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This Just In: Politics Defined
After decades of claiming electoral mandates, the Democratic Party actually has one. But there’s a hard truth that goes with politics.
What Pete Buttigieg’s Bet in the 2026 Midterms Could Mean for 2028
No longer a fresh face, he is arguing that his party needs moderate red-state whisperers.
Florida Democrats celebrate midterm gains as Republicans defend statewide victories despite political headwinds
Democrat Cindy Holscher wins Kansas governor's race, extending party's hold on governor's mansion
Democratic state Sen. Cindy Holscher wins the Kansas governor's race over Trump-backed Republican Ty Masterson, keeping the governor's mansion in Democratic hands.
Trump sank the GOP in 2026. He could do it again in 2028
Judging by their choices since this month’s Democratic sweep, both the White House and congressional Republicans are vastly underestimating the party’s risk in 2028 if President Donald Trump remains as unpopular as he is now.
State Senate's Minority Leader Roger Niello on his tight race, Republican Party challenges
California Republican State Sen. Roger Niello expressed confidence in his re-election chances despite a close race, citing the number of remaining votes and their origins as favorable indicators.
Incoming House Democrat says party is threatening him
Rep.-elect Don Leonard (D-OH) is claiming that his party’s senior representatives are threatening him to drop his stated preconditions for backing House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) in the upcoming speaker elections or face intraparty repercussions. Leonard ousted incumbent Rep. Mike Carey (R-OH) in last week’s midterm elections, flipping a district President Donald Trump won […]
Pols & Politics: 3 candidates now running for MassGOP Chair following Dem midterm dominance
It’s now a three-way race for Chair of the Massachusetts Republican Party following the midterm shellacking dished out in the midterm elections by Democrats nationally and here in Massachusetts.
Voters Want Affordability. Trump Wants a Fight.
Last week, voters sent a clear and historic rebuke to the party in power. Angry about the rising cost of living — and frustrated with what they see as the president’s disinterest in solving it — voters shouted the unambiguous message that they want urgent solutions on affordability.The president, however, seems not to have heard them at all.
15 new movies to stream before the holidays are over
Love movies? Live for TV? USA TODAY's Watch Party newsletter has all the best recommendations, delivered right to your inbox. Sign up now and be one of the cool kids.
United Airlines blocks AI agents from booking flights ahead of holidays
United Airlines is moving to block third-party artificial intelligence agents from booking flights and accessing customer accounts ahead of the holiday travel season.
Democrats look to what’s next after Trump. But first, an actual party
Democrats have exploded out of a Trump-imposed political wilderness to their most sweeping midterm win since Watergate. And they were ready to take a beat before they begin what’s sure to be a frenzied season of presidential campaign announcements, hiring, fundraising and knife-fighting among a dozen or more White House hopefuls.
'The time is now for change.' Bernie Sanders won't support Schumer for Senate Democratic leader
The demand for change sets up a seismic confrontation after the party's sweep to power in the midterm elections.
In their own words: Political science professors share insight on 2026 midterms implications
Before the 2026 midterm elections, Republicans had the majority of the House, 218-214, and majority of the Senate, 53-47. Pew Research conducted a survey in May discovering 5,103 U.S. adults, 58%, had an unfavorable view of the Republican party. After the elections, Democrats have majority of the House unofficially at, 255-169, and majority of the...
John Thune seeks another term as Senate Republican leader as the party reckons with election losses
Senate Republicans will be meeting for what they call a “robust conversation” on their future and to decide whether to keep South Dakota Sen. John Thune as their leader.
The Democrat Who Wants to Make Politics Boring
Jake Auchincloss has some ideas for his party.
The Democratic Divide Is Smaller Than You Think
What Rahm Emanuel’s latest economic speech shows about the Democratic Party’s ideas primary.
Hinkfuss casts run for Green Bay mayor as business-friendly, nonpartisan
Kathy Hinkfuss highlighted economic priorities as Green Bay mayor, deemphasizing her past Democratic Party involvement.
'We can't let them down' -- After midterm wins, Democrats turn to charting path ahead
Democrats from across the country descended on Denver for a two-day conference to chart the course of their party after sweeping victories in the midterm elections.
Two former CA governors host pizza party for veterans
How Landslides Renew American Politics
The ideological and policy implications of this month’s massive Democratic midterm victory remain far from clear. The public roundly rejected Republicans but still has a very low opinion of Democrats. And since congressional Democrats won’t have the numbers to routinely override presidential vetoes and did not even run on any shared agenda, they aren’t likely to chart any aggressive new direction in governing over the next two years. But in the long run, it may be the sheer scale and breadth of the Democrats’ win that matters most, and that may signal the dawning of a new phase of American political life. Either party could plausibly dominate that next phase, or power could continue to swing back and forth. But simply by making large majorities imaginable again, and so focusing political competition on the median voter and the challenge of building broad coalitions, this election could allow for some renewal in our constitutional system.
Why the Democrats are rethinking their politics
I want to start by talking about a Democratic loss from the midterms. Subscribe Florida was once a swing state that the outgoing governor, Ron DeSantis, said was now “off the board. It is a Republican state”. Yet Democrat Senate candidate Angie Nixon, pictured below, only lost by three percentage points. But what if the Democrats had won? Nixon was not the preferred establishment candidate and accused Democrat HQ of not sending enough money. I bring up Nixon’s “beef” because it gets to the heart of the debate about the way forward for the party when it is in control of the House and Senate come January. You’re reading InDepth: A weekly long read from Channel 4 News offering quality analysis and insight, diving deeper beyond the headlines Nixon, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), argues that her “progressivism” is popular. The centrists say she never stood a chance in the deep Red of the sunshine state. “The backlash against Trump and the general Blue wave tsunami was big enough that it carried people from all different factions of the party,” says Ben Krauss, from the think tank, Searchlight Institute. With Chris Van Hollen set to challenge leader Chuck Schumer in the Senate - and even some questioning Hakeem Jeffries as Speaker of the House - do the Democrats risk squabbling internally rather than working on their huge mandate? DSA on the rise The DSA has been around since the 1980s, but the last decade has been transformational for the group. In 2018, there was the emergence of Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and then in 2025 the victory of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, pictured below. Both individuals showed the left could challenge the Democratic mainstream with bold new policies. Mamdani spoke of free buses, free childcare and a freeze on rents. While only a few actual DSA members have now been elected to the House, some of the policies they champion are entering the broader mainstream. Medicare for All, a wealth tax on billionaires, raising the minimum wage, changing the US-Israel relationship. Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan and Penny Flanagan in Minnesota both championed Medicare for All and accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, which it denies. Neither are members of the DSA, but the messaging worked, and in the case of El-Sayed, it worked in a swing state. Socialism or populism? Perhaps we’re obsessed with labels rather than policy? Senator Bernie Sanders called the likes of Troy Jackson in Maine simply “progressive”, while his fellow senator Elizabeth Warren described the new intake as “populist economic fighters”. Ben Rhodes, who worked for Barack Obama, described the new governor-elector of Iowa, Rob Sand, pictured below, as a “radical centrist populist”. Matt Bennett of the centrist Democratic group, Third Way, told me: “The term populist has lost all of its meaning. It now applies to everyone. Everyone runs against the establishment. But they’re claiming that people like James Talarico and Adam Hamilton are running as leftists and they’re not. They didn’t run on the Green New Deal or abolishing ICE.” Share Krauss said: “The word that we use is heterodoxy. You can be someone that really goes after billionaires like Talarico, but also you saw him on the southern border doing campaign appearances with sheriffs. Everyone from the left to the moderates cheer that on. So that to me is a pretty remarkable departure from where we were five years ago.” The moderates argument The moderates or centrists, like Bennett, would take us back to the top of this article: Angie Nixon. They contend that the most left-leaning Senate candidates all ran behind the national swing to the Democrats. But what about Nixon’s argument about a lack of funds? “The reason that we didn’t have the resources to invest in Florida is because we had to put so much goddamn money into Michigan, a state that we should have won easily,” said Bennett. He added: “I believe if she had run more like Troy Jackson as ‘I’m a capitalist, but I’m progressive’, I think she would have had a shot at winning.” [ ](https://channel4news.substack.com/p/explained-why-democrat-scott-coloms) [ Explained: Why Democrat Scott Colom's Senate win is 'historic' ](https://channel4news.substack.com/p/explained-why-democrat-scott-coloms) Kiran Moodley · Nov 12 [ Read full story ](https://channel4news.substack.com/p/explained-why-democrat-scott-coloms) Still, with El-Sayed, a win is a win, right? Mamdani told The New Yorker: “I’ve often heard that the kind of politics that we’re fighting for isn’t possible outside of New York. Tuesday proved just how wrong that was.” Share Channel 4 News Indeed, Krauss’ point is how the left and the moderates are now taking notes from each other. Talarico advocates for universal healthcare, and while he may not have called for Bernie’s $20 minimum wage, he wants $15. Can they meet in the middle? So there is actually a common thread here. From Sanders to Sand, Democrats stopped focusing on culture wars and more on economic wars. Gina Hinojosa, the next governor of Texas, was pressed on the issue of “progressivism” by The New York Times and turned it around to say the real issue was: “We are facing an almost existential crisis in this country because tech giants are having their way with us.” [ ](https://channel4news.substack.com/p/why-voters-punished-trump-and-the) [ Why voters punished Trump and the Republicans in the midterms ](https://channel4news.substack.com/p/why-voters-punished-trump-and-the) Anushka Asthana · Nov 4 [ Read full story ](https://channel4news.substack.com/p/why-voters-punished-trump-and-the) Krauss said: “Everyone talked about tariffs. Everyone talked about the Iran war. People leaned into very populist themes about corporations, about making the wealthy pay their fair share. Pro-Israel thinking is not as common in the Democratic party as it once was.” The way forward - realignment? Two big questions then. Can the Democrats get anything passed to make meaningful change and does the broad sweep of victories indicate a significant shift in US politics? I spoke to Professor Charles Bullock, at the University of Georgia, and he said that the Democrats may want to shore up their numbers - especially in the Senate - in 2028 before doing that. “Look at the changes LBJ got through… or FDR. Under those circumstances, what you had were Democratic majorities of two to one in both chambers. If you got that, then sure, you can go very far left.” With the Democrats winning votes in the South, have they broadened their coalition permanently to levels not seen for decades? Bullock notes that the US has not had three one-term presidencies in a row since periods in the middle and late 19th century. “What happened to end that series of one-term presidencies? We had a major realignment. We also during those periods had very evenly divided Congresses. “So is this a prelude to that? I don’t know, but it could be.” Thanks for reading the latest edition of our InDepth newsletter. Subscribe below to keep up to date with Channel 4 News on Substack. Subscribe Share Channel 4 News Leave a comment
Like Reagan, Trump will define the GOP for decades
FDR lost 72 House seats in 1938 and still remade American politics. Trump's 2026 midterm election rout may not loosen his hold on the Republican Party
Communist Party Politics, Rockets and Komsomol Business in Soviet Dnipropetrovsk
