenmash projects (Horbulin 1998, 6, 24–31). Officially, Pivdenmash also manufactured agricultural tractors and special kitchen equipment for everyday needs, such as mincing machines or juicers for Soviet households. In official reports and public information there were no details given about its production of rockets or spaceships. However, hundreds of thousands of workers and engineers in the city of Dnipropetrovsk were employees of this plant, and members of their families and therefore most local people knew about the ‘real production’ of Pivdenmash. Dnipropetrovsk as a KGB “Testing Ground” The Soviet government approved the KGB’s proposal to introduce the highest level of secrecy over Pivdenmash and its products. According to the Soviet government’s decision, the city of Dnipropetrovsk was officially closed to foreign visitors in 1959. No citizen of a foreign country (even Eastern European socialist) was allowed to visit the city or district of Dnipropetrovsk. From the late 1950s, Soviet people called Dnipropetrovsk ‘the rocket city’ or ‘closed city.’ (Bolebrukh 2001, 211). Members of the Brezhnev clan in the Moscow offices of the KGB and Ministry of Interior also contributed to centralised ideological control in Dnipropetrovsk, which especially influenced the KGB and security operations in the closed city. The local KGB office was always more Moscow-oriented, ignoring the interests of the authorities in Kyiv. At the same time, for Moscow officials who began their careers in Dnipropetrovsk, the city became the testing ground for many All-Union KGB campaigns which they attempted to initiate. Dnipropetrovsk KGB officers were ‘pioneers’ in the organisation of ideological campaigns which became ‘models’ for other ‘closed’ industrial Soviet cities. [This phrase – ‘pioneers of ideological campaigns’ – belongs to a local retired KGB officer. According to the KGB documents, Moscow’s representatives in the Dnipropetrovsk clan always interfered in local KGB business, imposing their own practices on the local officers.] (Igor T.; DADO, f. 19, op. 52, spr. 72, ark. 1–18) As a result, the inhabitants of Dnipropetrovsk experienced more ideological limitations and more brutal anti-Western campaigns than people in many other Soviet cities. Facing direct Kremlin supervision, the local KGB and KPSS ideologists sought to prove their ideological reliability and occasionally exaggerated the ‘threat from the capitalist West.’ KGB officers transformed one building in the Dnipropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital (psikhushka), located in a town of Ihren (now a suburban district of Dnipro), into a special police facility for ‘political dissidents.’ All over the Soviet Union, Ihren psikhushka (especially its Section 9) became notorious and known as the worst incarceration for political prisoners. The Dnipropetrovsk KGB tested various drugs on prisoners and performed different medical experiments, treating the most ‘opinionated’ political dissidents as mentally sick patients. Many religious and civil rights activists and ‘bourgeois nationalists,’ such as national communist dissident Leonid Plyushch, described the Dnipropetrovsk Psychiatric Hospital as ‘mental hell’ because of its police system of harsh treatment and everyday humiliation (Plyushch 1979, 304–326, 340–349). Meanwhile, local KGB officers explained their harsh treatment of dissidents such as Plyushch as an ideological necessity to protect a strategically important centre of the Soviet military industrial complex (Igor T). Growth of the Population and Standards of Living in the Region The new status of the city brought more state investments and contributed to the overall improvement of the standard of living of its inhabitants. During the 1950s, the main sponsor of city improvements and renovations was the metallurgical industry. During the 1960s and 1970s, the space rocket industry and its biggest factory, Pivdenmash, sponsored all major city programmes, renovations and new architectural projects which included the sports palace Meteor with a large indoor pool, football team Dnipro, city airport, city theatre of opera and ballet, historical museum of Yavornitskii, department store ‘Children’s World,’ construction of thousands of modern apartments, libraries and movie-theatres, and celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the city of Dnipropetrovsk in 1976. (Bolebrukh 2001_,_ 211–212). Even the expansion and renovation of the Dnipropetrovsk Central Farmer Market (known as Oziorka) was supported by Pivdenmash as part of its improvement of the city’s life, and a reflection of the growth and strategic importance of the city. From 1958 to 1965 the city administration invested money in building a new covered location for the market and by 1970 they had re-built the entire neighbourhood transforming it into a modern and convenient place for the ‘socialist consumption of goods and services.’ (Lazebnik 2001, 167–185) As a result, the missile factory, the centre of the Soviet military industrial complex, contributed to a new level of cultural consumption among not only the city’s dwellers, but also among all guests of Dnipropetrovsk. Consequently, the pioneering efforts in the popularisation of new modern forms of Western music such as jazz and rock-n-roll also began among engineers and workers of Pivdenmash who contributed to the spread of new cultural forms and activities among those who lived in the city and region of Dnipropetrovsk. The improving living conditions in Dnipropetrovsk led to an increase of the regional population from 2,339,800 people (with a 56 per cent urban population) in 1951 to 2,850,700 (with a 72 per cent urban population) in 1961. The larger salaries and better distribution of food and industrial goods also attracted young people from other regions of the Soviet Union to Dnipropetrovsk. From the 1950s onward, most of the Dnipropetrovsk population were people younger than 30 years old. In 1970 there were 3,343,000 people in the region (76 per cent of who lived in cities) which by 1984 had increased to 3,771,200 people (with 83 per cent urban population). The population of the city of Dnipropetrovsk grew from 660,800 people in 1959 to 1,066,000 in 1979 and more than 1,153,400 people in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power (Glushkina 1985, 10, 11). The Dnipropetrovsk region had a young multinational, predominantly Russian speaking population. Three major ethnic groups shaped the cultural development of the region – Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews. During the peak of ‘international harmony and prosperity of developed socialism’ in 1979, Ukrainians made up the overwhelming majority of the regional (72.8 per cent) and urban (68.5 per cent) population. Due to massive emigration from the Soviet Union, the Jewish population decreased from 2.7 per cent in 1959 to 1.7 per cent in 1979 and 1.3 per cent in 1989. The number of Russians in the region’s population grew rapidly from 17.2 per cent in 1959, 20.9 per cent in 1970, 23 per cent in 1979 and 24.2 per cent in 1989 (O vozrastnoi structure 1971; Goskomstat USSR 1991, 100, 102). By 1985, more than a third of the population in the city of Dnipropetrovsk was ethnically Russian. If we add to this number the 3.2 per cent of Russian-speaking Jews and more than 33 per cent of Ukrainians who considered Russian their native language, we will have more than two thirds of the city’s population who associated themselves with Russian rather than with Ukrainian culture. According to contemporaries, the high salaries and better conditions of living attracted representatives of various nationalities from different republics who also spoke Russian rather than the Ukrainian language in Dnipropetrovsk (Goskomstat USSR 1991, 106, 108, 119, 122; Prudchenko and Smolenska 2007). Komsomol ‘Business’ During the Late Soviet Era The regional economic activities of local ‘businessmen and women’ from the Komsomol during perestroika had their roots in the pre-perestroika era. They also strengthened trends for independence from Moscow which had earlier existed in Dnipropetrovsk. All the elements of their initial business had already been developed during the Brezhnev era when the cultural consumption of late socialism combined the structures of Soviet international tourism with the ideological efforts of Komsomol activists into one business network. Mass rock and discotheque music consumption among Soviet youth was delivered by Komsomol and trade union apparatchiks. International tourism and discotheque enthusiasts provided these apparatchiks with music and video material for their entertainment business. Without these relations it would be impossible to imagine the development of post-Soviet capitalism. The first pioneers of organizing Komsomol business in the region were two graduates of Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute, the Ukrainian-Moldovan Sergiy Tihipko, the First Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Komsomol regional organization in 1986–91, and the Ukrainian Oleksandr Turchynov, who worked with Tihipko as head of the agitation and propaganda division in the same Komsomol regional organisation in 1987–90. Tihipko and Turchynov initiated and ‘ideologically justified’ the first Komsomol businesses in the region. Two other Komsomol members, who also graduated from the same institute as Tihipko and Turchynov, Kolomoyskyy and Viktor Pinchuk, both of Jewish origin, started their careers not in the official Komsomol business, but on the black market of Dnipropetrovsk, trading various goods, and using their financial and engineering skills for their own survival in the conditions of economic collapse of late socialism. Kolomoyskyy used his financial skills and connections with Tihipko to organize its own financial corporation Privatbank, which became the most successful bank in post-Soviet Ukraine. Pinchuk, using his engineering and managerial skills, founded his own metallurgical venture, entitled Interpipe Company. It is noteworthy that all four of those Komsomol members, two Ukrainian and two Jewish, used their personal connections through their friends and partners from Pivdenmash, including through its last director Leonid Kuchma, to start their first businesses in Dnipropetrovsk (see Golovko 2012). In the mid-1980s, when perestroika created favourable conditions for the managerial skills of Komsomol activists, this system produced new activities for cultural consumption, such as video salons which brought their organisers more profits than traditional discotheque clubs. The video business used the same infrastructure and network of the discotheque movement; namely international tourism, Komsomol activists, trade union leaders and the ‘discotheque mafia.’ This network contributed to the business career of two fans of Western popular music, Yulia Tymoshenko and her husband, Oleksandr (Popov, Milshtein, 55; Ponamarchuk). Yulia Grigian (Telegina) was the daughter of Armenian taxi-driver Grigian and Russian technical worker Telegina, a fan of British rock music. Yulia Grigian married Oleksandr Tymoshenko, son of a member of the city KPU committee in the Pivdenmash administration. In 1978, Yulia Tymoshenko joined the student Komsomol organization in the Department of Economy at Dnipropetrovsk State University. This department was opened on the initiative of the Pivdenmash administration in 1977 to provide training for qualified economists in Dnipropetrovsk’s growing military industrial complex. Yulia Tymoshenko graduated with honours from the Department of Economy in 1984 and began her first job as an engineer-economist through the connections of her father-in-law, Hennadii Tymoshenko. For five years, she worked at the Lenin machine building plant, another factory which belonged to the Soviet military industrial complex. In 1979, she gave birth to her daughter Yevhenia, and until 1988 she and her husband enjoyed a typical Soviet upper-middle class life in their one-bedroom cooperative apartment. They continued to watch movies, listen to Western pop music, and occasionally visited and danced in well-known discotheque clubs in downtown Dnipropetrovsk (Popov and Milshtein 2006, 64–67; Suvorov 1991). Perestroika changed the young Tymoshenko family. Hennadii Tymoshenko recommended his son and daughter-in-law to join the co-operative movement and promised his support through the city’s KPU and Soviet administration. In 1988, the young Tymoshenkos used their old connections in the Komsomol discothèque world to open a public service enterprise, a video-rental shop in Dnipropetrovsk, with 5,000 borrowed Soviet roubles. The profits made from this first venture were used to open a chain of video rental stores. They used the experience of Komsomol apparatchiks, who brought their first VCRs in Dnipropetrovsk through Sputnik. Contacts in the discotheque movement helped provide these apparatchiks with Western video tapes and an audience which was ready to consume new Western cultural products. Former discotheque enthusiasts tested these new business practices and proposed the idea of video salons, which had already become the most popular and fashionable form of entertainment Moscow and the three Baltic republics. As a result, during perestroika both the Komsomol and ‘discotheque mafia’ provided infrastructure for these salons in Dnipropetrovsk. When in 1987the KGB opened the city of Dnipropetrovsk to foreigners, Pivdenmash imported thousands of VCRs using barter agreements with South Korean businessmen. As a regional KPU apparatchik who oversaw the distribution of movies throughout the Dnipropetrovsk region (kinoprokat), Yulia Tymoshenko’s father-in-law had access not only to these Korean VCRs but also to local movie theatres which provided the first mass audience for video films. The main base of a Tymoshenko’s ‘video enterprise’ was the location of the former central Komsomol discotheque club of Dnipropetrovsk oblast– the Student Palace in the Taras Shevchenko Park of Culture and Relaxation in downtown Dnipropetrovsk (Popov and Milshtein 2006, 52–89; Ponamarchuk 2007). In 1989, she quit her old engineer-economist job and became the head of the Terminal co-operative. The same year, another participant in the ‘discotheque mafia,’ Serhiy Tihipko, was elected as the first secretary of the Komsomol organization of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. He not only supported Tymoshenko’s enterprise, but also brought his additional discotheque and Sputnik connections into Terminal. In this way, discotheque activists and Komsomol apparatchiks contributed to the growth and popularity of Tymoshenko’s business (Tihipko). In 1991 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Soviet state tourism, the representatives of the Brezhnev era Komsomol elite, such as Tymoshenko demonstrated again that a skilful adjustment of this network to the new economic situation was an important foundation for success in post-Soviet business activities. The initial capital of Terminal, the music and video Komsomol enterprise which Tymoshenko had launched during ‘the discotheque era’ of late socialism, became the foundation of her business and political career in post-Soviet Ukraine. Epilogue: Dnipropetrovsk Komsomol Entrepreneurs and the Formation of Post-Soviet Oligarchs Political corruption in the post-Soviet geopolitical space is rooted in cultural consumption during the Brezhnev era, especially in the so-called ‘discotheque effect’ on society during the era of ‘mature socialism.’ During this period of late socialism in the USSR, millions of Soviet young people, loyal members of Komsomol, fell in love with the catchy sound of ‘beat music’ by the Beatles and hard rock by Deep Purple. Even ten years after dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet space was ruled by former Soviet hard rock fans, representatives of the so-called ‘Deep Purple generation,’ new post-Soviet politicians, such as Russian Prime-Minister Dmitri Medvedev, twice Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, President Petro Poroshenko and former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Paradoxically, détente in the 1970s led to the influx of Western cultural products into the USSR, such as popular music and feature films. As a result, Soviet ideologists, including the Komsomol, attempted to control Soviet consumption of cultural products from the West using ‘Komsomol discothèques’ where Soviet young people could dance to ‘ideologically permitted’ Soviet and Western music. Contemporaries called these organizers ‘disco mafia’ in the industrial cities of Eastern Ukraine. By the end of perestroika in 1991, more than 100 Komsomol businesses had emerged in industrial cities in Eastern Soviet Ukraine, of which more than ninety originated in the city of Dnipropetrovsk (Zhuk 2010, 301). Only a few of the most successful enterprises survived post-Soviet competition during the 1990s and created ‘new business corporations’ such as Yulia Tymoshenko’s ‘Gas Empire,’ Kolomoyskyy’s and Tihipko’s Privatbank, Aleksandr Balashov’s ‘Trade Corporation’ and Rinat Akhmetov’s Liuks. The overwhelming majority of these post-Soviet successful businesses were organised by or directly connected to the ‘disco mafia.’ At the same time, the first Dnipropetrovsk ‘capitalists’ demonstrated a wide range of ethnic backgrounds, from the Ukrainian Tihipko, Armenian-Russian Tymoshenko, Russian Balashov and Jewish Kolomoyskyy contributing to the multi-national identity of the city of Dnipropetrovsk and Dnipro. Some contemporaries noted how the business activities of Komsomol ‘entrepreneurs’ in the 1980s contributed to regional identity in Eastern Ukraine. Many of these ‘entrepreneurs’ who were not ethnic Ukrainians became active participants in the Ukrainian independence movement in 1988–1991 to protect their regional business interests rather than defending Ukrainian culture and language. In the 1990s, former members of the Soviet ‘discotheque mafia’ and their former KPU supervisors became an integral part of the business and political life of independent Ukraine. As leaders of oligarchic clans in Ukraine they have resisted Russian expansion into their ‘spheres of influence.’ The case of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, elected in April 2019, whose entire career was generated inside the Soviet-based system of television entertainment, continues to demonstrate the connection between ‘post-Komsomol‘ business and political careers. Zelenskyy began his acting career in 95-yi Kvartal, which was a reference to a neighbourhood in Kryvyy Rih, where he had grown up and was inspired by the 1960s Soviet television show KVN. As we see, the Dnipropetrovsk and Dnipro elites, who are still rooted in their Soviet past, play a significant role in the development of independent Ukraine. References Berkhoff, Karel C., (2004). Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bolebrukh, Anatolii G. et al., eds., (2001). Dnipropetrovsk: vikhy istorii. Dnipropetrovsk: Grani. 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Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985. Baltimore, MD & Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. **Interviews**Igor T., KGB officer, 15 May 1991, Dnipropetrovsk. Karlo A. Markov, 12 April 1992, Dnipropetrovsk State University. Mikhail Suvorov, 1 June 1991, Dnipropetrovsk. Natalia V. Bocharova, 15 March 1993, Dnipropetrovsk State University. Sergiy Tihipko, director of Privatbank in Dnipropetrovsk, 12 October 1993, Dnipropetrovsk. Yevhen D. Prudchenko and Halyna V. Smolenska, 18 July 2007, Central Library of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Dnipropetrovsk. Notes [1] I used also numerous interviews conducted with my relatives, who are ethnic Ukrainians, but live in Moscow, Russia, who still support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s anti-Ukrainian politics. [2] Sovnarkhoz is abbreviated from Russian Sovet narodnogo khoziaistva, an economic department in the Soviet government during the early Stalin era and during Khrushchev’s reforms.