This is an excerpt from Ukraine’s Outpost: Dnipropetrovsk and the Russian-Ukrainian War (2022). Free to download from E-International Relations. The Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk (in 2016 the city was renamed Dnipro) was shown on a movie screen in the Soviet Union for the first time in 1981 as a ‘Russian-speaking’ city in Nikita Mikhalkov’s feature film Rodnia. A story of a Russian peasant woman who visited her daughter in the big industrial city was used by Mikhalkov in his movie to emphasise a growing crisis in Soviet family life during the Brezhnev era when former Russian peasants lost their Orthodox Christian identity during the process of socialist industrialisation and modernisation. Paradoxically, Mikhalkov completely ignored the real social and national problems of the city; instead choosing as the setting for his movie Russian peasants’ adjustment to Soviet modernisation. Even now many Russians use this film as evidence of the ‘Russian character’ of Dnipropetrovsk ignoring the real demographic and social history of this Ukrainian region (Elberg-Wilson 2016).[1] Despite Mikhalkov’s picture, the city of Dnipro and the Dnipropetrovsk region had a multi-national and multi-cultural character coupled with the strong influence of Ukrainian and Jewish culture. Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work. Subscribe Using various archival and published documents, this chapter will cover the social, economic and cultural development of the city and the region of Dnipropetrovsk through the period of late socialism after Stalin, showing the ties between the multi-national Komsomol members and business ventures during perestroika and how this influenced the rise of oligarchic clans in post-Soviet Ukraine. Emergence of Soviet Dnipropetrovsk Paradoxically, from the early beginning, the founding of the ‘city of Catherine’s glory’ (Ekaterinoslav in Russian) and its province in 1776 by the Russian imperial administration of the Catherine the Second involved non-Russian ethnic groups, which shaped a historical demography of this region in Southern Ukraine. These ethnic groups included the local Ukrainian Orthodox Christian peasants and Cossacks, Jewish traders and artisans, Armenian Christians, and Tatar Muslim settlers. By the middle of the nineteenth century, thousands of German Protestant and Mennonite colonists also settled in the province. Moreover, by attracting foreign capital, the Russian imperial administration transformed this multi-ethnic and multi-religious region in the booming industrial centre of the Russian Empire by the beginning of twentieth century (Zhuk 2004, 33–96). After the Russian Revolution and civil war, the province of Ekaterinoslav continued to play an important role in the industrial development of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1926 the Soviet administration decided to change the name of Ekaterinoslav which sounded too ‘old fashioned’ and ‘imperial Russian.’ The new name was a combination of the name of the Dnipro River with the last name of Grigorii Petrovskii, head of the All-Ukrainian Executive Committee of the Soviets, and well-known organiser of the working-class movement in the region of Ekaterinoslav before the Revolution. ‘Dnipro-Petrovske’ was later transformed into ‘Dnipropetrovsk’ (Bolebrukh 2001, 156). Both the city and region of Dnipropetrovsk lived through the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.), industrialisation and the Stakhanovite movement. The region lost millions of human lives during collectivisation and the dekulakisation campaign, and especially during the Holodomor of 1932–33. During industrialisation, the Soviet government restored the industrial base of the region. Former metallurgical giants such as the Petrovskii (formerly Brianskii)plant, the Chodoir (formerly Vladimir Lenin) plant and others resumed production of pig iron and steel. During the 1930s, Dnipropetrovsk became an important centre for Soviet heavy industry. In 1932, Dnipropetrovsk regional metallurgical plants produced 20 per cent of the entire cast iron and 25 per cent of the steel manufactured in the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. After the beginning of the campaign of ‘Ukrainianisation’ in 1923, the number of those who spoke Ukrainian grew, reaching 38.5 per cent in the city by the end of the 1920s. Between 1932 and 1939, the number of city dwellers in Dnipropetrovsk increased to over 500,662. The Dnipropetrovsk region became the most urbanised of Soviet Ukraine with more than 2,273,000 people living in the region (Vasiliev 1977, 55; Bolebrukh 2001, 159–164). Dnipropetrovsk also became the cultural and educational centre of Soviet Ukraine. There were ten colleges, including the State University, 97 secondary schools and 19 vocational schools. The Soviet administration restored local drama and music theatres. During the 1930s, Dnipropetrovsk had 120 libraries, five museums, six movie-theatres, 30 clubs and palaces of culture (Bolebrukh 2001_,_159–164). The Leonid Brezhnev Clan Post-war Soviet modernisation influenced the careers of many young and ambitious Komsomol members in the region. One of them, Leonid Brezhnev, was born in 1906 in Kamenskoe, joined the Kommunystycheskaya Partyya Sovetskoho Soyuza (Communist party of the Soviet Union - KPSS) in 1931 and, after graduation from Dniprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute was elected as a council deputy of the city of Dniprodzerzhinsk. The Stalinist purges of the 1930s removed many old Soviet and Communist officials from government positions who perished in prisons and the labour camps of GULAG. Young people such as Brezhnev filled the void created by Stalinist repressions in the region. In 1938, the young Brezhnev was elected as a member of the regional committee of the Soviet Communist party of Ukraine (KPU) and head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda. By the young age of 32, Brezhnev had become secretary of the KPU committee of the most important industrial region of Soviet Ukraine. His career was interrupted by the Great Patriotic War when Brezhnev joined the army as an ideological officer (see Mlechin 2005). From August 1941 to October 1943, the Dnipropetrovsk region was occupied by the Nazis, and Soviet troops liberated the entire region by February 1944 (Berkhoff 2004, 11, 36, 49, 149–150, 152–153, 248–249). The Soviet administration restored the industrial base of Dnipropetrovsk, and by 1950 the main metallurgical and machine-building factories had reached their pre-war levels of industrial production and productivity. During this period, Brezhnev began his political career as a talented and ambitious organizer of the industrial re-birth of Dnipropetrovsk. He was an experienced young army ideologist who had proved his loyalty to the Stalinist leadership during the war and was familiar with Dnipropetrovsk before 1941. The Central Committee of the KPSS sent Brezhnev to Dnipropetrovsk in November 1947 when he was elected first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk regional committee of the KPU, and he ruled the oblast until June 1950 (Vosstanovlenie). His successors were Andrei Kirilenko and Volodymyr Shcherbitskyy, both close friends. Two other young comrades of Brezhnev, Oleksiy Vatchenko and Yevhen Kachalovskii led the region respectively in 1965–1976 and 1976–1983 (Vasiliev 1977, 72; Bolebrukh 2001_,_ 233; Mlechin 2005). Brezhnev promoted the political career of his old friends, many of whom became prominent political figures in Kyiv and Moscow during his leadership of the KPSS. Both contemporaries and scholars who study the ‘Brezhnev period’ call this phenomenon the ‘Dnipropetrovsk mafia’ or rule of the ‘Dnipropetrovsk Family’ (Nahaylo 1999, 36, 69; Wilson 2000, 162). Since the rise of Brezhnev to the pinnacle of Soviet power, the ruling elites of Dnipropetrovsk influenced not only regional, but also republican and All-Union politics. Dnipropetrovsk’s transformation into an important centre of the Soviet military industrial complex was directly related to the sudden rise of Brezhnev to the pinnacle of Soviet power in October of 1964. Brezhnev promoted the political career of his compatriots from the Dnipropetrovsk military industrial complex. Brezhnev’s friends and close colleagues from his post-war years in the Dnipropetrovsk region went to Moscow and became prominent political figures in the Soviet nomenklatura hierarchy during the 1960s and 1970s. Two main industries of the Soviet military industrial complex – metallurgy and missile-building – had important factories in Dnipropetrovsk and therefore provided the Brezhnev clan with new members from 1964 until 1982. Even after the downfall of the Brezhnev clan in Moscow in 1983, when Yurii Andropov began his struggle ‘against corruption and nepotism’ in the Soviet nomenklatura, members of this clan continued to play a prominent role in the political life of Soviet Ukraine. Besides the Physical-Technical Department of Dnipropetrovsk State University, the Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute also assisted the political careers of many of Brezhnev’s close friends who in the 1970s and 1980s became important members of the Kremlin nomenklatura. Nikolai Tikhonov, former head of Dnipropetrovsk Sovnarkhoz during the 1950s, was one of the deputies of the Soviet Prime Minister between 1966 and 1976, First Deputy of the Prime Minister from 1976 to 1980 and head of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1980 to 1985.[2] Nikolai Shcholokov was the Soviet Minister of Public Order in 1966–1968 and from 1968 to 1982 he was Soviet Minister of Interior. Georgii Tsynev was during 1971–1976 a member of the Central Revision Committee of the KPSS and a deputy head of the KGB from 1970 to 1982. In the KGB he was the 1st Deputy Chairman in 1982–1985 as well as he was a Candidate Member of CPSU Central Committee in 1976–1981 and accordingly was a full Member of the said body in 1981–1986. Victor Chebrikov, who graduated from Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute in 1950, was one of the leaders of the city party organisation in Dnipropetrovsk from 1961 to 1971. In 1971 he became the head of the personnel department of the USSR KGB, First Deputy of the Head of this organization and from 1982 to 1988 a chairman of the KGB (Pikhovshek 1996, 11–12, 272–274). Another of Brezhnev’s close friends, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyy, promoted the careers of other people from the region of Dnipropetrovsk. With his support, Oleksii Vatchenko became the head of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Soviet Supreme Soviet from 1976 until 1984 with the assistance of another politician from Dnipropetrovsk, Valentyna Shevchenko. Aleksandr Kapto, who worked as a secretary of both the Dnipropetrovsk Komsomol organization and the Soviet Ukrainian Komsomol in Kyiv in the 1960s, oversaw the Department of Culture in the Central Committee of the KPU; in 1979–1986 he was a Secretary of the Central Committee and accordingly was the main ideologist of the Soviet Ukraine. Many other members of the ‘Kyiv ruling class’ under Shcherbytskyy were also linked to the Dnipropetrovsk metallurgical and military lobby. Shcherbytskyy’s assistant from 1972 to 1984 was Konstantin Prodan who began his career in the Komsomol organisation of the city of Dnipropetrovsk (Pikhovshek 1996, 48–103). As a contemporary political analyst noted, ‘Officially Prodan was put in charge of industrial production, though, according to insiders of the former KPU Central Committee, his principal function was ‘maintaining’ contact with Brezhnev’s assistant Georgii Tsukanov in Moscow’ (Pikhovshek 1996, 33–34). Another important reason for the rise of the ‘Brezhnev Clan’ was the relative independence of Dnipropetrovsk’s local administration from Kyiv. Because of the status of Dnipropetrovsk as a ‘strategically important centre for military industry,’ different branches of the local administration were under the direct supervision of Moscow, rather than Kyiv (Interviews with Tihipko, Markov and Bocharova). The Military Industrial Complex and Ruling Elite of Dnipropetrovsk The city of Dnipropetrovsk was the location of famous metallurgical and machine-building factories in pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union. Before 1941, Dnipropetrovsk became the most urbanised region of the Soviet Ukraine. Almost 53 per cent of this region’s population lived in 16 cities and towns of the region (Vasiliev 1977, 55; Bolebrukh 2001, 159–164). In 1980, the industrial enterprises of Dnipropetrovsk manufactured a significant part of the industrial products and customer goods for the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. A total of 5.4 per cent of steel, 9 per cent of rolled iron, 28 per cent of pipes, 62 per cent of combine beet-harvesters, 27.9 per cent of television sets, and 8.5 per cent of knitted wear in Ukraine were produced in the city of Dnipropetrovsk (Bolebrukh 2001, 219). After 1945, the main centre of economic and financial activities of the region and the city of Dnipropetrovsk became neither metallurgy nor mining. The new centre which changed the status of the region and of the city was a secret military factory in Dnipropetrovsk. The entire ideological and cultural situation in the region, and especially the city, depended on this one industrial plant which became the most important part of the Soviet military industrial complex. In July 1944, the State Committee of Defence in Moscow decided to build a large military machine-building factory in Dnipropetrovsk on the location of the pre-war aircraft plant. In December 1945, thousands of German prisoners of war began construction and built the first sections and shops of the new Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Factory (Markov, 1995). In 1947–1948 this factory produced its first cars and special military vehicles. However, on 9 May 1951 the USSR Council of Ministers decided to transform the main shops and sectors of this factory into ‘secret production’ which included not only special military vehicles, but also powerful rocket engines and different types of modern military aircraft. The former Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Factory was transferred to the Ministry of Armament of the USSR and received a new name – the State Union Plant #586 (Lukanov 1996, 12). Stalin introduced the organisation of special secret training of highly qualified engineers and scientists who were to become rocket construction specialists. He recommended the introduction of a new college degree at Dnipropetrovsk State University which would be a Master of Sciences in rocket construction. In 1952 the university administration formed a new department with the name ‘physical-technical faculty’ which was the largest department at the university, admitting on average four hundred students each year. These students received better accommodation and a higher stipend payment than students from other departments and colleges; the lowest stipend for this department was 450 roubles, while the highest stipend at another prestigious school, the Dnipropetrovsk Medical Institute, was only 180 roubles. A special commission from Moscow selected talented undergraduate students studying physics from engineering schools all over the USSR and sent them to the physical-technical department at Dnipropetrovsk State University, where they resumed their studies as rocket engineers. Simultaneously, the university administration announced the admission of new freshmen students in this department. The promise of a good stipend and a ‘romantic’ career of rocket engineer attracted thousands of talented young people to this ‘secret’ department, which provided training specialists for only the Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Factory (Horbulin 1998, 9, 62–63). In accordance with another decision of the Soviet government, in 1954 the administration of this automobile factory opened a secret design office with the name ‘Southern Construction Bureau’ (konstruktorskoe biuro Yuzhnoe). The main assignment of this office was to construct military missiles and rocket engines. Hundreds of talented physicists, engineers and machine designers moved from Moscow and other big cities in the Soviet Union to Dnipropetrovsk where they joined the konstruktorskoe biuro Yuzhnoe (KBYu). In 1965, the secret Plant #586 was transferred to the Ministry of General Machine-Building of the USSR and the next year it changed its name into the ‘Southern Machine-building Factory’ (Yuzhnyi mashino-stroitelnyi zavod) or simply Yuzhmash (in Ukrainian Pivdenmash). The first ‘General Constructor’ and head of the ‘Southern’ design office was Mikhail Yangel, a prominent scientist and outstanding designer of space rockets who led the design office and factory from 1954 to 1971. Yangel designed the first powerful rockets and space military equipment for the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Yangel worked with talented engineers who later became the leaders of military production in Dnipropetrovsk and the official directors of Pivdenmash. Two close collaborators of Yangel were the Pivdenmash directors Leonid Smirnov (1952–1961) and Aleksandr Makarov (1961–1986). Makarov’s successor was Leonid Kuchma, the Director General of the Pivdenmash in 1986–1992, who later became one of the most prominent political leaders in independent Ukraine and was and still is the only President of Ukraine (1994–2005) elected twice (Strazheva; Platonov and Horbulin; Romanov and Gubarev; Baikonur; Baikonur, Korolev, Yangel). In 1951 the Southern Machine-building Factory began manufacturing and testing new military rockets with an initial range of only 270 kilometres. By 1959 Soviet scientists and engineers developed new technologies, and as a result, the KBYu launched a new machine-building project producing ballistic missiles. Under Yangel, KBYu produced very powerful rocket engines which dramatically increased the range of ballistic missiles and from the 1960s, began to be used as launch vehicles for Soviet spaceships. Pivdenmash designed and manufactured four generations of missile complexes which included space launch vehicles Kosmos, Interkosmos, Tsyklon-2, Tsyklon-3 and Zenith. The KBYu created a unique space-rocket system called Energia-Buran and manufactured 400 technical devices which were launched as artificial satellites (Sputniks). For the first time in the world space industry, the Dnipropetrovsk missile plant produced space Sputniks. By the 1980s, Pivdenmash manufactured 67 different types of spaceships, 12 space research complexes and four defence space rocket systems. These systems were used not only for purely military purposes by the Ministry of Defence, but also for astronomical research, for global radio and television and for environmental monitoring. Pivdenmash initiated and sponsored the international space programme of Eastern European socialist countries, called Interkosmos. Twenty-two of the 25 automatic space Sputniks of this programme were designed, manufactured, and launched by engineers and workers from Dnipropetrovsk. Pivdenmash and KBYu became not only an important centre of the Soviet space industry and Soviet military industrial complex, but also the main rocket producer for the entire Soviet bloc. (Hall and Shayler 2001, 316ff; Siddiqi 2003, 97, 113, 114, 164, 177, 285) The military rocket systems manufactured in Dnipropetrovsk created the base for the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces (Dnepropetrovskii raketno 1994; Bolebrukh 2001_,_ 209–211, 229; Lukanov 1996, 13). On the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, KBYu had nine regular and corresponding members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 33 full professors and 290 scientists holding a Ph.D. More than 50,000 people worked at Pivdenmash. Pivdenmash was ‘a state’ inside the Soviet state. In 1969, after a long competition with Moscow’s V. Chelomei Centre of Rocket Construction, Pivdenmash rocket designs won, and from then leaders of the Soviet military industrial complex preferred only Pivdenmash models. The Soviet state provided billions of Soviet roubles to finance Pivdenmash projects (Horbulin 1998, 6, 24–31). Officially, Pivdenmash also manufactured agricultural tractors and special kitchen equipment for everyday needs, such as mincing machines or juicers for Soviet households. In official reports and public information there were no details given about its production of rockets or spaceships. However, hundreds of thousands of workers and engineers in the city of Dnipropetrovsk were employees of this plant, and members of their families and therefore most local people knew about the ‘real production’ of Pivdenmash. Dnipropetrovsk as a KGB “Testing Ground” The Soviet government approved the KGB’s proposal to introduce the highest level of secrecy over Pivdenmash and its products. According to the Soviet government’s decision, the city of Dnipropetrovsk was officially closed to foreign visitors in 1959. No citizen of a foreign country (even Eastern European socialist) was allowed to visit the city or district of Dnipropetrovsk. From the late 1950s, Soviet people called Dnipropetrovsk ‘the rocket city’ or ‘closed city.’ (Bolebrukh 2001, 211). Members of the Brezhnev clan in the Moscow offices of the KGB and Ministry of Interior also contributed to centralised ideological control in Dnipropetrovsk, which especially influenced the KGB and security operations in the closed city. The local KGB office was always more Moscow-oriented, ignoring the interests of the authorities in Kyiv. At the same time, for Moscow officials who began their careers in Dnipropetrovsk, the city became the testing ground for many All-Union KGB campaigns which they attempted to initiate. Dnipropetrovsk KGB officers were ‘pioneers’ in the organisation of ideological campaigns which became ‘models’ for other ‘closed’ industrial Soviet cities. [This phrase – ‘pioneers of ideological campaigns’ – belongs to a local retired KGB officer. According to the KGB documents, Moscow’s representatives in the Dnipropetrovsk clan always interfered in local KGB business, imposing their own practices on the local officers.] (Igor T.; DADO, f. 19, op. 52, spr. 72, ark. 1–18) As a result, the inhabitants of Dnipropetrovsk experienced more ideological limitations and more brutal anti-Western campaigns than people in many other Soviet cities. Facing direct Kremlin supervision, the local KGB and KPSS ideologists sought to prove their ideological reliability and occasionally exaggerated the ‘threat from the capitalist West.’ KGB officers transformed one building in the Dnipropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital (psikhushka), located in a town of Ihren (now a suburban district of Dnipro), into a special police facility for ‘political dissidents.’ All over the Soviet Union, Ihren psikhushka (especially its Section 9) became notorious and known as the worst incarceration for political prisoners. The Dnipropetrovsk KGB tested various drugs on prisoners and performed different medical experiments, treating the most ‘opinionated’ political dissidents as mentally sick patients. Many religious and civil rights activists and ‘bourgeois nationalists,’ such as national communist dissident Leonid Plyushch, described the Dnipropetrovsk Psychiatric Hospital as ‘mental hell’ because of its police system of harsh treatment and everyday humiliation (Plyushch 1979, 304–326, 340–349). Meanwhile, local KGB officers explained their harsh treatment of dissidents such as Plyushch as an ideological necessity to protect a strategically important centre of the Soviet military industrial complex (Igor T). Growth of the Population and Standards of Living in the Region The new status of the city brought more state investments and contributed to the overall improvement of the standard of living of its inhabitants. During the 1950s, the main sponsor of city improvements and renovations was the metallurgical industry. During the 1960s and 1970s, the space rocket industry and its biggest factory, Pivdenmash, sponsored all major city programmes, renovations and new architectural projects which included the sports palace Meteor with a large indoor pool, football team Dnipro, city airport, city theatre of opera and ballet, historical museum of Yavornitskii, department store ‘Children’s World,’ construction of thousands of modern apartments, libraries and movie-theatres, and celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the city of Dnipropetrovsk in 1976. (Bolebrukh 2001_,_ 211–212). Even the expansion and renovation of the Dnipropetrovsk Central Farmer Market (known as Oziorka) was supported by Pivdenmash as part of its improvement of the city’s life, and a reflection of the growth and strategic importance of the city. From 1958 to 1965 the city administration invested money in building a new covered location for the market and by 1970 they had re-built the entire neighbourhood transforming it into a modern and convenient place for the ‘socialist consumption of goods and services.’ (Lazebnik 2001, 167–185) As a result, the missile factory, the centre of the Soviet military industrial complex, contributed to a new level of cultural consumption among not only the city’s dwellers, but also among all guests of Dnipropetrovsk. Consequently, the pioneering efforts in the popularisation of new modern forms of Western music such as jazz and rock-n-roll also began among engineers and workers of Pivdenmash who contributed to the spread of new cultural forms and activities among those who lived in the city and region of Dnipropetrovsk. The improving living conditions in Dnipropetrovsk led to an increase of the regional population from 2,339,800 people (with a 56 per cent urban population) in 1951 to 2,850,700 (with a 72 per cent urban population) in 1961. The larger salaries and better distribution of food and industrial goods also attracted young people from other regions of the Soviet Union to Dnipropetrovsk. From the 1950s onward, most of the Dnipropetrovsk population were people younger than 30 years old. In 1970 there were 3,343,000 people in the region (76 per cent of who lived in cities) which by 1984 had increased to 3,771,200 people (with 83 per cent urban population). The population of the city of Dnipropetrovsk grew from 660,800 people in 1959 to 1,066,000 in 1979 and more than 1,153,400 people in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power (Glushkina 1985, 10, 11). The Dnipropetrovsk region had a young multinational, predominantly Russian speaking population. Three major ethnic groups shaped the cultural development of the region – Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews. During the peak of ‘international harmony and prosperity of developed socialism’ in 1979, Ukrainians made up the overwhelming majority of the regional (72.8 per cent) and urban (68.5 per cent) population. Due to massive emigration from the Soviet Union, the Jewish population decreased from 2.7 per cent in 1959 to 1.7 per cent in 1979 and 1.3 per cent in 1989. The number of Russians in the region’s population grew rapidly from 17.2 per cent in 1959, 20.9 per cent in 1970, 23 per cent in 1979 and 24.2 per cent in 1989 (O vozrastnoi structure 1971; Goskomstat USSR 1991, 100, 102). By 1985, more than a third of the population in the city of Dnipropetrovsk was ethnically Russian. If we add to this number the 3.2 per cent of Russian-speaking Jews and more than 33 per cent of Ukrainians who considered Russian their native language, we will have more than two thirds of the city’s population who associated themselves with Russian rather than with Ukrainian culture. According to contemporaries, the high salaries and better conditions of living attracted representatives of various nationalities from different republics who also spoke Russian rather than the Ukrainian language in Dnipropetrovsk (Goskomstat USSR 1991, 106, 108, 119, 122; Prudchenko and Smolenska 2007). Komsomol ‘Business’ During the Late Soviet Era The regional economic activities of local ‘businessmen and women’ from the Komsomol during perestroika had their roots in the pre-perestroika era. They also strengthened trends for independence from Moscow which had earlier existed in Dnipropetrovsk. All the elements of their initial business had already been developed during the Brezhnev era when the cultural consumption of late socialism combined the structures of Soviet international tourism with the ideological efforts of Komsomol activists into one business network. Mass rock and discotheque music consumption among Soviet youth was delivered by Komsomol and trade union apparatchiks. International tourism and discotheque enthusiasts provided these apparatchiks with music and video material for their entertainment business. Without these relations it would be impossible to imagine the development of post-Soviet capitalism. The first pioneers of organizing Komsomol business in the region were two graduates of Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute, the Ukrainian-Moldovan Sergiy Tihipko, the First Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Komsomol regional organization in 1986–91, and the Ukrainian Oleksandr Turchynov, who worked with Tihipko as head of the agitation and propaganda division in the same Komsomol regional organisation in 1987–90. Tihipko and Turchynov initiated and ‘ideologically justified’ the first Komsomol businesses in the region. Two other Komsomol members, who also graduated from the same institute as Tihipko and Turchynov, Kolomoyskyy and Viktor Pinchuk, both of Jewish origin, started their careers not in the official Komsomol business, but on the black market of Dnipropetrovsk, trading various goods, and using their financial and engineering skills for their own survival in the conditions of economic collapse of late socialism. Kolomoyskyy used his financial skills and connections with Tihipko to organize its own financial corporation Privatbank, which became the most successful bank in post-Soviet Ukraine. Pinchuk, using his engineering and managerial skills, founded his own metallurgical venture, entitled Interpipe Company. It is noteworthy that all four of those Komsomol members, two Ukrainian and two Jewish, used their personal connections through their friends and partners from Pivdenmash, including through its last director Leonid Kuchma, to start their first businesses in Dnipropetrovsk (see Golovko 2012). In the mid-1980s, when perestroika created favourable conditions for the managerial skills of Komsomol activists, this system produced new activities for cultural consumption, such as video salons which brought their organisers more profits than traditional discotheque clubs. The video business used the same infrastructure and network of the discotheque movement; namely international tourism, Komsomol activists, trade union leaders and the ‘discotheque mafia.’ This network contributed to the business career of two fans of Western popular music, Yulia Tymoshenko and her husband, Oleksandr (Popov, Milshtein, 55; Ponamarchuk). Yulia Grigian (Telegina) was the daughter of Armenian taxi-driver Grigian and Russian technical worker Telegina, a fan of British rock music. Yulia Grigian married Oleksandr Tymoshenko, son of a member of the city KPU committee in the Pivdenmash administration. In 1978, Yulia Tymoshenko joined the student Komsomol organization in the Department of Economy at Dnipropetrovsk State University. This department was opened on the initiative of the Pivdenmash administration in 1977 to provide training for qualified economists in Dnipropetrovsk’s growing military industrial complex. Yulia Tymoshenko graduated with honours from the Department of Economy in 1984 and began her first job as an engineer-economist through the connections of her father-in-law, Hennadii Tymoshenko. For five years, she worked at the Lenin machine building plant, another factory which belonged to the Soviet military industrial complex. In 1979, she gave birth to her daughter Yevhenia, and until 1988 she and her husband enjoyed a typical Soviet upper-middle class life in their one-bedroom cooperative apartment. They continued to watch movies, listen to Western pop music, and occasionally visited and danced in well-known discotheque clubs in downtown Dnipropetrovsk (Popov and Milshtein 2006, 64–67; Suvorov 1991). Perestroika changed the young Tymoshenko family. Hennadii Tymoshenko recommended his son and daughter-in-law to join the co-operative movement and promised his support through the city’s KPU and Soviet administration. In 1988, the young Tymoshenkos used their old connections in the Komsomol discothèque world to open a public service enterprise, a video-rental shop in Dnipropetrovsk, with 5,000 borrowed Soviet roubles. The profits made from this first venture were used to open a chain of video rental stores. They used the experience of Komsomol apparatchiks, who brought their first VCRs in Dnipropetrovsk through Sputnik. Contacts in the discotheque movement helped provide these apparatchiks with Western video tapes and an audience which was ready to consume new Western cultural products. Former discotheque enthusiasts tested these new business practices and proposed the idea of video salons, which had already become the most popular and fashionable form of entertainment Moscow and the three Baltic republics. As a result, during perestroika both the Komsomol and ‘discotheque mafia’ provided infrastructure for these salons in Dnipropetrovsk. When in 1987the KGB opened the city of Dnipropetrovsk to foreigners, Pivdenmash imported thousands of VCRs using barter agreements with South Korean businessmen. As a regional KPU apparatchik who oversaw the distribution of movies throughout the Dnipropetrovsk region (kinoprokat), Yulia Tymoshenko’s father-in-law had access not only to these Korean VCRs but also to local movie theatres which provided the first mass audience for video films. The main base of a Tymoshenko’s ‘video enterprise’ was the location of the former central Komsomol discotheque club of Dnipropetrovsk oblast– the Student Palace in the Taras Shevchenko Park of Culture and Relaxation in downtown Dnipropetrovsk (Popov and Milshtein 2006, 52–89; Ponamarchuk 2007). In 1989, she quit her old engineer-economist job and became the head of the Terminal co-operative. The same year, another participant in the ‘discotheque mafia,’ Serhiy Tihipko, was elected as the first secretary of the Komsomol organization of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. He not only supported Tymoshenko’s enterprise, but also brought his additional discotheque and Sputnik connections into Terminal. In this way, discotheque activists and Komsomol apparatchiks contributed to the growth and popularity of Tymoshenko’s business (Tihipko). In 1991 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Soviet state tourism, the representatives of the Brezhnev era Komsomol elite, such as Tymoshenko demonstrated again that a skilful adjustment of this network to the new economic situation was an important foundation for success in post-Soviet business activities. The initial capital of Terminal, the music and video Komsomol enterprise which Tymoshenko had launched during ‘the discotheque era’ of late socialism, became the foundation of her business and political career in post-Soviet Ukraine. Epilogue: Dnipropetrovsk Komsomol Entrepreneurs and the Formation of Post-Soviet Oligarchs Political corruption in the post-Soviet geopolitical space is rooted in cultural consumption during the Brezhnev era, especially in the so-called ‘discotheque effect’ on society during the era of ‘mature socialism.’ During this period of late socialism in the USSR, millions of Soviet young people, loyal members of Komsomol, fell in love with the catchy sound of ‘beat music’ by the Beatles and hard rock by Deep Purple. Even ten years after dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet space was ruled by former Soviet hard rock fans, representatives of the so-called ‘Deep Purple generation,’ new post-Soviet politicians, such as Russian Prime-Minister Dmitri Medvedev, twice Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, President Petro Poroshenko and former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Paradoxically, détente in the 1970s led to the influx of Western cultural products into the USSR, such as popular music and feature films. As a result, Soviet ideologists, including the Komsomol, attempted to control Soviet consumption of cultural products from the West using ‘Komsomol discothèques’ where Soviet young people could dance to ‘ideologically permitted’ Soviet and Western music. Contemporaries called these organizers ‘disco mafia’ in the industrial cities of Eastern Ukraine. By the end of perestroika in 1991, more than 100 Komsomol businesses had emerged in industrial cities in Eastern Soviet Ukraine, of which more than ninety originated in the city of Dnipropetrovsk (Zhuk 2010, 301). Only a few of the most successful enterprises survived post-Soviet competition during the 1990s and created ‘new business corporations’ such as Yulia Tymoshenko’s ‘Gas Empire,’ Kolomoyskyy’s and Tihipko’s Privatbank, Aleksandr Balashov’s ‘Trade Corporation’ and Rinat Akhmetov’s Liuks. The overwhelming majority of these post-Soviet successful businesses were organised by or directly connected to the ‘disco mafia.’ At the same time, the first Dnipropetrovsk ‘capitalists’ demonstrated a wide range of ethnic backgrounds, from the Ukrainian Tihipko, Armenian-Russian Tymoshenko, Russian Balashov and Jewish Kolomoyskyy contributing to the multi-national identity of the city of Dnipropetrovsk and Dnipro. Some contemporaries noted how the business activities of Komsomol ‘entrepreneurs’ in the 1980s contributed to regional identity in Eastern Ukraine. Many of these ‘entrepreneurs’ who were not ethnic Ukrainians became active participants in the Ukrainian independence movement in 1988–1991 to protect their regional business interests rather than defending Ukrainian culture and language. In the 1990s, former members of the Soviet ‘discotheque mafia’ and their former KPU supervisors became an integral part of the business and political life of independent Ukraine. As leaders of oligarchic clans in Ukraine they have resisted Russian expansion into their ‘spheres of influence.’ The case of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, elected in April 2019, whose entire career was generated inside the Soviet-based system of television entertainment, continues to demonstrate the connection between ‘post-Komsomol‘ business and political careers. Zelenskyy began his acting career in 95-yi Kvartal, which was a reference to a neighbourhood in Kryvyy Rih, where he had grown up and was inspired by the 1960s Soviet television show KVN. As we see, the Dnipropetrovsk and Dnipro elites, who are still rooted in their Soviet past, play a significant role in the development of independent Ukraine. References Berkhoff, Karel C., (2004). Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bolebrukh, Anatolii G. et al., eds., (2001). Dnipropetrovsk: vikhy istorii. Dnipropetrovsk: Grani. 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Romanov, Aleksandr P., Gubarev, Vladimir S. (1989). Konstruktory. Moscow: Molodaia gvardia. Siddiqi, Asif A. (2003). Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Elberg-Wilson, Eliot. (2016). ‘Eduard Artem’iev and the Sonics of National Identity,’ Slovo, 28, 2: 2–25. Strazheva, Irina V. (1978). Tiulpany s kosmodroma. Moscow: Molodaia gvardia. Vasiliev, I. V. et al. eds. (1977). Istoria gorodov i siol Ukrainskoi SSR v 26-ti tomakh: Dnepropetrovskaia oblast. Kyiv: Glavnaia redaktsia Ukrainskoi Sovestskoi Entsiklopedii. Vosstanovlenie Pridneprovia (1946–1950). (1980). Dokumenty i materially. Kyiv: Nauka. Wilson, Andrew. (2000). The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press Zhuk, Sergei. (2004). Russia’s Lost Reformation: Peasants, Millennialism and Radical Sects in Southern Russia and Ukraine, 1830–1917. Baltimore, MD & Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. Zhuk, Sergei (2010). Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985. Baltimore, MD & Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. **Interviews**Igor T., KGB officer, 15 May 1991, Dnipropetrovsk. Karlo A. Markov, 12 April 1992, Dnipropetrovsk State University. Mikhail Suvorov, 1 June 1991, Dnipropetrovsk. Natalia V. Bocharova, 15 March 1993, Dnipropetrovsk State University. Sergiy Tihipko, director of Privatbank in Dnipropetrovsk, 12 October 1993, Dnipropetrovsk. Yevhen D. Prudchenko and Halyna V. Smolenska, 18 July 2007, Central Library of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Dnipropetrovsk. Notes [1] I used also numerous interviews conducted with my relatives, who are ethnic Ukrainians, but live in Moscow, Russia, who still support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s anti-Ukrainian politics. [2] Sovnarkhoz is abbreviated from Russian Sovet narodnogo khoziaistva, an economic department in the Soviet government during the early Stalin era and during Khrushchev’s reforms.
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As with every election, partisans on one side will be far happier with the results than their opposites across the divide. Acknowledging that those in blue America have a renewed bounce in their step while those most committed to red America are downcast here two weeks later, let me suggest that the election aftermath holds considerable good news, regardless of specific winners and losers.
Assemblyman Carl DeMaio on CAGOP reform and future voter ID push
Assemblyman Carl DeMaio, one of the few Republicans reelected to the California legislature, is calling for significant reforms within the California Republican Party following major losses in the recent election.
Sorry, You’re Wrong About ‘Rivals’
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Reform UK losing support to Labour after ‘difficult year’, says Danny Kruger
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From culture war to class war: US Democrats ditch woke politics
The newly emboldened party shifts gears after its sweeping midterm election victory
Trump's handpicked party chair faces a rebellion as midterm losses challenge president's grip on GOP
A rebellion is forming against President Donald Trump’s handpicked chairman at the Republican National Committee.
Ilhan Omar Sets Major Party Record in 5th CD Rout
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Arizonans voted to isolate judges from politics, it’s not working
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UCHealth Notifies Individuals of Data Security Incident
Aurora, Colo. (November 13, 2026) – UCHealth, including its affiliated healthcare facilities (collectively “UCHealth”), is notifying individuals of a recent data security incident in which accounts were inappropriately accessed. On July 27, 2026, UCHealth discovered that an unauthorized third party gained access to two employee accounts in UCHealth’s Microsoft cloud system. As soon as this […]
Green Party Announces Results of 2026 Leadership Race
The Green Party holds its 2026 leadership results announcement in Ottawa. The event includes a tribute to outgoing party leader Elizabeth May, who delivers remarks, followed by guest speakers and the announcement of the party's new leader. The newly elected leader then delivers remarks. (no interpretation)
House Republicans’ middle is disappearing
Some are cautioning that they do not want to see their party further embrace the MAGA agenda after one of the party’s biggest wipeouts in decades.
Xbox Is Releasing Two First-Party Expansions In December 2026
Perhaps not such a quiet month after all
Commentary: Arkansas Republicans confront their party’s Trump dilemma after midterms
COMMENTARY: If you want to see the divide Republicans face on how to move forward after a midterm election that saw them suffer historic losses in Washington and around the country, look no further than Arkansas’ current and former GOP governors.
For peptide enthusiasts, a new HHS policy means party time
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Democratic group launches new push to shape AI agenda before 2028
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Swiping left over politics: Why some Gulf Coast singles won’t date across party lines
Politics is becoming a dating dealbreaker, and Southwest Florida matchmakers say more singles are swiping left over party lines.
The Era of Political Whiplash
This is from “Swamp Notes” on the Financial Times’ web page. To see this costs over $900 a year, which is beyond my own budget, so I thought I would copy it here for my substack readers. Rana Foroohar leads off and I follow. By Rana Foroohar: A recent piece in the Wall Street Journal announced that “a new political era appears to be taking hold from Paris, Texas to Paris, France. Voters are becoming less attached to the parties their parents voted for and more likely to try out new parties or new pitches, on the left and the right”. This put me in mind of a piece my colleague Gillian Tett wrote years ago about the “pick ‘n’ mix” generation of young people who take a bit of this and a bit of that from whatever political or cultural ideas they most like and blend it into a highly personalised ideological mix. Perhaps this accounts, at least in part, for the way in which voters in the midterm elections could express both concern about open borders and disdain for Donald Trump’s aggressive deportations and ICE tactics. Or the “horseshoe” phenomenon in which some Maga labour voters who had been labour-left Democrats pre-2016 swung back to their progressive roots once again. Whatever the reasons, politics have become more extreme. This raises the question of whether the blue wave we’ve just seen will be lasting or — just like the Maga phenomenon itself — something that will flip more quickly. My partner in the Swamp today is John Judis, an astute political analyst and commentator who recently wrote a piece for Compact looking at just this phenomenon. As he points out, ever since Democrats lost their traditional white working-class majority after 1968, there hasn’t really been a dominant party in this country. Since the 2014 election, power has changed in one of the two houses of Congress or the White House every biennial election. This is something that is mirrored in many parts of Europe now as well. Voters in France, Italy, Germany and the UK seem to swing as radically as — if not more so — than those in the US. And younger people are much more likely than older ones to identify as independent, which makes them more likely to shift with the political winds. What is this all about? I sometimes wonder if the high-speed media cycle has something to do with it. A public inundated with information expects political change and policy accomplishments on the same timeline as that on which they consume their digital media. It is always amazing to me how much credit and blame politicians get for things (debt, inflation, growth) that are the result of a multitude of factors that came well before they were in office and will continue regardless of what decisions they make. Perhaps this is simply the nature of democracy. But it leads to many unrealistic expectations about politics and the world. In any case, I’m interested in whether some of the big whiplash trends we saw in this election cycle will stick. It seems to me, for example, that the American South is likely to stay blue — or at least purple — for some time, given that the shift towards Democrats there is as much about growth as it is about dissatisfaction with Trump’s economic mismanagement. Younger, richer people tend to be more liberal — and the South is where they are moving and where trend growth is higher. On the other hand, I wonder if the Midwest could flip red again if Democrats aren’t able to convince working people they can do a better job than Republicans, particularly if you see a conservative candidate in 2028 who understands the economic reasons for populism. While I think that some union voters turned away from Trump because they felt betrayed, I believe most working people in the heartland are thinking about the kitchen table and the medicine cabinet and who can best help them pay for what’s on it or in it. Given that inflation tends to be sticky, it will be a tough task to bring down prices in a way that allows Democrats to take credit by 2028. I’m also curious about whether Europe or the US will be more politically volatile in the coming years. If measured by percentage point swings away from traditional parties, Europe wins on volatility over the last 15 years or so. Will that hold true in the future? John, you ponder these and many other pressing political questions in your Substack. What is your take on what the midterms and shifting voting patterns tell us about political volatility in the US? And what should we take from the recent populist swings in Europe? Where will things calm down first? Or won’t they? Recommended reading I’ve just finished Sherry Turkle’s book Artificial Intimacy: Who We Become When We Talk to Machines, which is well worth a read. This is the woman who first thought about how personal computers would change how we think; her warning about empathy becoming a pose in the age of artificial intelligence is cautionary. I did a Lunch with the FT years ago with her and it’s still one of my favourites. I couldn’t help but think about James Fallows’ extremely prescient New York Times magazine piece that came out on Thursday, about how the Trump administration has made air travel less safe, as I was sitting for hours the very next day on the Newark tarmac following the nationwide FAA ground stop. In the FT, I enjoyed Rob Armstrong’s dissection of midterms sartorial messaging, as well as Martin Sandbu’s conversation with economist Isabella Weber, whose new book Anti-Fascist Economics is worth a read as well. John Judis replies There were two things that contributed to the unexpected success of the Democrats in the midterm elections. The first was that longstanding trends towards the party, which can ebb and flow, cascaded in this election. Democrats have been acquiring centre-left majorities in urban-suburban metropolitan areas. That helps explain their victories in erstwhile red states like Texas, Georgia, North Carolina and even Kansas. Kansas is known as a farm state, but in the 2026 Senate vote 68 per cent of the electorate came from the Kansas City, Topeka and Wichita areas. Texas is 73 per cent urban and suburban. The Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston areas alone comprised 44 per cent of the electorate. Democrats have always been strong among urban voters, but in 2026 the party improved its percentage of the vote among suburban voters. These trends have not guaranteed Democratic victories because they have been countered by a shift to the Republican Party in small towns and rural areas. But in 2026, the urban and suburban voters predominated and many of the white rural and small-town Trump voters stayed home. The second factor was Republican complicity in Trump’s horrific presidency. The Iran war, the inflation caused by it, the arbitrary tariffs, the alleged corruption, ICE and deportations, racial redistricting, you name it. Trump and the Republicans’ conduct removed and reversed the large gains the party had made among Hispanic and Black voters. In House races in 2024, Republicans won the Latino male vote by 53 per cent to 45 per cent. In 2026, Democrats won them by 64 per cent to 35 per cent. Republicans won almost a quarter of votes among Black men in 2024 House elections; Democrats won Black men by 89 to 11 per cent in 2026. Combine that with increased Black and Hispanic turnout, including in rural areas, and you have Democratic victories in Mississippi, Texas and the Carolinas. Trump’s war in Iran and the rise in gasoline and diesel prices undermined Republican support in heavily-oil dependent states like Montana and Iowa. It wasn’t just the price of diesel for tractors or gasoline for pick-up trucks, it was also the cost of fertiliser. If not for the skyrocketing price of heating oil, Troy Jackson may not have unseated Susan Collins in Maine. If Trump had governed like he did during his first term — without “liberation day” tariffs or Middle Eastern wars — Democrats would probably have still gained House and Senate seats, but not to the degree they did. If Trump continues along the same course in his last two years, Democrats are very likely to solidify their majority in Congress and win the White House. Beyond that, as Trump leaves the stage, it is very possible that the parties will revert to the teeter-totter alternation in power that has characterised party politics for almost five decades. The parties are still demographically at about equal strength. Republicans should get back their edge in states whose economies are based on resource extraction. A state like Kansas is unlikely to turn blue. Each party will continue to have extreme wings — Republicans have Maga and the Democrats have police abolitionists and open borders advocates — that can potentially doom their chances at the polls. Voters will resent Republican tax breaks for the rich; they are also leery of Democrats’ social spending. But the havoc Trump has wrought may provide the Democrats an opportunity to create an advantage beyond 2028. From 1932 to 1980, Democrats benefited from being seen as the party of the common man (and woman) and Republicans as the party of the rich. Ronald Reagan and Trump challenged that perception. They conveyed an impression of the Republicans as the party of the average American and the Democrats as the party of the woke coastal elites. In his second term, Trump — with his Mar-a-Lago cronies and Silicon Valley ultra-wealthy — may have revived the older, and politically deadly, impression of the Republicans as the party of the callous rich. Democratic candidates, from Abdul El-Sayed on the left to Adam Hamilton in the centre, ran successfully against the GOP as the party of the “billionaire class”. In his second term, Trump may have also undone the Republican Party’s attempt to win its share of the Hispanic, Black male and young male vote. The Hispanic vote is particularly important to Republican efforts to win majorities nationally and in states like Texas. In California, Republican failure to win back Hispanic votes after a Republican-backed xenophobic initiative in 1994 doomed the party to permanent minority status. Could the same thing now happen outside California? Young voters have been trending strongly Democratic since the early 2000s, but Trump enjoyed particular success among young men, winning their vote by as much as 14 percentage points in 2024. In this month’s midterms, Democrats won 59 per cent of this demographic. Has Trump allowed Democrats to regain their hold over these voters? This is, admittedly, windy speculation. Great events — wars and the bursting of mega-investment bubbles (what could I be thinking of?) — can push politics off course. And in American politics, so much depends upon who holds the presidency and what he or she does with it. That’s the lesson of Trump’s second term and the reason why Democrats can look to the future with a more hopeful gaze than Republicans.
What’s next for Democrats after their Hegseth impeachment effort falters?
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Purplish: How the midterms could shake up Colorado politics
Colorado Republicans didn’t think things could get worse for them. During the midterms, they did, with Democrats flipping some congressional and statehouse seats.
Trump's handpicked party chair faces a rebellion as midterm losses challenge president's grip on GOP
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Chris Van Hollen to Challenge Chuck Schumer for Senate Majority Leader
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‘The Ass-Kicking We Needed’: A Loss in GOP Heartland Exposes a Party in Pieces
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Memory Politics in Dnipropetrovsk, 1991–2015
This is an excerpt from Ukraine’s Outpost: Dnipropetrovsk and the Russian-Ukrainian War. Free to download from E-International Relations. This chapter is the first scholarly study of memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk between 1991 and the 2013–2014 Euromaidan Revolution. The Russian-speaking city of Dnipropetrovsk has been traditionally viewed as pro-Russian while at the same time, results from elections over this period show a gradual but steady increase in the share of votes won by pro-European parties. Memory politics and de-Sovietisation played an important role in the decline of pro-Russian political forces in Dnipropetrovsk. In this chapter, historical memory is defined as the interaction of family and public memory. Family memory is transmitted mainly in the form of traditional stories and folklore from the older generation to youth, not necessarily within one family. This type of memory can be learnt from the experience of the older generation who are recognised as an authority by the recipient. Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work. Subscribe Pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian actors fashioned memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk. Each of them has its own vision of what constitutes memory. Those considered pro-Ukrainian were liberal and conservative while pro-Russian actors were nostalgic for the Tsarist Russian Empire and Soviet era. Scholarly research has analysed how each of the two groups interpreted three key historical periods: the Cossack era, Tsarist Russian Empire and Soviet Union. In analysing pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian memory politics it is important to bring in policies by state and local authorities. Scholarly Research on Memory Politics in Dnipropetrovsk Since 1991, memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk has been a neglected field of academic research. Despite the importance of Dnipropetrovsk to Soviet and Ukrainian politics, scholars have largely ignored the city and region, preferring instead to focus on the Lviv-Kyiv-Donetsk axis. Among the few exceptions is the collective monograph Historical memory of the Dnipropetrovsk region which includes a chapter devoted to memory politics undertaken by the regional authorities during the celebrations of the 75th and 80th anniversaries of the region, as well as the activities of institutions such as the Dmytro Yavornytskyy Dnipropetrovsk National Museum. Another chapter analysed the transformation of historical memory in the region through the development of historical and local lore (Svitlenko 2012, 344–427). An interesting analysis of different approaches to the problem of the emergence of the city was provided by Andrii and Tetiana Portnova (2015, 223–250). They outlined the main approaches to the founding of the city of Dnipropetrovsk within the ‘imperial’ paradigm, noting that typologically, celebration of the city’s 100th anniversary in 1878 and the city’s 200th anniversary in 1976 were very similar. Their theory is based on the idea of Russia’s civilising role for the region. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some historians in Dnipropetrovsk began to substantiate the idea of the emergence of the city from settlements in the Cossack era, an approach aimed at searching for a Ukrainian identity for the city. Memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk was analysed in Politics and Memory. Dnipro - Zaporizhzhya - Odesa - Kharkiv. From the 1990s to the present by several authors, including myself (Kasianov 2018, 20–21, 39, 54–56, 67–68, 78–79, 84–85, 87, 94–95, 100–101, 108–110, 133–135, 138–140, 202–219). This detailed study identified the main contours of memory policies undertaken by the authorities and public figures during historical events. The material on each of the cities is divided into sections, with authors analysing the ‘myths of the foundation,’ the Tsarist Russian Empire in memory politics and memory politics in the twentieth century. The study (Kasianov 2018) analyses competition between Cossack and imperial myths of Dnipropetrovsk’s emergence, uncertain perceptions in the nineteenth century and controversial approaches to events in Soviet history. The authors emphasise that controversy is inherent in all areas of Ukrainian memory politics, with a specific focus on the period after World War II when the city was closed to foreigners and became the centre of Soviet nuclear missile production. Textbooks on the history of the region describe the post-Soviet era as a period of prosperity. The second part of the study is devoted to analysis of public opinion polls conducted in 2013 and 2015 in several Ukrainian cities, including Dnipropetrovsk, which showed attitudes to Ukrainian history and memorialisation of history in public spaces. The study included several interviews with Dnipropetrovsk residents from different generations who outlined their perception of the city and memory politics. Researchers have found that the most dramatic historical event in the city is World War II. Perceptions of Historical Memory in Dnipropetrovsk To understand the mechanisms of memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk one must first analyse the perceptions of its residents about the history of their region. In general, there are two images of the past, Cossack and Tsarist Russian imperial with Soviet memory divided into several components. If we discuss oral traditions, the Cossack past continues to be developed through two types of legends, family through ancestors of Cossacks, and toponymic, through the origin of names associated with events or figures from the Cossack era. The Tsarist Russian imperial era is represented somewhat more broadly. There is also a living tradition; for example, legends about landlords and their influence (both negative and positive) on the life of a particular village. Memory politics of the Soviet era is very different in terms of how it is evaluated and very much dependent upon a family’s experience of the communist system. The key historical moments are in 1917–1921; the Holodomor, collectivisation, and political repression; and the Second World War. Memory politics of the post-Stalin era is divided into when the USSR was led by Nikita Khrushchev (1953–1964), Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) or Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991). Here, to a certain extent, we find a public perception that during the second half of the twentieth century there was a gradual improvement of standards of living, a myth of a ‘golden age’ in the 1970s and deterioration of living standards in the second half of the 1980s. Another approach to the interpretation of historical memory in Dnipropetrovsk is by dividing public opinion into on the one hand pro-Ukrainian (both conservative and liberal) and on the other, pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet. Despite the existence of certain differences within these two large groups (pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet), they are quite clear in how they identify themselves when discussing with the competing ‘Other.’ Now let us attempt to instrumentalise the history of these two groups. There is a certain consensus between them in recognising the Cossack era. At the same time, those with a pro-Ukrainian identity emphasise the place of Cossacks in their historical memory while those holding a more Imperial and Soviet identity typically display, with certain exceptions, an ignorance about them (which is discussed below). Interest in Cossacks had always existed in the region; Ukrainian Communist leader Petro Shelest had praised them in his 1970 book Ukrayina nasha radyanska (Ukraine. Our Soviet Land) for which he was accused of ‘national deviationism’ and removed two years later (Tillett 1975). It was not surprising that interest in Cossack history was revived in the late Gorbachev era during the uncovering of ‘blank spots’ in Ukrainian history. This came to the fore in 1990 during the 500th anniversary of the formation of Ukrainian Cossacks when Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhhya hosted events which gathered upwards of 20,000 people from the region and visitors, mainly from Western Ukraine and Kyiv. Rallies were held and a monument to a young Taras Shevchenko was unveiled. A striking event was the march by thousands of people along the central avenue of Dnipropetrovsk to the D. Yavornytskyy Museum and a rally at the end of the commemoration in the Taras Shevchenko Park. There were minor skirmishes in the city with Soviet veterans from the Afghanistan war who opposed the Ukrainian national revival. This commemoration not only revived and reclaimed the Cossack past, but also other national liberation struggles in 1917–1921 by the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and in the 1940s by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[1] Since the early 1990’s the Dnipropetrovsk region has registered 49 so-called ‘Cossack’ pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Cossack organisations. Most of them were interest clubs who occasionally gather a small number of their members and undertake respectable activities. Kodak Palanka of the Zaporizhzhyan Cossack Army, which stands out among the pro-Ukrainian organisations, regularly participates in the ‘Sokil-Yura’ regional competition, has defended a school playground from illegal construction, created a 400-strong Maidan self-defence group, and defended state buildings in Dnipropetrovsk in spring of 2014 from their take-over by Party of Regions and pro-Russian vigilantes.[2] The most successful pro-Russian Cossack organisation is the Ekaterinoslav Cossack District, ideologically based on the not so historically important Ekaterinoslav Cossack army which fought for the Tsarist Russian Empire. They strongly support the concept of the Russian World and have organised processions with the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine in honour of military victories by the Tsarist Russian Empire. They established a Cadet Corps for young Cossacks and organised visits by Cossacks from Russia. Since 2014, they have been not surprisingly inactive.[3] Cossack organisations in Dnipropetrovsk traditionally celebrate the Intercession, the Day of Remembrance of Hetman Ivan Sirko on 14 October. In 2000–2010, the Samarska Pokrova festival took place on the territory of the Old Samara fortress (located in the modern village of Shevchenko in Dnipropetrovsk). On 1–2 August, commemorations of Hetman Sirko are traditionally held at his gravesite in the village of Kapulivka. During celebrations prior to 2014, there were often conflicts between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Cossack organisations, with the latter supported by the authorities during Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency (2010–2014).[4] Competition Over Who Founded Dnipropetrovsk One of the important areas of conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet memory politics is the founding of the city of Dnipropetrovsk. The year 1776 was celebrated by the Soviet regime in the 1970s as a way of deliberately coinciding with the 70th anniversary of Brezhnev’s birth. This replaced the previously dominant date of the founding of Dnipropetrovsk during the visit of Tsarist Empress Catherine II in 1787 which was traditionally used by historiography as the city’s foundation year. Since the 1990s, attempts have been made to revise these Tsarist and Soviet dates and, more importantly the context by expanding discussion into the media. In the 1990s, the most prominent scholar who regularly addressed this topic was Yuriy Mitsik who argued that the history of the city should be dated earlier from the construction of the Cossack Kodak Fortress in 1635.[5] Discussion about the origins of the city of Dnipropetrovsk intensified following the 2004 Orange Revolution when several civic organisations and academic centres (e.g., Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Institute of Social Research), appealed to scholars and local historians to begin research into the Cossack era foundation of Dnipropetrovsk. Based on the monograph Palimpsest: settlements of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in the history of Dnipropetrovsk, they launched a public campaign to redefine the origins of Dnipropetrovsk by proposing 1645 as its founding year. Press conferences in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv, round tables, petitions to the city’s mayor, billboards on streets, and the unveiling of a memorial on the territory of Novyy Kodak were used to popularise the Ukrainian claim to having established the settlement of Dnipropetrovsk. The city authorities moved towards the Ukrainian claim to having founded Dnipropetrovsk through symbolically recognising the Cossack component of the history of Dnipropetrovsk by naming one of the streets in the centre of the city of Polovytska in honour of the settlement of Polovytsya established around 1743. Interestingly, the names of districts within Dnipropetrovsk, such as Mandrykivka, Diyivka, Kamyanka, and others are linked to Ukraine’s Cossack past. The biggest revival of Cossack historical names took place during the process of decommunisation in 2015–2018 which is analysed in the next chapter by Kocherhin (see Repan 2007).[6] Pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet memory politics on the founding of Dnipropetrovsk is weakly endowed with scholarly support; nevertheless, it was dominant among the city’s political elites prior to the 2014 crisis. The History of the City of Dnepropetrovsk, which was commissioned by the City’s Council, uses 1776 as the date of the founding of Dnipropetrovsk which influences the city’s annual Day of the City holiday and the celebration of other anniversaries. Even between 2014–2015, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, social advertising was embellished in the city centre with the foundation year of 1776 – supposedly to promote local unity in the face of the threat from foreign invasion (Bolebrukh 2006). At the heart of the pro-Russian Imperial approach is a thesis of the civilising influence of the Tsarist Russian Empire on the development of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Tsarina Catherine II and Prince Potemkin allegedly aimed to fashion Katerynoslav into the third capital of the Tsarist Russian Empire. In the 1990s, this thesis was used to justify the uniqueness of Dnipropetrovsk. The costumed characters of Tsarina Catherine II and her favourite courtiers participated in the Day of the City celebrations and were aired in television commercials. Local businessman Hennadiy Balashov named his chain of ‘Moskva’ shops after figures from the Tsarist Empire, such as Katerininsky, Potemkin, Orlovsky and others. These shops were part of the city landscape for a long period of time.[7] In 2005–2006, following the Orange Revolution, a heated debate broke out in the local media over the erection of new monuments. Attempts to erect monuments to Tsarina Catherine II were successful in several Ukrainian cities and in Dnipropetrovsk there was an initiative to install a monument to her next to the building of the Central Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The head of the Dnipropetrovsk state administration Yuriy Yekhanurov, appointed by President Viktor Yushchenko, was opposed to this proposal, arguing it represented homage to the Tsarist Empire and demanded an end to its construction. Supporters of the pro-Russian Imperial approach to memory politics actively promoted ‘St. Catherine’ by attempting to provide the Empress with a saintly image.[8] The importance of the mythology about Tsarina Catherine II was demonstrated during the 2012 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political technologist Konstantyn Zatulin, who was accompanied by a team of historians and a film crew from the Russian Kultura television channel to Dnipropetrovsk and other cities in Eastern-Southern Ukraine. The visit was to mark the 225th anniversary of the so-called ‘Great Journey’ of Tsarina Catherine II and to promote her memory as that of a ‘civilising mission’ into so-called ‘wild lands.’ The Party of Regions organised several supporting events in Dnipropetrovsk oblast library, promotions in the media, and presentations by Party of Regions deputy Oleh Tsarev (who in the 2014 crisis became a separatist leader). Subsequently published Russian media reports and pseudo-academic work by Russian historians were of low scholarly quality, primarily consisting of disinformation about the life of ‘Russians’ living in Dnipropetrovsk.[9] This view of ‘Russians’ inhabiting Eastern-Southern Ukraine had already been propagated by Putin in 2008 to a NATO audience.[10] Not all historic figures were unacceptable in the competition over the origins and identity of Dnipropetrovsk. Two historical figures, Dmytro Yavornytskyy and Olexandr Pol, were acceptable to pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet memory politics of Dnipropetrovsk. They were both represented in the public space with monuments. During the decommunisation process the central avenue of Dnipropetrovsk was renamed after Yavornytskyy while a large avenue on the right bank of the city was named after Pol. Besides a monument to him as a historian on Dnipropetrovsk’s central avenue the city’s Historical Museum also bears his name.[11] Yavornytskyy satisfied supporters of the pro-Ukrainian interpretation of Dnipropetrovsk history because he was a populariser of Cossacks, an archaeologist, and activist of the Ukrainian cultural organisation Prosvita. His work made him a legendary figure during his lifetime and following his death, positive memories were published of Yavornytskyy which were incorporated into the city’s folklore. Consequently, his legacy did not provoke opposition from civic groups. Pol’s memory was revived after it had been banned in the Soviet era. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pol was influential as a historian who imbued a self-confident identity to Dnipropetrovsk. Pol was traditionally supported by those holding a pro-Russian Imperial identity of Dnipropetrovsk because he was an aristocrat, had taken part in the Zemstvo movement, and actively lobbied for the construction of a railway through Ekaterinoslav which had assisted the development of the region’s metallurgical industry. At the same time, he was favourably received by those upholding a pro-Ukrainian identity of Dnipropetrovsk because he identified himself as a ‘Little Russian’ with Cossack ancestry and because he was interested in Ukrainian ethnography. Pol’s memory was revived through many newspaper articles, publication of a monograph and a popular scholarly book, opening of a monument to him near the City Council’s building, and the re-naming of a street after him. In 2020 on the initiative of Dnipro Mayor Boris Filatov his anniversary was honoured in official ceremonies (Kocherhin 2002; Platonov 2002). Ukrainian National Liberation Struggle in Dnipropetrovsk Memory Politics The 1917–1921 national liberation struggle was not actively debated in Dnipropetrovsk during the first two decades of Ukrainian independence. Dnipropetrovsk inherited street names which commemorated the Soviet interpretation of the ‘Russian civil war,’ such as the plaque on the Holovposhti (Main Post Office) which commemorated the Bolshevik victory against ‘counter-revolutionaries.’ Prior to, and especially since 2014, there have been attempts to rethink the 1917–1921 period of Ukrainian history. A crucifix was installed at the burial place of UNR soldiers on Zhovtnevyy (re-named Sobornyy) Square in the upper part of the city of Dnipro. Initially, the city authorities did not allow the installation of the crucifix memorial and dismantled it, but it was replaced by a stone cross unveiled by Mayor Filatov.[12] Other memorials to UNR officers installed by civic activists were unveiled in the villages of Dniprovokamyanka (Spyrydon Tropko) and Verkhnodniprovsk (Nykyfor Avramenko).[13] Reviving the memory of anarchist leader Nestor Makhno was less problematical. In the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhhya regions many legends about Makhno continued to persist with one of the most common being his mistress had lived ‘in our village.’ A memorial plaque was erected at the Ukrayina Hotel where Makhno established his headquarters during his occupation of Katerynoslav. A Makhno Public Bar also operates on a street in the centre of Dnipro. A monument to Makhno was erected in Nikopol.[14] Other ways in which historical memory has been revived is through the romanticisation of the 1917–1921 Ukrainian national revolution through the songs of the Dnipro Vertep (travelling drama theatre). The ‘ultras’ (football club extremists) of the Kryvyy Rih football club Kryvbas are fond of the UNR Hetman Kost Pestushko who was one of the most ardent anti-Bolshevik leaders in the Dnipropetrovsk region.[15] The Holodomor was denied by the Soviet regime until 1990. Knowledge about the Holodomor was revived during the Gorbachev era’s unveiling of blank spots in history and of course from 1991 in independent Ukraine. President Viktor Yushchenko devoted a good deal of attention to reviving memory of the Holodomor and mobilised an international campaign to persuade governments it constituted a genocide against Ukrainians. A memorial to the victims of the Holodomor in Dnipropetrovsk was unveiled in 2008.[16] Yanukovych’s presidency adopted a Russophile stance on the 1933 famine as an all-Soviet tragedy (not a Ukrainian genocide) leading to a decline in interest in the Holodomor by state institutions. In the public arena the Holodomor continued to be of interest to civic groups and scholars. Great Patriotic War and World War II In 2000–2010, the most heated discussions in memory politics dealt with the myth of the Great Patriotic War and OUN and UPA. Dnipropetrovsk had many Soviet memorial plaques and monuments upholding the Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War. Ukraine inherited celebrations of the Liberation Day of the city and Victory Day (9 May). The Party of Regions exported to Dnipropetrovsk the transformation in Putin’s Russia of the Great Patriotic War into a quasi-religious cult and promotion of the St. George ribbon. This was especially evident in the ‘Immortal Regiment’ of people marching on 9 May with portraits of Soviet heroes from their families; in reality, they were often teachers and state officials ordered to attend. In 2013, the cult of Victory Day was promoted by a huge injection of resources into the re-staging of the crossing of the Dnipro River in 1943 during the Great Patriotic War during which hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers died.[17] In May 2013, a march by pro-Ukrainian civic groups and activists was attacked by young vigilantes from a sports club funded by the Party of Regions.[18] Memory politics aimed at honouring the memory of OUN and UPA was systematic but slow. The Dnipropetrovsk branch of the Brotherhood of Soldiers of UPA had operated since the 1990s and public commemorations of UPA on 14 October were regularly held. Publications in the mass media and scholarly conferences devoted to the Ukrainian nationalist movement led to bitter debates in the city. Supporters of the pro-Ukrainian memory politics and nationalist groups publicised OUN and UPA through torchlight processions in Dnipropetrovsk. After 2014, ‘ultras,’ civic activists and patriots held portraits of OUN leader Stepan Bandera in marches to demonstrate their hostile attitudes to Putin and Russian military aggression against Ukraine.[19] Negative attitudes towards Ukrainian nationalism in response to Russian military aggression waned and since 2014 more Ukrainians have had a positive view of OUN and UPA (Oliinyk and Kuzio 2021, 831–832). An ethnic Russian fighting in Ukraine’s armed forces compared volunteers like himself with the volunteers who had joined OUN and UPA. Bandera had, Anatoliy Lebidyev believed, in the same manner as they were, defended their own land, seeing nationalism as ‘vaccine’ against genocide by Ukraine’s neighbours and believing that if there had been no nationalism in Western Ukraine there would have been ‘genocide’ against the local Ukrainian population (Reva 2020, 250). Jewish Life in Dnipropetrovsk Memory Politics The Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies ‘Tkuma’ and the Museum of the History of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine, both located in the city of Dnipro, were created, and headed by historian and author of school textbooks Ihor Shchupak (see the chapter by Ishchenko). They became a public platform which provided an opportunity for dialogue and presentation for supporters of both the liberal and conservative wings of pro-Ukrainian memory politics. Their premises were used by the Dnipro Historical Club[20] which regularly invited Ukrainian historians, such as Vladyslav Hrynevych, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, Ivan Patrylyak, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Paul R. Magocsi, Sergei Zhuk and Timothy Snyder. The contents of their lectures expanded discussed of Ukrainian history in the local media.[21] The museum’s exposition presented materials which demonstrated a moderate stance towards Ukrainian nationalism while seeking to advance understanding between Jews, who had no love for the USSR, and Ukrainian patriots. The exhibition included examples of cooperation between the OUN and Jewish community during World War II, participation of Ukrainian nationalists in the Holocaust, rescuing of Jews by Ukrainian nationalists and participation of Jews in the UPA. The museum exhibition presents far more than the Holocaust with visitors experiencing the Jewish world of Ukraine which preceded the Shoah. The museum does not attempt to show the history of the Jews in an unblemished manner, and they are represented as both victims and perpetrators. Ukrainians are similarly presented not as one homogenous group of murderers or patriots, but as either participant, indifferent to what is taking place around them, and rescuers in the Holocaust. It is noteworthy the museum’s exposition presents the tragedies of a broader number of peoples who include Armenians, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars who have also suffered genocides.[22] Euromaidan Revolution and Russian-Ukrainian War Historical debates over memory politics subsided during the Euromaidan Revolution. The exception was how the greeting ‘Glory to Ukraine! Glory to its heroes!’ became popular at that time. Dnipropetrovsk experienced its own Maidan which was savagely attacked by Party of Regions vigilantes in January 2014. After Yanukovych fled from office in February 2014, the situation in the city became precarious. At a time when there were demoralised and paralysed state structures, following the disintegration of the Party of Regions, the vacuum was filled by Euromaidan Revolution supporters and Ukrainian patriots. On a symbolic level, the removal of the large Vladimir Lenin monument in the central square of Dnipropetrovsk was an early symbolic victory. Its removal over eight hours was broadcast live by several local television channels.[23] St. George’s ribbons were worn by supporters of the anti-Maidan and Party of Regions vigilantes. Annual 9 May Victory Day celebrations often experienced fierce confrontations between those holding a pro-Russian Imperial and Soviet identity who insisted on the right to wear the St. George’s ribbon and those holding a pro-Ukrainian identity who interpreted the ribbon as a symbol of the Russian World and Russian military aggression against Ukraine. In 2015, after the adoption of four decommunisation laws, poppies dominated the public space in Dnipropetrovsk and a far smaller number of supporters of the Opposition Bloc (one of two successor parties to the Party of Regions) continued to wear the St. George ribbon. In 2017, and therefore beyond the scope of this chapter, Ukraine’s only exposition dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Museum of the ATO[24], was opened in Dnipro.[25] Conclusions In 1991–2015, memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk resembled that found on the national level, but with some local differences as memory politics in Dnipropetrovsk were often inconsistent and schizophrenic prior to the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko’s presidency officially promoted the Holodomorand a pantheon of heroes of Ukrainian nationalism. Yanukovych’s presidency attempted to undertake a counter-revolution against pro-Ukrainian memory politics and imported approaches to the 1933 famine and quasi-religious cult of the Great Patriotic War propagated in Putin’s Russia. Yanukovych and the Party of Regions built on pre-existing Soviet memory politics. Post-Soviet local elites in Dnipropetrovsk had tolerated the Cossack past of the region but strongly objected to memory politics of the UNR and especially OUN, which had operated a sizeable underground in the city during World War II. The only significant event which was firmly entrenched in the public space was the Holodomor because of support given by the central government coupled with a strong memory of the tragedy which had survived in local family history. Fundamental changes occurred in response to the victory of the Euromaidan Revolution, 2014 crisis and Russian military aggression. Prior to then there had been a gradual growth in pro-European and Ukrainian patriotism and those holding this identity came to power in 2014. This was ironically personified in Deputy Governor and (from 2015) Mayor Filatov, Governor Ihor Kolomoyskyy and Deputy Governor Hennadiy Korban, an ethnic Russian and two Jewish-Ukrainians respectively, leading the counter-offensive against pro-Russian forces and Russian military aggression. Their support made Dnipropetrovsk and Dnipro the most radical implementor of decommunisation in Eastern-Southern Ukraine. The roots of the gradual change in electoral sentiment and coming to power of pro-Ukrainian forces is to be found in the revision and de-Sovietising of identity and promotion of pro-Ukrainian memory politics which had taken place since 1991. Other important factors were a pluralistic approach to the Ukrainian past (unlike in neighbouring Donbas), diversity of activists and scholars working in the field of memory politics and official support given to a pro-Ukrainian identity by government institutions. Supporters of Soviet memory politics were clearly at a disadvantage during the bulk of the period from 1991–2013, except during Yanukovych’s presidency, and were completely defeated in 2014–2015. The smaller influence of pro-Russian memory politics is explained by two factors. Firstly, their activities were to a great extent inspired by external support through funding from the Russian World Foundation or the Donetsk-based Party of Regions, rather than from local support. Secondly, their activities most often relied on the support of state institutions (such as during Yanukovych’s presidency) or the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine — rather than from local civil society. References Bolebrukh, Anatoliy. ed., (2006). Istoriya mista Dnipropetrovska, Dnipropetrovsk: Grani. Kasianov, Heorhiy ed., (2018). Polityka i Pammyat. Dnipro - Zaporizhzhya - Odesa - Kharkiv. Vid 1990-x do syohodni, Lviv: FOP Shumylovych. Kocherhin, Ihor. (2002). Oleksandr Pol: mrii, spravy, spadshchyna, Dnipropetrovsk: NHA. Platonov, V. (2002). Chelovek-legenda: Aleksandr Pol, Dnipropetrovsk: Prospekt. Portnov, Andriy and Portnova, Tetiana. (2015). ‘The ‘Imperial’ and the ‘Cossack’ in the Semiotics of Ekaterinoslav-Dnipropetrovsk: The Controversies of the Foundation Myth,’ In: Igor Pilshchikov, ed., Urban Semiotics: The City as a Cultural- Historical Phenomenon, Tallinn: TLU Press, 223–250. Repan, Oleh. (2007). Valentyn Starostin and Olexandr Xarlan, Palimpsest poselennya XVI–XVIII st. v istoriyi Dnipropetrovska, Kyiv: Ukrayinski propiley. Svitlenko, Serhiy. eds., (2012). Istorychna pamyat Dnipropetrovshchyny, Dnipropetrovsk: Monolyt. Tillett, Lowell. (1975). ‘Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest,’ Slavic Review, 34, 4: 752–768.
Elections change politics overnight but not Oklahoma agriculture
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Saved by Trump: What Hegseth’s political survival means for Europe – European Council on Foreign Relations
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Delaplaine party will bring together Frederick’s photographer community
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New York senator Chuck Schumer expressed confidence that he would become the majority leader after the Democratic party gained at least 54 seats in the Senate during the midterm elections. Schumer's remarks came after Vermont senator Bernie Sanders announced he would not support Schumer for the leadership position. Sanders joins a growing list of Democratic senators who have said they will not support Schumer
Democrats' anxiety was already showing at 'What's Next?' confab
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11/10/2026: Supervisory Status and Health Care Rule Quirks
Union Electric Company D/B/a Ameren Missouri, 14-RM-394835 (Regional Election Decision) A Regional Director dismissed the Employer's petition after finding that Distribution System Operating Supervisors (DSOS) II are statutory supervisors under Section 2(11) of the NLRA, but not managerial employees. The Employer, an electric and gas utility, filed the petition after the Union demanded recognition for DSOS I and II positions. Because the DSOS II are supervisors excluded from the NLRA's protection, no election was ordered. The DSOS I position was not decided, since no one currently holds it, and ordering an election for a unit with zero employees would be contrary to Board policy. As a preliminary matter, the Union was precluded from litigating supervisory or managerial status because it filed its Statement of Position with the Region but did not serve it on the Employer by the deadline. The Regional Director still took evidence sufficient to decide unit appropriateness, as the Board's rules require. Supervisory status rested on the authority to assign. The DSOS prioritize work tickets, choose which Line Troubleman or Traveling Operator to send, pull employees off lower-priority jobs, hold employees past shift end, decide whether to call in crews and how large they should be, and handle sick call-outs, all without consulting anyone. Relying on Oakwood Healthcare and Entergy Mississippi, the Regional Director found this resembled utility dispatchers who used independent judgment in assigning employees to places. It did not matter that the record did not show who selects the specific employees who respond to a call-out. The Employer failed to prove responsible direction because nothing showed DSOS face adverse consequences for field employees' performance. The one Performance Improvement Plan involved a DSOS's own errors. The Employer also failed to prove discipline authority, since switching error forms merely report incidents and upper management decides whether discipline follows. The managerial claim failed because there was no evidence the DSOS formulate high-level employer policy. They exercise technical discretion, sit below Superintendents and a Manager, and are first-level supervisors. Significant Cases Cited Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006): Defined "assign" and "responsibly direct" under Section 2(11) and placed the burden of proving supervisory status on the party asserting it. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 367 NLRB No. 109 (2019): Held utility dispatchers were supervisors because they used independent judgment in prioritizing outages and assigning field employees. NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001): Established the three-part test for supervisory status under Section 2(11). NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980): Described managerial employees as those who formulate and effectuate management policies and are aligned with management. Ikea Distribution Services, Inc., 370 NLRB No. 109 (2021): Affirmed preclusion of issues for a late-served Statement of Position while confirming the Regional Director must still determine unit appropriateness. NLRB Edge is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Subscribe Prime Healthcare Services – St. Michael’s, LLC D/B/a Saint Michael’s Medical Center, 22-RC-392696 (Regional Election Decision) The Regional Director dismissed a petition seeking an Armour-Globe self-determination election for two full-time radiation therapists at a Newark hospital. The union wanted the therapists to vote on joining its existing nonconforming unit of registered nurses, nurse anesthetists, and technical employees. The Regional Director found the union had not shown the therapists could appropriately be added to that unit under the Board's Health Care Rule and the community-of-interest factors. The Regional Director first explained that the Health Care Rule does not categorically bar an Armour-Globe election in a partially organized hospital with existing nonconforming units. Under St. Vincent Charity Medical Center, such an election does not create a new unit and so does not offend the Rule's concern with unit proliferation. The petitioner still bears the burden of showing the group is identifiable and distinct and shares a community of interest with the existing unit. The therapists were an identifiable, distinct group because they do identical work in the same department under the same managers. On community of interest, the evidence was mostly unfavorable to the union. The therapists work in the Cancer Center alongside unit nurses but have separate supervision (apart from occasional coverage), separate break areas, and distinct equipment and functions. Their contact with nurses is limited to routine patient handoffs, and they do not interact with or fill in for technical employees such as radiology technicians. The Regional Director found some overlap in certifications and training, which might tip the scale on those factors, but the union did not establish common terms and conditions. The Regional Director added that shared benefits or work rules would not suffice given separate supervision, no interchange, and physical separation. The decisive problem was the Health Care Rule's classifications. The therapists are professionals who fall within the Rule's "all other professionals" category. The parties' contract expressly excludes "all other professionals," and the union's attempt at hearing to classify some respiratory therapists as professionals contradicted that contract. Adding the therapists would create yet another nonconforming grouping and leave other unrepresented professionals in that category. A separate therapist-only unit would also be inappropriate because the record shows other unrepresented professional employees. A unit of all unrepresented employees in that category may be appropriate. Significant Cases Cited St. Vincent Charity Medical Center, 357 NLRB 854 (2011): An Armour-Globe election in an acute care hospital does not violate the Health Care Rule because it adds employees to an existing unit rather than creating a new one. Rush University Medical Center v. NLRB, 833 F.3d 202 (D.C. Cir. 2016): Section 103.30(c) of the Health Care Rule applies only to petitions for additional units, not to Armour-Globe elections adding employees to an existing unit. Warner-Lambert Co., 298 NLRB 993 (1990): A self-determination election requires that the employees share a community of interest with the existing unit and form an identifiable, distinct segment constituting an appropriate voting group. United Operations, Inc., 338 NLRB 123 (2002): Sets out the community-of-interest factors, and common supervision alone does not require inclusion in one unit absent interchange, contact, or functional integration. Wheatland Electric Cooperative, Inc., 375 NLRB No. 16 (2026): Functional integration requires that positions depend on one another to accomplish their tasks, and minor differences between groups should not be given too much weight.
Did Israelis Prove the World Wrong About Their Politics?
Israeli President Isaac Herzog has passed the baton to Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot, tasking him with forming Israel’s next government. Meanwhile, last Tuesday, the newly elected 120-member Knesset was sworn in without incident. Leaks and speculation had suggested the worst, including that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might attack Iran to delay the swearing-in ceremony. […]
This Isn’t the First Time Texans Have Revolted Against the Ruling Party
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Online sportsbooks bet $136 million on state politics during 2026 midterms
DraftKings, FanDuel, and a handful of other online sportsbooks spent at least $136 million on state elections during the 2026 election cycle, making the industry a dominant force in down-ballot races. The industry spent the money across 36 states, promoting a ballot initiative and supporting or opposing 948 candidates for state legislature, governor, attorney general, secretary of state, comptroller, school superintendent, and other statewide and local offices. The money was funneled through a complex network of state political action committees (PACs), state super PACs, federal super PACs, leadership PACs, trade groups, state party committees, national party committees, and other vehicles. Popular Information catalogued the full scope of the online sportsbook industry’s political spending by searching data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The totality of the industry’s efforts to influence the 2026 midterm elections has not been previously reported. The money was used to support candidates who, in many cases, were willing to assist the industry in its efforts to legalize online sports betting in states where it is still banned, add online casino gambling in states where sports betting is already legal, thwart proposals to raise taxes on online gambling revenue, defeat proposals to ban prop bets, and undermine emerging competitors. Most of the cash was provided by the two dominant players, with DraftKings directly contributing $56.2 million and FanDuel kicking in $41.8 million. The bulk of the money, over $80 million, was first donated to Win for America, a federal super PAC. Win for America distributed nearly all of its cash to two other federal super PACs, $56.5 million to American Conservative Fund, which supports Republican candidates, and $20.2 million to American Future, which supports Democratic candidates. Although American Conservative Fund and American Future are federal committees, they spent their money supporting state candidates with independent expenditures. Their federal campaign finance filings, however, provided almost no information about which candidates the PACs supported, listing the spending under vague categories like “non-federal” media production and placement. Both FanDuel and DraftKings donated more through the Sports Betting Alliance, the trade organization for online sportsbooks that spent another $21.7 million on state politics. The precise contributions of each company to the group are not disclosed. Popular Information has, for the first time, traced this spending — along with other direct and indirect online sportsbook spending — to specific states and candidates. How was this money spent? In Pennsylvania, for example, State Senator Chris Gebhard (R) played a key role in removing a proposed tax increase on online sports betting, which would have funded investments in public transit, from the state budget. The Sports Betting Alliance spent a relatively small amount of money, less than $20,000, running ads on Meta thanking Gebhard for his efforts. As the election neared, however, the spending exponentially increased while the involvement and agenda of online sportsbooks were obscured. Win for Pennsylvania, a group that was 100% funded by the Win for America subsidiary American Conservative Fund, spent $654,835 on broadcast TV ads supporting Gebhard and attacking his Republican primary opponent, Clovis Crane. Win for Pennsylvania does not break down its spending by candidate, but Popular Information was able to determine its spending in Gebhard’s race through filings with the FCC by television affiliates. The pro-Gebhard television ads funded by Win for Pennsylvania did not mention his positions on online sports betting but praised Gebhard for supporting President Trump, deporting immigrants, and building a border wall. The anti-Crane ads attacked Crane over alleged DUI charges. Win for Pennsylvania also spent as much as $99,000 on dozens of online ads on Meta and Google platforms promoting Gebhard and attacking Crane. One ad attacked Crane for voting “against President Trump and our America First agenda“ in Republican primaries that Crane, then a registered independent, was not eligible to vote in. None of them mentioned gambling. The more than $700,000 Win for Pennsylvania spent promoting Gebhard and attacking Crane substantially exceeded the total amount raised in the primary by Crane’s campaign, about $550,000. Gebhard romped to a primary win, beating Crane by 35 points. Outlays during the 2026 midterms represent a dramatic increase in the scope and breadth of political spending by online sportsbooks. In the 2024 election cycle, almost all industry spending was devoted to supporting a ballot initiative in Missouri to legalize online sports betting. Online sportsbooks spent about $4 million supporting state-level candidates during the 2024 cycle. During the 2026 midterms, that figure increased to $107 million — a 25-fold increase. Armed with this cash, online sportsbooks secured key policy wins in some states. In other instances, the industry came up short of its ultimate goal but was nevertheless able to demonstrate its political influence. Today’s newsletter involved collecting and analyzing thousands of campaign finance records from the FEC, FCC, IRS, and all 50 states. The information you just read in minutes is the product of weeks of painstaking work. You can support independent, fact-based accountability journalism by upgrading to a paid subscription. Subscribe Enriching politicians in the Empire State In New York, FanDuel and DraftKings funded a state super PAC called New York Future. During the 2026 midterms, New York Future spent $8 million on independent expenditures supporting or opposing 27 candidates. Among the beneficiaries was State Senator Joseph P. Addabbo Jr. (D), who chairs the Senate’s gambling committee. New York Future spent over $125,000 backing Addabbo’s campaign. The ads highlighted Addabbo’s positions on guns, anti-hate crime legislation, and domestic violence. They did not mention gambling. Addabbo authored legislation banning “sweepstakes” casinos, which is a key priority of online sportsbooks because they compete with traditional gambling. (Sweepstakes casinos attempt to evade traditional gambling regulations through a scheme that involves packaging play money with other tokens that can be redeemed for cash.) Addabbo also sponsored a bill legalizing online casino games, a key priority for online sportsbooks that would like to expand their operations to include traditional casino games like slot machines and blackjack. When the State Assembly passed a bill restricting advertising by online sportsbooks, Addabbo did not bring it up for consideration. Bills banning online sportsbooks from sending push notifications, requiring online sportsbooks to set default spending limits, and restricting bets from college campuses also died in committee. In 2025, Addabbo also co-hosted a seven-episode podcast series, “Place Your Bets, New York,” on gambling co-sponsored by the Sports Betting Alliance. (Addabbo did not list any compensation for hosting the podcast in his financial disclosure report. Income of $1,000 or less from a single source is not required to be reported.) Online sportsbooks also spent $1.2 million supporting New York Governor Kathy Hochul (D) through another state super PAC, Greater Empire State. When Addabbo’s sweepstakes casino bill passed the legislature, Hochul signed it into law. Betting on the Buckeye State In Ohio, Representative Brian Stewart (R), the chairman of the House Finance Committee, was heavily backed by the online sportsbook industry. Stewart presented a budget that dropped the governor’s plan to double the state tax on sportsbooks and forcefully opposed Governor Mike DeWine’s proposal to ban prop bets. The ads by Win for America’s American Conservative Fund promoted Stewart as an “America First Conservative” who “championed historic property tax reform” and supported law enforcement. They did not mention his positions on gambling. Stewart won his primary election over Republican challenger Patty Hamilton by a 17-point margin and prevailed easily in the general election. The precise amount that the online sportsbook industry spent in Ohio in support of Stewart and other industry-friendly politicians through Election Day is unknown because American Conservative Fund appears to be out of compliance with state campaign finance law. Ohio law requires federal super PACs, each time the PAC files with the FEC, to also file with the Ohio Secretary of State, “an itemized list of the contributions, expenditures, and independent expenditures made in connection with state and local elections in Ohio.” American Conservative Fund registered with the Ohio Secretary of State on March 9, 2026. (The organization misspelled its name as “AMERCIAN CONSERVATIVE FUND.”) But, according to the Ohio Secretary of State website, American Conservative Fund (using both the correct and incorrect spelling) has not filed any reports, despite filing with the FEC on April 15, July 15, and October 15. In response to a request for comment, a spokesperson for Win for America told Popular Information, “Win for America and its allied PACs take compliance with state laws seriously. In Ohio, ACF [American Conservative Fund] followed the guidance of the Secretary of State, which can be found here.” That guidance, however, merely restates Ohio law and requires a state filing with each FEC report. Asked for clarification, the spokesperson responded, “All required docs were filed.” A review of data from the FCC, Meta, and Google reveals that Win for America, through American Conservative Fund, spent at least $2.3 million to influence Ohio state elections. Dollars for the Old Dominion State In Virginia, the state’s more permissive campaign finance laws allowed the Sports Betting Alliance to donate nearly $4 million directly to state candidates and committees. A bill to allow online casino games, which would allow the online sportsbooks to expand their offerings, initially was rejected by the Virginia House by a vote of 46-49 on February 17. Virginia House Speaker Don Scott (D), whose campaign and leadership PAC received $625,000 from the Sports Betting Alliance in 2025, then called a recess. When the House voted again, 25 Democrats switched their vote and the online casino bill passed by a vote of 67-30. In the Virginia Senate, a version of the bill passed the chamber in February after five Republicans bucked their party and supported the legislation. Four months later, as first reported by the Poole Report, all five Republicans received $100,000 each from the Sports Betting Alliance, the largest donation any of the senators had ever received. Because there were differences between the House and Senate bills, a conference committee was created. The bill ultimately failed to become law when the conferees were unable to resolve their differences.
Trump pulls Vance from Iran talks, saying 'we don't need a deal'
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Times Union's Dan Clark discusses how gains made by Working Families Party will impact NY politics
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